By , January 10, 2023.

Below is the full text of the Sixth Annual Donald C. Brace Memorial Lecture presented by former U.S. Register of Copyrights Barbara A. Ringer on March 26, 1976, titled “Copyright in the 1980’s.” Copyright in the lecture was expressly disclaimed by the author.

I wanted to make the lecture available here for two reasons.

First, I think Ringer’s remarks are both historically compelling and still relevant today. Less than a month before Ringer delivered her lecture, the Senate passed S. 22 by a vote of 97-0—a bill that would completely rewrite U.S. copyright law, both in form and in substance. But by this point, Congress was 15 years into the effort to revise copyright law (over 20 years if you start counting when Congress directed the Copyright Office to produce a series of copyright law revision studies that would serve as the foundations for the effort). Several times, this effort came close to being derailed over contentious issues. So it’s understandable that Ringer couches her remarks with uncertainty over the fate of the revision effort, even in the face of a unanimous Senate vote.

But Congress would finally succeed this time. Two weeks after Ringer’s remarks, given in front of the Copyright Society of New York, the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice would begin markup of S.22, leading to President Gerald Ford signing the bill into law October 19, 1976.

The difference between the new and old laws cannot be overstated. But the influence of Ringer on the revised act is often understated. Ringer served in the U.S. Copyright Office during the entire two decade revision effort, the last several years as Register of Copyrights (securing that role only after prevailing in federal court on sex and race discrimination claims after being passed over for a less-qualified man). Anecdotally, Ringer has been credited with drafting at least “75%” of the Act’s text, an enormous undertaking that involved balancing the equities of numerous, competing interests; rationalizing complex and technical language over a sprawling, comprehensive Act; and keeping a keen eye toward an unknown future to craft a law capable of maintaining its coherence during rapid technological changes.

So her observations about where copyright law will go in the decade following the new copyright act are especially instructive, born out of her experience shepherding the revision effort. Her lecture touches upon themes Ringer had spoken about previously (such as in her 1974 article, The Demonology of Copyright)—the fragile state of individual authors, the degrading effects of technological progress, and both the promise and shortcomings of the current revision effort for authors and society.

My second motivation for making the lecture available here is because, despite its public domain status, the only freely accessible version I could find online is a low-quality scan made available through ERIC, which is difficult to read in parts.1https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED126906.pdf. I have done my best to transcribe the text accurately and apologize for any errors. I have also added footnotes (judiciously, I hope) to provide additional context where appropriate or helpful.

Copyright in the 1980’s

By Barbara Ringer*

*Register of Copyrights. The views of the author are personal and are not intended to reflect any official positions of the Copyright Office or of the Library of Congress. No copyright is claimed in this lecture.

When Paul Gitlin2Among other things, Gitlin, a pioneering literary agent, co-wrote a 1963 Practicing Law Institute monograph titled “Copyrights” with Ringer. called to invite me to deliver the Sixth Donald C. Brace Memorial Lecture, he did me more honor than he knew. Donald Clifford Brace was a truly outstanding publisher, who brought to the American public the works of some of the greatest English authors of the Twentieth Century. Among them is the single writer whose works and voice and life have spoken to me more directly than that of any other: George Orwell.

In 1946 Orwell wrote to his agent, Leonard Moore:

You mentioned in your last letter something about giving Harcourt Brace an option on future books. It’s a bit premature as I have no book in preparation yet, but I should think Harcourt Brace would be the people to tie up with, as they had the courage to publish Animal Farm. But of course they may well be put off the idea if the book flops in the USA, as it well may. I am not sure whether one can count on the American public grasping what it is about. You may remember that [a certain publisher] had been asking me for some years for a manuscript, but when I sent the MS of AF in 1944 they returned it, saying shortly that “it was impossible to sell animal stories in the USA.” . . . . So I suppose it might be worth indicating on the dust-jacket of the American edition what the book is about. However, Harcourt Brace would be the best judges of that.

Harcourt Brace did, in fact, go on to publish Orwell’s next work, one whose literary and historical significance, and whose ultimate social influence, cannot be exaggerated. The title of Orwell’s work, “1984” has become a symbol and, I fear, a political slogan of exactly the kind he was attacking in the book. The popularity of the title as a catch phrase has obscured and distorted the meaning of the work itself. Orwell, who was dying when the novel was published in 1949, cast his story in terms of the utmost pessimism, but his intention was the opposite of despair. “1984” is a kind of hymn to what Erich Fromm has called the very roots of Occidental culture: the spirit of humanism and dignity. Most of all it is a warning that the values on which our culture is based—of individualism, idealism, and free expression—are in the most immediate possible danger, not from any particular ideology or political system, but simply from the juggernaut of technology. Orwell was powerfully and desperately trying to warn us of the new barbarism just around the corner, of “the new form of managerial industrialism in which,” to quote Fromm’s trenchant essay, “man builds machines which act like men and develops men who act like machines”— of “an era of dehumanization and complete alienation, in which men are transformed into things and become appendices to the process of production and consumption.”

For publishing this book, and for publishing George Orwell at all, Donald Brace deserves to be thanked and honored. The message Orwell was seeking to convey affected the lives and actions of some members of my generation very profoundly. And yet today, less than eight years from the date Orwell chose as his particular doomsday—when everything he predicted is coming true, and not just in other countries—we accept these horrors as inevitable or even acceptable, and spend most of our time looking for personal anodynes.

When he first called to ask me about making this lecture, Paul Gitlin had just seen a piece I wrote for the Centennial Issue of the Library Journal titled “Copyright and the Future Condition of Authorship.” He said he found the tone of my essay pessimistic, and he rather implied that I might do well to make this lecture a little more up-beat. As I told him, my own feeling is not one of despair, and I certainly have no wish to plunge anyone into a blue funk over what is happening to copyright and the condition of authorship. But in copyright, which is the particular field I am called upon to plow, I do believe that people should be made to recognize the dangers and to realize that there is still a chance to do something toward averting them.

I am making these remarks at a time that may prove to be a major turning point in the history of American copyright law. In February the bill for general revision of the copyright law, which has been pending in Congress for nearly 12 years, passed the Senate unanimously by a vote of 97 to nothing. Progress in the House of Representatives has been slow, and I see enormous difficulties in the months ahead, but I still believe it is safe to predict enactment of the bill this year. If I am wrong, if the efforts to reform the present copyright statute of 1909 have to continue into the 1980’s in the face of on-rushing technological change, I am afraid the picture I am painting will be much darker and bleaker than I anticipate.

I prefer to look on the brighter side. I base my analysis of copyright in the 1980’s on the assumption that S. 22 of the 94th Congress will be in effect before the start of that decade, and that the impact of its changes will already have been felt. These changes will certainly lay the basis for the conditions of authorship and the dissemination of authors’ works during the last quarter of this century.

When I began to frame the outline of this lecture I first thought I would take the specific provisions of S. 22 and project them into the 1980’s, in an attempt to analyze how they should work out in practice. It did not take me long to realize that this approach would be both too difficult and too easy: too difficult because of the amount of complex detail and imponderabilia involved, and too easy because it is always simpler to analyze the trees and ignore the forest and the surrounding terrain. Instead, and with considerable misgivings, I will try to take the trends I see working upon and through the domestic revision bill—and in international copyright—and to project what may emerge from them in the next decade. I will try to deal with these trends under four general headings:

1) The nature of copyrightable works and the methods of their dissemination;

2) The nature of rights in copyrightable works;

3) The situation of individual authors; and

4) The role of the state in copyright and authorship.

The nature of copyrightable works and the methods of their dissemination

I believe, with Orwell, that mankind is changing the world through technology and that technology in its turn is changing mankind into technological beings. Where does this leave the creative individual and his ability to present his ideas and creations to others?

It seems almost superfluous to observe that the technological revolution in communications is a pivotal event in the history of mankind and that its full impact has not yet been felt. Among the plethora of electronic marvels now arrayed for our use, there are those that are merely transitory toys and gadgets, but there are others that seem to some people to have god-like qualities. It is certain that, amid all the electronics and advertising, the quality of human life is changing, and that the real impact of the change has not yet been felt.

Anyone who sits down and thinks about what has happened to mass communications since 1909 can come up with quite a list. Silent and later sound motion pictures; radio and later television and still later cable and pay-television; computers and their ability to assimilate, generate, and manipulate limitless amounts of information; satellites and their potential for reaching and linking everyone on earth; sound recordings and later audio and video tape recordings; photocopying and microreprography; and automation in the composition and reproduction of printed matter. This certainly does not exhaust the list, and many of these developments combine and interact, providing nationwide and worldwide networks for quick or instantaneous dissemination of what passes for information and entertainment. And there is evidently no end to this process: a satellite is already making direct transmissions into individual receiving sets in India;3I believe this is a reference to the Satellite Instructional Television Experiment. holography is beginning to lose its mystery; and lasers are being used for all sorts of things: for data storage, for communications channels into homes, and as part of commercial video disk players soon to enter the consumer marketplace.

On the face of it, all this opens tremendous new channels for creative endeavor and new ways of reaching huge audiences of readers, and viewers, and listeners, and information seekers. Like the invention of movable type and of painting techniques and musical instruments during the Renaissance, technology is bringing a whole new breed of creators into the communications arts. It is also allowing traditional creators to fix their works permanently and literally to get them into the hands of anyone who wishes to see or hear them. The 90’s should see some startling developments in one-way, two-way, and unlimited wireless communications.

Despite the cynicism and alienation that we see everywhere today, most people still welcome each technological “advance” as some sort of miracle and rush to buy and use it for purposes that, if pressed, they might have trouble articulating. Yet, unless I misjudge the signs, there is a growing realization that all this machinery has done less than nothing to improve human life, and the more voracious our craving for technological advance, the more individual people suffer. Instead of fostering perfection in the arts and the creation of masterpieces, the communications revolution has already maimed a number of traditional forms of expression and is destroying our standards, our ability, and our desire to judge our own culture.

I remember someone predicting a few years ago that, if the present trends continue, by the end of the century we will have a great many more birds than we have now, but that they will almost all be either pigeons and starlings. I have the same feeling about the effect of technology on copyright: a great many more works are going to be copyrighted in 1986 than in 1976, but their intrinsic value will continue to decline.

I believe that the courts and the Congress will continue to expand the subject matter protected by copyright and to cover the new uses of copyrighted works made possible by the expanding technology. But if the effect of this limitless expansion is to destroy incentives to truly creative work, to substitute remuneration for inspiration, and to make great creative works compete unequally with vastly increased quantities of trash and propaganda, we will have lost much more than we have gained.

The nature of rights in copyrightable works

Throughout the whole range of national and international copyright regimes since 1950, a single concept insistently recurs: it is usually called compulsory licensing, although in its various guises it may be referred to as “obligatory,” “statutory,” “legal” or “agreed” licensing. Characteristically, it is offered as a compromise to copyright controversies in two situations: where technology has created new uses for which the author’s exclusive rights have not been clearly established, and where technology has made old licensing methods for established rights ponderous or inefficient.

Under a typical compulsory licensing scheme, the author loses the right to control the use of his work, and cannot grant anyone an exclusive license for a certain specified purpose. Instead, his work is lumped with thousands or millions of other works, and the author also becomes a unit in a large collective system under which blanket royalties are received and distributed. The government is involved in operating the system, and the individuality of both authors and works tends to be lost. Authors may be paid well for the use of their works, but their participation in the system is, by definition, compulsory rather than voluntary.

It may come as a shock to realize that S. 22, as it now stands, contains four full-fledged compulsory licenses involving rate-making by a Government tribunal. A separate piece of legislation, which will be pushed very hard in the House, raises the possibility of a fifth, and others may emerge before the bill is finally enacted. As we go into the 1980’s, copyright is becoming less the exclusive right of the author and more a system under which the author is insured some remuneration but is deprived of control over the use to which his words are put.

In 1908, Congress was confronted with a peculiar dilemma of either giving exclusive rights to musical copyright owners, and thereby allowing the creation of what they referred to as a giant music trust, or of withholding these rights and thereby causing a great injustice to creators. Congress devised what, to my knowledge—and I have never been challenged on this statement—is the first compulsory license in history, section 1(e) of the present law. There may well have been intellectual antecedents to this under specific court decisions or in private, blanket licensing arrangements; but, as far as statutory, across-the-board, arrangements are concerned, I believe that the copyright royalty for sound recordings was the first compulsory license in the world.

It was copied almost immediately in the copyright statutes of other countries, in the same context of mechanical royalties for recording music. The situation as it evolved in the statute meant that a two-cent limit was imposed on the amount of royalties a copyright owner could get for having a song recorded. Once the owner of the copyright in a musical composition licensed his work for recording, everyone else had a right to make a recording by paying two cents per song per record. This is still the law, all these years later, and it is getting on towards 70 years now.

It would seem, on the basis of a great deal of experience, that this compulsory license is as firmly rooted in our copyright law as anything can be. I suspect that, by the time S. 22 is enacted into law, the two-cent rate will have been raised somewhat, but it is probably too late to raise any philosophical questions about compulsory licensing in this context. Indeed, the trend is exactly the reverse: to expand the concept of compulsory licensing into every new form of use of copyrighted works created by changes in communications technology. This seems certain to be true in the case of jukebox performances and cable television transmissions.

The cable issue, in particular, has been the reef on which copyright law revision foundered for seven years. In 1967, the House Subcommittee, confronted by this new and highly controversial issue, tried as forthrightly as possible to solve the problem through a rather simple form of compulsory license, and without imposing the heavy hand of government regulation. This effort was doomed to failure. The reason was that no one knew what the liability of cable systems was under the law, as construed in 1967. They do now: the Supreme Court has twice held in favor of cable and against exclusive rights under the copyright statute.

Cable became a roaring issue in 1967 and, as a result, when the House passed the bill, the whole cable provision was simply wiped away and the problem was passed to the Senate.

The Senate, in turn, evolved a whole new concept of protection for cable uses of copyrighted works which rested upon a compulsory license and added a new and very significant institution, a copyright royalty tribunal. This new device, which was inevitable when the House approach of 1967 failed, would create a government-associated body empowered to make decisions with respect to the practical running of the compulsory licensing system. Rates would be subject to review by this tribunal and decisions would be made with respect to the distribution of fees.

All three of these compulsory licenses—the so-called mechanical royalty, the jukebox compulsory license, and the compulsory license for cable television—seem certain to be enacted in some form. All three are very deeply rooted in the bill, and they are all related, in one way or another, to a copyright royalty tribunal that would be involved in rate-making and in the distribution of fees.

In 1969, the Senate Subcommittee added a fourth compulsory license for the performance of sound recordings. This turned out to be one of the most controversial provisions in the bill. It was knocked out in the Senate in September of 1974 and has not yet been reintroduced. Interestingly, for a generation or more the organized musicians turned their back on copyright protection and sought to protect their interests through collective bargaining and a controversial trust-fund device. Now, in a complete turnabout, the whole AFL-CIO has joined with the record industry in a concerted effort to enact a copyright law establishing a royalty for the performance of sound recordings in radio and other media. Of course, this is being fought vigorously by the broadcasting industry, and the fight will probably go right down to the House floor, promising a dramatic confrontation.

I am supporting this proposal in principle because I think it is unfair that individual performers have rarely received any of the benefits from the great technological developments that have, to a large extent, actually wiped out their profession. Fairness indicates that it is wrong that they not get paid for performances of their works, and I believe that sooner or later this right will be recognized under some form of compulsory licensing.4As of the time of publishing, performers in the US do not have a general public performance right for their sound recordings. A bill introduced in the 117th Congress, the American Music Fairness Act (H.R. 4130), would have created a right of performance publicly by means of an audio transmission and is the latest in a long line of legislative attempts to remedy the issue raised by Ringer above. Congress did grant an exclusive right for public performance by digital audio transmissions in 1995, and, in line with Ringer’s prediction, created a statutory license covering certain types of transmissions.

When this provision was in the bill the public broadcasters said, “Well, for heaven’s sake, if all these commercial interests are going to get something like this compulsory license, why shouldn’t we? We public broadcasters are not paying any copyright royalties now, but we recognize that we should. But, even if we have to pay something, we cannot put ourselves in the position of having to get individual clearances for all the music we play, all the graphic works that we show on the screen, and all of the literary works that we read over public radio and on the tube.”

They took their problems to Senator Mathias and apparently made a persuasive case, because we now have a new Section 118 in the bill as it passed the Senate. It would create a rather amorphous compulsory license for the public broadcasting of musical compositions, nondramatic literary works, and pictorial, graphic and sculptural works. It would leave to the proposed royalty tribunal the problem of setting the terms, rates, and the entire mechanism for running the compulsory license.

I am opposed to this provision, and particularly its impact on the whole range of nondramatic literary works.5The Copyright Office as a whole shared this view of the proposed amendment. The Office published a Public Broadcasting Report in May 1980 as provided by the 1976 Copyright Act that details the background and legislative history of the proposal along with voluntary licensing agreements for the use of nondramatic literary works by public broadcasters in the wake of the 76 Act. At the same time, I am aware of the vast political power of public broadcasters, and I think the chances of facing compulsory licensing in this area in the 1980’s are better than ever.

What we have seen demonstrated in the evolution of these five compulsory licensing schemes, and others that seem to be right around the corner, is a kind of inexorable historical process.

  • First you have a copyright law that was written at a particular point in the development of communications technology, and without much foresight.
  • Then you have technological developments, which create whole new areas for the creation and use of copyrighted works.
  • Business investments are made and industries begin to develop.
  • The law is ambiguous in allocating rights and liabilities, so no one pays any royalties.
  • A point is reached where the courts simply stop expanding the copyright law and say that only Congress can solve the problem by legislation.
  • You go to Congress, but you find that you have hundreds of special interests lobbying for or against the expansion of rights, and the legislative task is horrendous.
  • So Congress, looking for a compromise, turns to compulsory licensing. On its face, a compulsory licensing system looks fair to each side: the author and copyright owner get paid, but the user, who has made a strong argument that what he is doing represents the public interest, cannot be prevented from using the work.

We have reached the point where any new rights under the copyright law apparently cannot be exclusive rights. If a new technological development makes new forms of exploitation possible, compulsory licensing seems to offer the only solution. This is happening in the United States and it is happening just as much internationally. Compulsory licensing systems represent key provisions in the 1971 revisions of both the Berne and Universal Copyright Conventions, and in recent copyright laws in other countries.

Before the present program for general revision of the copyright law began in 1955, the United States had endeavored successfully to develop an international convention which would provide multilateral copyright relations between Western Hemisphere countries and the European countries members of the Berne Convention. The result was the Universal Copyright Convention, which was signed in Geneva in 1952 and came into effect in 1955.

In its origins the Universal Copyright Convention was considered a low-level transitional treaty which would dry up and blow away as more and more of its members accepted the principles of the Berne Convention. The confident assumption twenty-five years ago was not only that the level of protection reached at the Brussels revision of the Berne Convention in 1948 constituted the norm in international copyright, but that even its relatively high level of protection would continue to rise and expand.

These expectations, have proved false, for at least three interrelated reasons:

  • First, the technological revolution in communications and the compulsory licensing demands that it has spawned in practically all countries.
  • Second, the needs of developing countries. At crucial conferences in Stockholm in 1967 and Paris in 1971 the developing countries made a persuasive case for an international copyright system that gives them ready access to the materials they need to combat illiteracy, provide educational and scientific and technical information for their peoples at prices they can afford to pay. Whether the 1971 revisions of the two conventions have achieved this goal as a practical matter remains to be seen.
  • The concessions made in the Paris revisions of both the UCC and Berne Convention, in a general sense, are an attempt to preserve the principles of copyright in the face of the needs of states with limited resources, confronted with difficult and pressing development choices in allocating their expenditures. In this light, the Paris revisions looked towards greater interdependence and cooperative trading relationships within the world copyright community. Whether this approach is realistic in an increasingly inflationary world economy is far from certain.
  • Third, the impact of socialist legal thinking. The adherence by the USSR to the 1952 text of the UCC, effective on May 27, 1973, was a dramatic illustration of a trend already apparent in international copyright.

The situation of individual authors

All of these forces seem to be combining throughout the world to substitute compulsory licensing and various forms of state control for exclusive copyright control, and to substitute remuneration for voluntary licensing arrangements. Individual authors, standing alone, are helpless to protect themselves in a situation like this. Ironically, in order to preserve their own independence as authors, they will inevitably be forced to unite in collective bargaining organizations, and to allow their representatives to speak for them.

Authorship, by which I include all kinds of creative endeavor, is in an extraordinary state of flux. For some two hundred years, from the end of the patronage system in the late 17th Century to the emergence of the new technology in the beginning of the 20th Century, authors enjoyed something like a direct one-to-one relationship with their readers through their publishers. This relationship has ceased to exist entirely in some creative fields, and is fast disappearing in others. Authors are losing their ability to speak directly to readers, listeners and viewers, and must now deal with increasing hordes of middle-men who control the communications media or the access to them. In this situation it is quite possible to envision the mergence of societies in which there is little individual or independent authorship; most creative work would be done as part of collective endeavors, merged together anonymously, and whatever individual writing remains would be done under the patronage and control of the state.

Copyright is obviously caught up in a social tidal wave. In trying to preserve independent, free, authorship as a natural resource, one must be aware of the changes that are taking place and cautious about the methods adopted and deal with them. Some ideas that are put forward as solutions to practical problems of copyright clearance and access to information may turn out to be more destructive to our society than the problems they are supposed to solve.

I confess that at this point I come to the first of two dilemmas in my present thinking about the next 20 years—questions that I consider of immense importance but to which I can see no clear-cut answers. The first is what individual authors can do to protect themselves from this onslaught of technology. We have already reached a turning point in several areas, and are fast approaching it in others, where the individual creator simply cannot assure himself of fair remuneration for the use of his works unless he joins a collective organization of some sort. ASCAP and BMI are examples of one sort of collective organization in which authors pool their copyrights but maintain some degree of individual ownership and control over their use. The other most common type of organization is a trade union, which represents its members as employees and bargains for them on a collective basis.

There is, quite obviously, a loss of independence in both cases, and for some authors and for some types of work this may prove an intolerable sacrifice. But what are the alternatives? A continuing alliance with publishers or equivalent middle-men in which the individual author’s voice cannot be heard? Direct government control over licensing? Direct government patronage?

These are the questions that will inevitable have to be faced and answered in the 1980’s, and I find it astonishing that so far there is very little awareness or discussion of them. The discussion should be undertaken by the authors and creators themselves, not by lawyers or government types like me, and not by publishers or film producers or information industry representatives. But a movement toward clearinghouse arrangements and collective licensing has already started, and unless the implications and alternatives are carefully examined, patterns may become established that authors will soon find themselves powerless to change.

The role of the state in copyright and authorship

The most critical question arising from all of these trends involves the role that government will play in the operation of the copyright systems of the 1980’s. In the United States that role is clearly expanding. It seems inevitable that the government will shortly be involved in setting regulatory standards and royalty rates, in settling disputes over distribution of statutory royalties, and in establishing means by which individual authors organize for the payment of royalties. How far this process is allowed to go, and how irreversible it is allowed to become, will depend on decisions that must be taken in the immediate future.

My second dilemma thus involves the Copyright Office and what is to become of it. Recognizing what happens whenever bureaucratic nature is allowed to take its course, I feel that the office must resist the lure of embracing new regulatory powers over copyright licensing which could easily grow into government control over the conditions of authorship. Yet, I feel just as strongly that the Copyright Office cannot simply walk away from the problem, leaving it to other would-be government regulators or communicators or patrons to fill the vacuum. The decisions on this question, whatever they are, must be taken in full realization of the dangers facing independent authorship in the next decade, and in full determination to surmount them.

References

References
1 https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED126906.pdf.
2 Among other things, Gitlin, a pioneering literary agent, co-wrote a 1963 Practicing Law Institute monograph titled “Copyrights” with Ringer.
3 I believe this is a reference to the Satellite Instructional Television Experiment.
4 As of the time of publishing, performers in the US do not have a general public performance right for their sound recordings. A bill introduced in the 117th Congress, the American Music Fairness Act (H.R. 4130), would have created a right of performance publicly by means of an audio transmission and is the latest in a long line of legislative attempts to remedy the issue raised by Ringer above. Congress did grant an exclusive right for public performance by digital audio transmissions in 1995, and, in line with Ringer’s prediction, created a statutory license covering certain types of transmissions.
5 The Copyright Office as a whole shared this view of the proposed amendment. The Office published a Public Broadcasting Report in May 1980 as provided by the 1976 Copyright Act that details the background and legislative history of the proposal along with voluntary licensing agreements for the use of nondramatic literary works by public broadcasters in the wake of the 76 Act.
By , August 16, 2017.

On August 18, 1787, James Madison proposed to the Constitutional Convention what would become Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution, granting Congress the authority to make copyright (and patent) laws. To mark 230 years since that occasion, I’m posting the text of a brief talk I gave during the Center for Protection of Intellectual Property’s fourth annual fall conference October 2016 (video of the talk available here). The text is mildly edited for style, since I talk less grammatically correct than I write.


Lawyers rely on history a lot in practice. Common law itself is built on history—we rely on precedent—and when we are interpreting statutory and constitutional provisions, we’ll often turn to history to find insights and help us guide our interpretation.

But, of course, there’s always a danger with using history. Someone who’s trying to make a point may try to find evidence in the historical record to support that point, so there’s a danger of abuse. And perhaps there’s no period more prone to this type of myth and mischief then the Founding period, the period beginning after the end of the Revolutionary War, through the drafting and ratification of the Constitution, and through the first Congress. Because this is when the Constitution was drafted, so a lot of people discussing hot-button topics will try to look at the historical record from the Founding era to find some support for the positions that they are advancing.

And that’s true for copyright law as well, because the constitution does authorize Congress to enact copyright legislation—as well as patent legislation in the same clause, but I’ll be focusing here on copyright (though there is some overlap).

One of the unfortunate trends that a few people have observed is that supporters of a more minimalist copyright, of drawing back the current scope of copyright protection and enforcement, have been trying to advance this narrative that the Founding Fathers would be appalled if they looked at copyright law today, that they intended something completely different from what we see in the statute and in practice.

For example, a few years ago the Electronic Frontier Foundation wrote an article in response to some comments, saying, “Don’t be so sure you’ve got the Founders on your side.” They said, “We suspect that if anyone had described today’s copyright system to, say, Thomas Jefferson, he would have been shocked.”1Mitch Stoltz, EFF, “Looking Deeper into MPAA’s Copyright Agenda” (June 17, 2013).

Instead they advance this alternate narrative, which goes something like this: the Founders conceived copyright for a very narrow utilitarian purpose; authors’ interests aren’t at the central part of this equation; and they are only given protections begrudgingly through a narrow government privilege in order to advance this narrow utilitarian purpose.

The problem is when I look at the historical record that we have in front of us, I don’t see a lot of evidence for this view. Instead, I see evidence for something different about what the Founders intended.

Very briefly, I think it’s good to get some context of the timeline we’re looking at here before delving into the details. The Revolutionary War ends, and the Continental Congress is put together. Around the early 1780s, a number of authors started asking the states to pass copyright legislation. Chief among them was Noah Webster, whose dictionary bears his name, and he was lobbying a number of state legislatures to pass copyright legislation, along with others like John Ledyard, who petitioned the Connecticut General Assembly.2William Patry, Copyright Law and Practice (1994). In 1783, Connecticut was the first of the states to pass its own copyright legislation.3Copyright Office, Copyright Enactments, 1783-1973 (1973).

Around that same time, the great poet Joel Barlow petitioned the Continental Congress to—while they didn’t have the authority to pass copyright laws on their own—recommend to the remaining states to pass their own copyright laws.4Letter from Joel Barlow to the Continental Congress (1783), Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-1900), eds L. Bently & M. Kretschmer, www.copyrighthistory.org. The Continental Congress agreed, they passed this resolution, and eventually twelve out of the thirteen states did pass their own copyright laws.5Copyright Enactments. Delaware was the only state to fail to pass a copyright bill before the drafting of the federal constitution.

That brings us to the drafting of the Constitution. By August 6 during the Constitutional Convention, there was a first draft.6Madison Notes on the Debates in the Federal Convention, August 6, Avalon Project. It did not mention copyright or patent law in it, but in the middle of August, James Madison proposed that Congress does have the power to pass copyright and patent legislation, and that was added without debate—or without controversy—and sent to the Committee on Style, which came up with the language that we see today in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8.7Patry.

So why did they include copyright? Why did the Founding Fathers think copyright was important enough both at the state level and eventually to be given to the federal congress in order to enact? I think we could get some idea if we turn to the proponents who were pushing for copyright. When Noah Webster wrote a letter to one of the Connecticut representatives in favor of passing copyright legislation, he said, “America must be as independent in literature as in politics, and as famous for arts as for arms.”8Oren Bracha, Commentary on the Connecticut Copyright Statute 1783, in Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-1900), (2008). citing Noah Webster, Letters of Noah Webster ed. H.R. Warfel (New York: Literary Publishers, 1953), 1-4. In the same fashion, Joel Barlow, when he wrote to the delegates of the Confederate Congress, said, “America has convinced the world of her importance in a political and military line by the wisdom energy and ardor for liberty which distinguish the present era. A literary reputation is necessary in order to complete her national character. And she ought to encourage that variety and independence of genius in which she is not excelled by any nation in Europe.”9Letter from Joel Barlow.

So they thought this was important for the country as a whole, to complete its national character, and set it on equal stage among its international brethren. And how did they propose doing this? Here let’s look at Thomas Paine, who was very influential in the ideas of the American Revolution and the ensuing country. He wrote in 1782, around the same time, that “the state of literature in America must one day become a subject of legislative consideration, for hitherto it has been a disinterested volunteer in the service of the Revolution, and no man thought of profits. But when peace shall give time and opportunity for study, the country will deprive itself of the honor and service of letters in the improvement of science unless sufficient laws are made to prevent depradations of literary property.”10Paine, On the Affairs of North America: In Which the Mistakes in the Abbe’s Account of the Revolution of Amreica [sic] are Corrected and Cleared Up (1782).

So the idea was that we’ll give property rights to authors, we’ll create a market for these types of expressive and cultural works, and this will induce people to create these types of great works for the benefit of the public.

Property, of course, was central to the Founding Fathers in general. John Adams famously said, “Property must be secured, or liberty cannot exist.”11Discourses on Davila : A Series of Papers on Political History first published in the Gazette of the United States (1790-1791). Property was really important, and they saw copyright as a type of property. By giving authors these exclusive rights, it enabled this marketplace for creative works. This is consistent with other things you hear. When the Continental Congress recommended to the states, the Committee that made that recommendation said they were “persuaded that nothing is more properly a man’s own than the fruit of his study and that the protection and security of literary property would greatly tend to encourage genius, to promote useful discoveries, and to the general extension of arts and commerce.” You’ll see this elsewhere, where they talked a lot about how this property regime would encourage the types of works that they thought would really benefit culture and the nation as a whole.

Which is curious, because if you do see proponents of weaker copyright protections or more minimal copyright protections, they’ll sometimes say they don’t see a lot of “property talk” in the Founding era12See, e.g., Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs: The Rise of Intellectual Property and How it Threatens Creativity (2003).—which is just not evidenced by the historical record. Or they might recognize that, yes, they talked about property, but this was property in the sense of a statutory creation. It was a utilitarian instrument created in order to advance these goals, it wasn’t something that came from the natural rights of the authors.

But again, I don’t see a lot of evidence in the historical record for this. As noted in the passage above from the Continental Congress, the Founders explicitly mentioned natural rights.

And indeed, you’ll see a lot of other references to natural rights as the source of this property for authors. For example, the Massachusetts Copyright Act, which was passed before the Constitutional Convention, said that “the principal encouragement such persons can have to make great and beneficial exertions of this nature must exist in the legal security of the fruits of their study and industry to themselves and as such security is one of the natural rights of all men there being no property more peculiarly a man’s own than that which is produced by the labor of his mind.”13Copyright Enactments. Over half of the states that passed copyright legislation included such an explicit reference to natural rights as the source of these property rights.14Those states were Connecticut, Georgia, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina, New York, and Rhode Island.

I think one of the things that underlies this alternative historical narrative used by supporters of weaker copyright is this fallacy that the interests of authors—and authors rights—is somehow distinct from the interests of the public; that we stick one on each end of a scale, and if authors’ rights are too strong then the public’s interest suffers. But I don’t think this is the case. It seems more accurate to say that authors interests and the public’s interests are interrelated and mutually reinforcing. And I think you could see, looking back at the Founding generation, that this is consistent with how they saw property.

This is an idea that was most famously put by Adam Smith, who a lot of the Founders were familiar with.15See, e.g., Robert L. Hetzel, The Relevance of Adam Smith. He famously said that “it’s not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we can expect our dinner but from their regards to their own interests. By directing that industry in such a manner that produces of greatest value he intends only his own gain and he is in this as in many other cases led by an invisible hand to promote an end that was no part of his intention.”16Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations. So, in other words, the promotion of the public interest is inherent to the pursuit of self-interest and not something that is external to it.

If we look then to the Founding generation, there is one single reference to the copyright and patent clause in the Federalist Papers, Federalist 43, which was written by James Madison. It’s very brief, but one of the few things that James Madison mentioned about the copyright and patent power is that “the public good fully coincides in both cases with the claims of individuals”. He’s basically echoing Adam Smith’s sentiment here that private interest is what drives the public interest.

This is not an obsolete idea. We saw this recently in Eldred v Ashcroft, a Supreme Court case decided in 2003.17537 US 186. Justice Breyer had made in his dissent this balance argument consistent with what other copyright minimalists might make, and the majority responded to Justice Breyer in a footnote saying, “Justice Breyer’s assertion that copyright statutes must serve public and not private ends misses the mark. The two ends are not mutually exclusive… copyright law serves public ends by providing individuals with incentives to pursue private ends.”

Or, to put it bluntly, society benefits when creators get paid. The private right that copyright secures is what advances the public’s interest in new expressive works.

I think looking back at this historical record—and I don’t want to draw too strong conclusions, especially in such a brief essay—but I think we could say that maybe the Founding Fathers wouldn’t be so shocked if they looked at the copyright law today. They would see that it is rather consistent with the ideas that they had in mind when they were creating the copyright and patent power. I think especially if they looked at the success of US creative industries and copyright industries today—Hollywood, the record industry, the publishing industry—all these creative contributions to our economy and culture,18In 2015, the core copyright industries contributed $1.2 trillion to U.S. G.D.P. and employed over 5.5 million U.S. workers. Stephen Siwek, IIPA, Copyright Industries in the U.S. Economy: The 2016 Report (2016). I think they would feel validated that their approach has led to what they intended it to lead to.

References

References
1 Mitch Stoltz, EFF, “Looking Deeper into MPAA’s Copyright Agenda” (June 17, 2013).
2 William Patry, Copyright Law and Practice (1994).
3 Copyright Office, Copyright Enactments, 1783-1973 (1973).
4 Letter from Joel Barlow to the Continental Congress (1783), Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-1900), eds L. Bently & M. Kretschmer, www.copyrighthistory.org.
5 Copyright Enactments. Delaware was the only state to fail to pass a copyright bill before the drafting of the federal constitution.
6 Madison Notes on the Debates in the Federal Convention, August 6, Avalon Project.
7 Patry.
8 Oren Bracha, Commentary on the Connecticut Copyright Statute 1783, in Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-1900), (2008). citing Noah Webster, Letters of Noah Webster ed. H.R. Warfel (New York: Literary Publishers, 1953), 1-4.
9 Letter from Joel Barlow.
10 Paine, On the Affairs of North America: In Which the Mistakes in the Abbe’s Account of the Revolution of Amreica [sic] are Corrected and Cleared Up (1782).
11 Discourses on Davila : A Series of Papers on Political History first published in the Gazette of the United States (1790-1791).
12 See, e.g., Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs: The Rise of Intellectual Property and How it Threatens Creativity (2003).
13 Copyright Enactments.
14 Those states were Connecticut, Georgia, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina, New York, and Rhode Island.
15 See, e.g., Robert L. Hetzel, The Relevance of Adam Smith.
16 Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations.
17 537 US 186.
18 In 2015, the core copyright industries contributed $1.2 trillion to U.S. G.D.P. and employed over 5.5 million U.S. workers. Stephen Siwek, IIPA, Copyright Industries in the U.S. Economy: The 2016 Report (2016).
By , May 11, 2017.

The United States is somewhat of an outlier among nations in that the US Copyright Office is located within the Library of Congress. In many countries, the agency charged with copyright governance is located within a cultural agency, while others place it within a unified intellectual property agency.

This uncommon arrangement has been brought into focus recently with the passing of H.R. 1695, the Register of Copyrights Selection and Accountability Act, in the House on April 26 by a vote of 378-48 (an identical bill, S. 1010, was introduced in the Senate May 2). The bill would make the head of the Copyright Office, currently appointed solely by the Librarian of Congress, appointed by the President with the Advice and Consent of the Senate. House Judiciary Committee Chairman Goodlatte described it as the first step toward overall modernization of the Copyright Office and is being considered separately given the current lack of a permanent Register. 1A little over four years ago, then Register of Copyrights Maria Pallante testified to Congress about the need for a wholesale review of the Copyright Act. As part of that review, she said “evolving the Copyright Office should be a major goal of the next great copyright act. In short, it is difficult to see how a 21st century copyright law could function well without a 21st century agency.” Pallante expanded on her thoughts during the annual Meyer Lecture later that year, giving a talk on the Next Generation Copyright Office: What it and What it Means. The public record developed considerably since then, with Congress turning its attention to it several times. The House Judiciary Committee devoted an entire hearing to the Copyright Office’s functions and resources in February 2015 and most of the hearing on the Register’s Perspective on Copyright Review in April that same year, but it was also discussed by the House IP Subcommittee in September 2014, the House Administration Committee in December 2015, and budget hearings in the House and Senate Legislative Branch Appropriations Subcommittees in early 2015. Representatives Marino (R-PA) and Chu (D-CA) introduced a discussion draft of the Copyright Office for the Digital Economy Act (CODE Act) in June 2015. The bill provided for Copyright Office autonomy over its IT, staff, and budget, and included elevating the Register to a Presidential appointee confirmed by the Senate. The bill was formally introduced in the 114th Congress in December 2015 and reintroduced in the 115th Congress this past February. House Judiciary Committee Chairman Goodlatte and Ranking Member Conyers released a policy proposal on Copyright Office modernization in December 2016 for public comment. The proposal outlined an approach similar to the one taken in the CODE Act, including making the Register a Presidential Appointee. The Senate Judiciary Committee indicated that it was also working on draft legislation to address Copyright Office modernization.

In support of the bill, many have referred to the Copyright Office’s location within the Library of Congress as an accident of history. But I wanted to look more closely at the process that led to the present situation and see what, if any, conclusions we could draw as to Congress’s motivation regarding this historical accident.

Legislative History

As recounted elsewhere, the Office’s creation within the Library of Congress is the result of efforts by former Librarian Ainsworth Spofford beginning in the 1870s to centralize copyright deposits within the Library—the idea was to use these deposit copies, required under the current copyright act to perfect title to copyright, to build the Library’s collections for free. He got his wishes, but the plan worked a little too well. Within two years, Spofford was raising concerns about the “large amount of clerical labor” involved in maintaining the copyright department and how quickly the deposits were taking up the available space for the Library.2Annual Report of the Librarian of Congress, year ended December 1, 1872, pp. 6-7.

A big part of the problem was lack of space—the Library at that time was housed in the US Capitol building, which was starting to burst at its seams. Congress approved construction of a new building to house the Library in 1886, which would take eleven years to complete. As the construction of the building, which is today named the Thomas Jefferson Building, neared completion, it appears that Congress became sufficiently interested in reassessing the issue of Library management.

In anticipation of the new building, Congress instructed Spofford to report on the complete reorganization of the Library. Spofford provided a special report in response on December 3, 1895 to the Committee on the Library. In it, Spofford called for “The appointment of a suitably qualified register of copyrights, who should be a bonded officer, to have charge of the entire business of copyrights and of the clerical force employed therein.”

Beginning shortly afterward, a number of bills focusing on the “business of copyrights” were introduced. Vermont Senator Justin Morrill introduced S. 425 on December 5, 1895,328 Cong. Rec. 41 (Dec. 5, 1895). and Alabama Representative John Bankhead introduced H.R. 1243 five days later.428 Cong. Rec. 134 (Dec. 10, 1895). Both bills would create a Register of Copyrights to be appointed by the Joint Committee on the Library, a Congressional committee made of both Representatives and Senators that supervised the operation of the Library.

Rep. William Treloar, a one-term Missouri representative and songwriter, introduced his own bill February 13, 1896 with marked similarities to H.R. 1695. His bill, H.R. 5976, would have, among other things, created the position of “commissioner of copyrights, to be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, who shall, under the supervision of the Joint Committee on the Library, perform all the duties relating to copyrights which have heretofore by law been imposed upon the Library of Congress.”

Morrill’s bill was reported by the Committee on the Library on February 20, 1896.528 Cong. Rec. 1959. The House of Representatives Committee on Patents held a hearing March 19 that included discussion of Treloar’s bill, but the bill would not move any further forward.

Morrill’s bill would, however. S. 425 was reported by the Committee on the Library on February 20, 1896.628 Cong. Rec. 1959. On May 8 that year, the bill was brought up on the floor of the Senate. It was passed over because, as Senator Cockrell said,”It will lead to discussion.”728 Cong. Rec. 4695.

It would indeed.

Robust discussion began when the bill was attached to a conference report on an omnibus appropriations bill (H.R. 9643) regarding the constitutionality of the Register’s appointment by a Congressional committee.8See 29 Cong. Rec. 316 (Dec. 19, 1896) (remarks of Mr. Quigg). The discussion continued when, on May 21, 1896, the Senate took up the conference report.9See 28 Cong. Rec. 5496-5507 (May 21, 1896). The bill and its Constitutional issues were discussed again in the House at the end of December right before the Christmas recess, but without resolving the issue.1029 Cong. Rec. 314-319 (Dec. 19, 1896).

Something changed over the recess. On January 20, 1897, an amendment was offered in the Senate by the Appropriations Committee that would make the Librarian a Presidential appointee with the authority to appoint the Register of Copyrights. The Senate agreed to the amendment.1129 Cong. Rec. 975 (Jan. 20, 1897).

A conference report was agreed to by the Senate on February 15,12See 29 Cong. Rec. 1832-33. and the House two days later.13See 29 Cong. Rec. 1945-47 (Feb. 17, 1897). After another two days, the appropriations bill was enacted into law.14Act of February 19, 1897, 54th Cong., 2d Sess., 29 Stat. 545.

A look at the discussions surrounding this legislative process reveals a number of conclusions.

The distinct missions of the Library and Copyright Office

First, the general sense of those most directly involved in creating the Copyright Office was that its function was distinct from the Library of Congress and its placement within was merely a matter of happenstance. This view was expressed (perhaps surprisingly) by the man responsible for bringing “the copyright business” within the Library in the first place—Spofford.

In his special report to Congress discussed above, Spofford noted that “The Librarian is charged by law with two wholly distinct functions—one as Librarian of Congress, the other as register of copyrights.” After describing in detail these functions, Spofford reported:

Six months ago he suggested to the accounting officers of the Treasury Department his purpose to urge upon the attention of Congress the importance of separating the functions of register of copyrights from those of the Librarian of Congress, with a view to promptitude and efficiency of service. The same recommendation is made in the annual report of the Auditor, and is enforced by many considerations of much weight. The appointment of a suitably qualified register of copyrights, who should be a bonded officer, to have charge of the entire business of copyrights and of the clerical force employed therein, would relieve the Librarian of an immense bureau of detail, and enable him to devote his energies to the tasks immediately belonging to Library interests.

Spofford wanted nothing to do with the copyright business. Congressional records reveal that in 1896, “Mr. Spofford told the joint committee that he had repeatedly asked to be relieved from the control of this copyright business. It interfered with his duties as a librarian. He urged the joint committee in drawing up its bill to see to it that the Librarian was relieved from all copyright duties.”1529 Cong. Rec. 385 (Dec. 21, 1896) (remarks of Mr. Cummings).

Spofford also appeared to support a Presidentially appointed Register of Copyrights, such as the one proposed by Treloar in his bill. The House of Representatives Committee on Patents held a hearing on the bill March 19. Appearing before the Committee was Alexander Browne, on behalf of the Music Publishers’ Association of the United States. Browne noted that the proposed commissioner of copyrights was supported by Spofford. 16Treloar himself noted in a letter after introduction of the bill that the “creation and maintenance of a Copyright Department…has the approval of…the Librarian of Congress.” Letter from Representative William M. Treloar, to J.N. Johnson, Esq., Sec’y, Am. Copyright League (Feb. 20, 1896), as quoted in Zvi Rosen, “The Twilight of the Opera Pirates: A Prehistory of the Right of Public Performance for Musical Compositions,” 24 Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal, 1157, 1180 (2007). He remarked,

Mr. Treloar’s bill begins with a proposed enactment, represented in the title and the first seven sections, of a separate department, under the charge of a Commissioner of Copyrights. I was very glad to hear Mr. Spofford favor that. We know the difficulties that Mr. Spofford has labored under for many years; and all I need say on that subject is that my clients, all of them, heartily indorse that measure and the form in which it is presented.

The bill advanced no further, largely because of opposition to other substantive provisions in the bill unrelated to the Copyright Office.17See Rosen, above. One contemporary account noted these controversies but said of the Copyright Office proposal just that it would “be dealt with more effectively in a separate bill.” Scientific American, “A New Copyright Bill“, pg 179 (March 21, 1896).

Senate Committee on Patents Chairman Platt made the same point during Congressional proceedings, saying,

This man [the register of copyrights], too, is pretty far removed from the Library. It is only by a very thin, elastic, and well-stretched cord that he is connected with the Library at all. The duties of this person regarding copyrights are taken entirely away from the Librarian, and so far as he is register of copyrights, he has no connection with the Library. 1828 Cong. Rec. 5496-97.

Constitutional Questions

Far and away the biggest debate over the formation of the Copyright Office had to do with Constitutional questions arising over who could appoint the register of copyrights (though these discussions ran parallel with similar discussions over appointment of the Librarian of Congress).

The disagreement hinged primarily on the characterization of the register. Supporters of appointment by the Joint Committee argued that the Library was a Congressional body, and Congress absolutely had the authority to select and appoint its own employees and officers. Opponents of that process argued that a register of copyrights would be a legal or executive official, meaning appointment was dictated by the Constitution’s Appointments Clause. 19U.S. Constitution, Article 2, Section 2 states the President “shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law: but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments.”

New York representative Lemuel Quigg, active in many of these discussions on the House floor, was perhaps not exaggerating when he remarked, “During the last four months I have had the question addressed to me, I think, a little over ten thousand times as to who had the power to make appointments in the Library.” 2030 Cong. Rec. 1945.

Interestingly, the American Library Association reported on the Constitutional debate in its publication, The Library Journal, and said

[Appointment of the register by the Joint Committee on the Library] was finally declared unconstitutional. But as neither house could bring themselves to abdicate the control of copyright, which had come under their control solely through its being jumbled into the duties of the librarian of Congress, and as no motion prevailed to put the appointment where it properly belongs, in the hands of the President, the register of copyrights was finally dropped altogether.

Senator Platt said on the Senate floor, “It is of the highest importance that the person who has charge of copyright matters shall be an officer of the Government.”2128 Cong. Rec. 5496. This is the view that prevailed.

Delaware Senator George Gray gave a compelling argument in favor of this approach on the Senate floor:

This officer which this provision of law seeks to create and appoint is an officer who has nothing to do, so far as this function is concerned, with the administration of the duties of either House or of both Houses jointly. He does not perform any functions necessary to the organization of the House, to its convenience, or to its proper duties. We have created an office here in order to fulfill an intent of the Constitution, to provide for the protection of authors and inventors.

***

The issuance of a copyright has no more to do with the establishment of a library or the convenience of either House of Congress than the issuance of a patent—not a particle. The mere fact that the copyright law requires two copies of each copyrighted publication to be deposited with the Librarian can not confer the appointing power. 2228 Cong. Rec. 5502-5503.

Conclusion

One hundred and twenty years later, the Copyright Office still resides as a department within the Library of Congress, and the Register of Copyrights is still appointed by the Librarian. And while a lot has changed since then—technology has advanced rapidly, copyright law has grown more complex, and the core copyright industries today contribute over $1.2 trillion to U.S. GDP—as Congress reconsiders the organization and structure of the Copyright Office, some of the same questions that arose in 1897 are being asked today.

References

References
1 A little over four years ago, then Register of Copyrights Maria Pallante testified to Congress about the need for a wholesale review of the Copyright Act. As part of that review, she said “evolving the Copyright Office should be a major goal of the next great copyright act. In short, it is difficult to see how a 21st century copyright law could function well without a 21st century agency.” Pallante expanded on her thoughts during the annual Meyer Lecture later that year, giving a talk on the Next Generation Copyright Office: What it and What it Means. The public record developed considerably since then, with Congress turning its attention to it several times. The House Judiciary Committee devoted an entire hearing to the Copyright Office’s functions and resources in February 2015 and most of the hearing on the Register’s Perspective on Copyright Review in April that same year, but it was also discussed by the House IP Subcommittee in September 2014, the House Administration Committee in December 2015, and budget hearings in the House and Senate Legislative Branch Appropriations Subcommittees in early 2015. Representatives Marino (R-PA) and Chu (D-CA) introduced a discussion draft of the Copyright Office for the Digital Economy Act (CODE Act) in June 2015. The bill provided for Copyright Office autonomy over its IT, staff, and budget, and included elevating the Register to a Presidential appointee confirmed by the Senate. The bill was formally introduced in the 114th Congress in December 2015 and reintroduced in the 115th Congress this past February. House Judiciary Committee Chairman Goodlatte and Ranking Member Conyers released a policy proposal on Copyright Office modernization in December 2016 for public comment. The proposal outlined an approach similar to the one taken in the CODE Act, including making the Register a Presidential Appointee. The Senate Judiciary Committee indicated that it was also working on draft legislation to address Copyright Office modernization.
2 Annual Report of the Librarian of Congress, year ended December 1, 1872, pp. 6-7.
3 28 Cong. Rec. 41 (Dec. 5, 1895).
4 28 Cong. Rec. 134 (Dec. 10, 1895).
5 28 Cong. Rec. 1959.
6 28 Cong. Rec. 1959.
7 28 Cong. Rec. 4695.
8 See 29 Cong. Rec. 316 (Dec. 19, 1896) (remarks of Mr. Quigg).
9 See 28 Cong. Rec. 5496-5507 (May 21, 1896).
10 29 Cong. Rec. 314-319 (Dec. 19, 1896).
11 29 Cong. Rec. 975 (Jan. 20, 1897).
12 See 29 Cong. Rec. 1832-33.
13 See 29 Cong. Rec. 1945-47 (Feb. 17, 1897).
14 Act of February 19, 1897, 54th Cong., 2d Sess., 29 Stat. 545.
15 29 Cong. Rec. 385 (Dec. 21, 1896) (remarks of Mr. Cummings).
16 Treloar himself noted in a letter after introduction of the bill that the “creation and maintenance of a Copyright Department…has the approval of…the Librarian of Congress.” Letter from Representative William M. Treloar, to J.N. Johnson, Esq., Sec’y, Am. Copyright League (Feb. 20, 1896), as quoted in Zvi Rosen, “The Twilight of the Opera Pirates: A Prehistory of the Right of Public Performance for Musical Compositions,” 24 Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal, 1157, 1180 (2007).
17 See Rosen, above. One contemporary account noted these controversies but said of the Copyright Office proposal just that it would “be dealt with more effectively in a separate bill.” Scientific American, “A New Copyright Bill“, pg 179 (March 21, 1896).
18 28 Cong. Rec. 5496-97.
19 U.S. Constitution, Article 2, Section 2 states the President “shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law: but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments.”
20 30 Cong. Rec. 1945.
21 28 Cong. Rec. 5496.
22 28 Cong. Rec. 5502-5503.
By , February 26, 2015.

Two hearings today will look at the current state of the US Copyright Office—one in front of the House Judiciary Committee on the Office’s functions and resources, and a budget hearing by the House Appropriations Legislative Branch Subcommittee looking at the Architect of the Capitol and the Library of Congress (The Copyright Office is a department within the Library of Congress). Besides the registration of copyrights and recordation of copyright transfers and assignments—and be sure to check out the Office’s report on Technical Upgrades to Registration and Recordation released earlier this month—the Copyright Office is more broadly responsible for copyright policy and education. However, it is currently underfunded, understaffed, and faces structural and technological impediments to its mission. The witnesses at the Judiciary Committee hearing will discuss the challenges under the status quo in more detail and offer suggestions for improvement, ranging from increasing the resources and autonomy of the Office to establishing the Copyright Office as an independent agency.

The Copyright Office has evolved tremendously since it was first created 118 years ago, and I think it’s commendable that its role and status, along with its functions and resources, are being fully examined.

Centralizing Copyright

When the delegates of the Constitutional Convention in 1787 drafted the plan for a federal government, they forewent a legislature with general, indefinite powers, such as the States enjoyed, for one that had authority only according to an enumerated list of under 20 powers. One of these powers was securing the property rights of authors at the federal level because, as James Madison would explain in the Federalist Papers, “the States cannot separately make effectual provisions for” this protection. 1Federalist 43.

For nearly a century afterward, Congress played a relatively hands-off role in copyright policy. It occasionally held hearings and amended the copyright laws, but otherwise remained passive. Copyright law did require registration, but this function was administered by federal district courts.

Copyright registration certificate for Walt Whitman's "Leaves of Grass."

Copyright registration certificate for Walt Whitman, “Leaves of Grass”, 1855.

That began to change in 1870, when Congress centralized copyright registration and deposit functions within the Library of Congress. 2Act of July 8, 1870, §§85-111, 41st Cong., 2d Sess., 16 Stat. 198, 212-16. Then Librarian Ainsworth Spofford was a staunch advocate of using copyright deposit as a means of building the Library’s collections; he lobbied heavily for bringing copyright functions entirely within the Library’s purview, saying,

Under the present system, although this National Library is entitled by law to a copy of every work for which a copyright is taken out, it does not receive, in point of fact, more than four-fifths of such publications.

The transfer of the Copyright business proposed would concentrate and simplify the business, and this is a cardinal point…. Let the whole business… be placed in the charge of one single responsible officer, and an infinitude of expense, trouble, and insecurity would be saved to the proprietors of Copyrights and to the legal profession. 3John Y. Cole, Of Copyright, Men & a National Library, The Quarterly Journal of the Library of Congress, Vol. 28, April 1971. See also A Visit to the Library of Congress.

But Spofford underestimated the amount of work that would go into administering copyright registrations. Before the end of the century, Congress created (through an appropriations bill) a Copyright Office as a separate agency within the Library, headed by a Register of Copyrights. 4Act of February 19, 1897, 54th Cong., 2d Sess., 29 Stat. 545.

The Copyright Office Grows

The Copyright Office’s importance quickly grew. The first Register, Thorvald Solberg, proved ambitious, and established the Office as a legislative and policy expert, writing recommendations and drafting legislative proposals that would eventually become the Copyright Act of 1909. 5Abe Goldman, The History of USA Copyright Law Revision from 1901 to 1954, Copyright Law Revision Study No. 1, pp. 1-3 (1955). Thorvald Solberg recommendation for copyright law revision.

The Office played an even more critical role during the 1955-1976 copyright law revision effort in producing the current Copyright Act. As Bob Brauneis explains in his testimony, the legislative process

began with a series of 34 studies prepared by the Copyright Office over a five-year period addressing every corner of copyright law and of the economics of the copyright industries. Building on the insights of those studies, Register of Copyrights Abraham Kaminstein prepared in 1961 a comprehensive “Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law.” Register Kaminstein then held a series of public meetings with copyright stakeholders to discuss the recommendations of that report, and gathered written comments as well. Having gathered that input, the Copyright Office then issued a “Preliminary Draft for Revised U.S. Copyright Law” in late 1962, and in 1963 held a series of public meetings discussing sections of that draft in detail. That led to the first bill introduced in Congress in 1964, which was used as the basis for another series of public meetings held by the Copyright Office. Finally, after a second bill was introduced in 1965, Congress itself began to hold hearings on the proposed legislation.

Since the Copyright Act of 1976, the Copyright Office has played a central role in copyright law and policy: advising Congress and the Executive Branch; providing guidance to courts, copyright practitioners, and the general public; and administering copyright registrations, recordations, and deposits. It has also taken on new substantive roles, such as recommending exceptions for the circumvention of technical measures under 17 USC § 1201. And copyright policy has increasingly been addressed at an international level in venues such as WIPO and the WTO, expanding the scope of the Copyright Office’s work.

A Look at the Copyright Office

In recent decades, there have been a number of looks at the structure of the Copyright Office and administration of the copyright system. (Although it’s worth noting that Benjamin Kaplan suggested a regulatory commission with power to “adapt the statute to changing realities” when “congressional responses are apt to be late or inadequate” in his 1967 work, An Unhurried View of Copyright.)

In 1986, the Congressional Office of Technical Assessment (OTA) released a report on “Intellectual Property in an Age of Electronics and Information,” which sought to examine “the impact of recent and anticipated advances in communication and information technologies on the intellectual property system.” Among the report’s recommendations were institutional changes, ranging from intermediate changes—increasing research, coordination, regulatory, or adjudicatory functions of existing agencies, for example—to the creation of a new intellectual property agency. A joint Congressional committee held a hearing on the report on April 16, 1986, but no further legislative action resulted.

On February 16, 1993, Rep. William Hughes introduced H.R.897, the Copyright Reform Act of 1993. Among other things, the proposed bill would have made the Register of Copyrights a Presidential Appointee. This would have allowed the Register to make rules rather than requiring rules to be adopted by the Library of Congress. The Librarian of Congress, James Billington (who still serves in that capacity), opposed this move. He said in Congressional testimony,

At a time when publishing and communication are experiencing technological breakthroughs, it is particularly critical that the interests of the Library, the Copyright Office, and their constituents, be treated as mutual and complementary. The Library must be able to work hand in hand with the Copyright Office to ensure the continued collection, preservation, and protection of published and unpublished materials, including the new electronic information media that are making an increasingly important contribution to the nation’s intellectual heritage. 6Statement of James Billington, Hearings on H.R. 897: Copyright Reform Act of 1993, pg. 191, before the House Judiciary Comm. Subcomm. on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration, 103rd Congress (March 4, 1993).

Hughes encouraged Billington to study further the effects his bill would have on the Library’s functions, and in response, Billington created an Advisory Committee on Copyright Registration and Deposit (ACCORD) to analyze these issues. Although the 20 member Committee (which included current Register of Copyrights Maria Pallante, then serving as Executive Director of the National Writers Union) did not examine the institutional changes contained within the Copyright Reform Act, it did look at registration and deposit issues.

The report of the ACCORD co-chairs presciently observed

As the communications revolution gathers momentum and the information superhighway is in its early stages, a comprehensive and reliable copyright database, available freely to the general public, is an enormous asset for a number of purposes. These matters were addressed during the ACCORD deliberations and by the individual authors of the working papers prepared for ACCORD discussions. There was consensus among ACCORD members that information obtained through registration-information bearing on authorship/dates of creation and publication, the ownership and duration of copyright, and the like can be extremely valuable not only for business transactions such as transferring rights, and obtaining permissions or licenses, but also for resolving legal disputes, providing biographical information, and so forth.

The Senate subsequently held a hearing on its companion bill, but while the legislation passed the House, it did not go any further. The issues raised by the report, however, did not disappear.

In 1996, Senator Orrin Hatch introduced an omnibus patent act which would have established a single government corporation to formulate policy and administer all forms of intellectual property: patent, trademark, and copyright. During a hearing on the bill, Hatch explained the motivation behind the change. First, he said, “The locus of copyright policymaking has shifted to the executive branch primarily because the international dimension of copyright has become dominant,” so the Copyright Office needs to be in the executive branch if it is to continue to play a leading role in policymaking. Second, Hatch noted the potential for increased rulemaking authority for the Copyright Office in the digital age—”For example, it has been suggested that the Copyright Office might administer a system of virtual magistrates for fair use and Internet access provider liability.” Increased executive powers, said Hatch, would cause problems given the Office’s current “anomalous position in the legislative branch.” Finally, Hatch said, the shift would “free the Copyright Office from the lengthy and cumbersome hiring practices of the Library of Congress.”

Register of Copyrights Marybeth Peters sharply criticized the proposal during her testimony, calling it “hasty and radical” and spoke on a number of issues such a change would raise. The move “first and foremost” would require a “fivefold increase” in registration fees, leading, consequently, to a decrease in registrations and Library of Congress deposits. Second, the move has “the potential to politicize copyright policy.” Under the Library of Congress, said Peters, the Copyright Office is not “influenced by political agendas or subject to interagency clearance.” Third, the combination of copyright with patent and trademark raises “conceptual concerns” because of fundamental differences between the two. Copyright has strong cultural, educational, and expressive policies not present in patent and trademark, and “These values may be slighted if copyright policy is wholly determined by an entity dedicated to the furtherance of commerce.”

Peters concluded by raising questions concerning the need for change and potential consequences, and said

Answering all of these questions requires consultation with the affected communities to determine their needs and to weigh their perspectives. That process has not taken place. There has been no open, public debate of the issues involved. Neither the Copyright Office nor members of the private sector participated in formulating these proposals. No representative of the author, copyright owner, or copyright user communities were given the opportunity to testify today and no further hearings are scheduled.

William Patry testified in support of the bill on a following panel, calling the current placement of the Copyright Office in the legislative branch a “historic anomaly” and arguing that if the agency is to engage in executive functions, it should reside in the executive branch. But overwhelmingly the sentiment from participants in the hearing was against the move. Statements from other copyright groups almost universally agreed with Peters’ assessment. The bill did not make it out of committee nor reemerge during later Congressional sessions.

A New Great Copyright Agency?

The challenges facing the Copyright Office only continue to grow as technology advances and copyright policy becomes more central to society. As I noted in 2015 in Copyright Law and Policy, Register Pallante has said “Evolving the Copyright Office should be a major goal of the next great copyright act.” She elaborated on the staffing, funding, and technological challenges of the Office in a 2013 lecture and a 2014 House IP Subcommittee oversight hearing.

The House Judiciary Committee hearing today will focus not only on those challenges but also look at potential solutions. These include increasing the Copyright Office’s administrative authority, shifting it to the Department of Commerce, or creating a freestanding, independent agency outside the Library of Congress. Though there is no clear consensus yet on which avenue to take, the witnesses are in remarkable agreement about the critical role the Office plays, the need to modernize it, and the deficiencies in the status quo. The benefits of modernizing the Office would be shared by authors, users, and the general public. That means that Congress is presented with a rare opportunity to take a bold step in improving the law that would not likely be divisive—something presently rare in the world of copyright.

References

References
1 Federalist 43.
2 Act of July 8, 1870, §§85-111, 41st Cong., 2d Sess., 16 Stat. 198, 212-16.
3 John Y. Cole, Of Copyright, Men & a National Library, The Quarterly Journal of the Library of Congress, Vol. 28, April 1971. See also A Visit to the Library of Congress.
4 Act of February 19, 1897, 54th Cong., 2d Sess., 29 Stat. 545.
5 Abe Goldman, The History of USA Copyright Law Revision from 1901 to 1954, Copyright Law Revision Study No. 1, pp. 1-3 (1955).
6 Statement of James Billington, Hearings on H.R. 897: Copyright Reform Act of 1993, pg. 191, before the House Judiciary Comm. Subcomm. on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration, 103rd Congress (March 4, 1993).
By , November 13, 2014.

In a recent article in Newsweek, cultural historian Peter Baldwin (who recently published The Copyright Wars: Three Centuries of Trans-Atlantic Battle, reviewed by Robert Levine at Columbia Journalism Review), says of early US copyright law, “More important, it refused to grant foreign authors protection. *** Convinced that a fledgling nation, eagerly building its cultural infrastructure, would be best served by having the Old World’s heritage freely on tap, America’s founders not only shamelessly pirated European culture, but also proudly hailed their pilfering as pursuit of the Enlightenment ideal of an educated democratic citizenry.”

Given that this is an excerpt published in a magazine, I can’t see what sources Baldwin relies on to make these claims, but having studied a bit of copyright history myself, this strikes me as inaccurate on a number of levels. First, to point out that the first copyright act did not grant foreign authors protection makes the fact sound remarkable when it was anything but. This was generally the case with most laws at the time. And to say the US “refused” to grant protection to foreign authors makes it sound like a far more deliberate and deliberated choice than it actually was. There is no recorded debate about the substance of any provisions of the first copyright act—the bill itself was essentially the same as England’s Statute of Anne and the state copyright acts that preceded the Constitution.1Oren Bracha, Commentary on the U.S. Copyright Act 1790 (2008). Indeed, the only deliberate choice seems to have been the decision to pass separate copyright and patent bills; initial proposals had the two combined. This was done at the urging of South Carolina representative Aedanus Burke, who told his fellow Congressmen, “several gentlemen had lately published the fruits of their industry and application, and were every hour in danger of having them surreptitiously printed.”2Gales & Seaton’s History, pp. 1117-18 (January 25, 1790). Burke thought a separate copyright bill could be passed easily, saying “a short bill would be sufficient for the purpose, because it is almost as easy to ascertain literary as any other kind of property.” Patent legislation, on the other hand, “would occasion a good deal of discussion.” A bill sped through the House and Senate and was signed into law by President Washington a mere four months after Burke’s remarks.

Second, while some at the time may have “proudly hailed their pilfering,” this was far from a universally shared belief. In the century following the first US copyright act, you can find numerous examples of Americans calling for recognition of copyright beyond national borders, and serious legislative efforts to remedy this defect began as early as the 1830s. One of the earliest was a result of an 1837 petition of British Authors to a US Senate Committee seeking protection of their property in the United States. And while, yes, one Senator (James Buchanan from Pennsylvania, who, coincidentally, would go on to become one of the worst Presidents in US history) talked about the importance of focusing on “the interest of the reading people of the United States”, and how “cheap editions of foreign works” brought them “within the reach of every individual,”3Senator Buchanan’s remarks also included an early version of the “piracy is great exposure” claim, saying, “But to live in fame was as great a stimulus to authors as pecuniary gain; and the question ought to be considered, whether they would not lose as much of fame by the measure asked for, as they would gain in money.” there was more discussion about the detriments of a lack of protection.4Gales & Seaton’s Register of Debates in Congress, 24th Congress, 2nd Session, 670-71 (Feb. 2, 1837).

Kentucky Senator Henry Clay, who presented the petition to the Senate, said, “Of all classes of our fellow-beings, there is none that has a better right than that of authors and inventors, to the kindness, the sympathy, and the protection of the Government. And surely nothing could be more reasonable than that they should be allowed to enjoy, without interruption, for a limited time, the property created by their own genius.” Clay concluded his remarks by saying, “Indeed, I do not see any ground of just objection, either in the constitution or in sound policy, to the passage of a law tendering to all foreign nations reciprocal security for literary property.” South Carolina Senator William Preston observed that “there was a large and meritorious class of authors in this country, who had a direct interest in securing to the authors of Great Britain the copy-right to their works, because copies of these works were sold without the expense of a copyright, and thus came in free and injurious competition with the works of American authors.”

In the years following, several groups of American authors added their voices in support of international copyright protection. On February 4, 1837, thirty US citizens (including telegraph inventor Samuel Morse) submitted a petition “Praying an alteration of the Law regulating Copyrights.” The petitioners wrote that “they believe native writers to be as indispensable as a native militia” and echoed Preston’s remarks that “our own authors are unable to contend with foreigners who are paid elsewhere.” They concluded by calling for international copyright protection to, among other goals, secure the public “against a discouraging monopoly.” A second petition was submitted by “a number of citizens of Boston” April 24, 1838 and signed by 130 individuals. The petition urged passage of an international copyright law, asserting it was “essential to the encouragement and development of American literature.”

These efforts were unsuccessful, as were other pushes for international copyright law in the 1850s and 1860s.5William Patry, Copyright Law and Practice (1994). But the motivation persisted. The following is an excerpt from Brander Matthews‘ 1890 article, The Evolution of Copyright, that demonstrates the pragmatic nature of this development as well as calls for further improvement.

In the beginning the sovereign who granted a privilege or at his caprice withheld it, could not, however strong his good will, protect his subject’s book beyond the borders of his realm; and even when privilege broadened into copyright, a book duly registered was protected only within the state wherein the certificate was taken out. Very soon after Venice accorded the first privilege to John of Spira, the extension of the protection to the limits of a single state only was found to be a great disadvantage. Printing was invented when central Europe was divided and subdivided into countless little states almost independent, but nominally bound together in the Holy Roman Empire. What is now the Kingdom of Italy was cut up into more than a score of separate states, each with its own laws and its own executive. What is now the German Empire was then a disconnected medley of electorates, margravates, duchies and grand-duchies, bishoprics and principalities, free towns and knight-fees, with no centre, no head and no unity of thought or of feeling or of action. The printer-publisher made an obvious effort for wider protection when he begged and obtained a privilege not only from the authorities of the state in which he was working but also from other sovereigns. Thus when the Florentine edition of the Pandects was issued in 1553, the publisher secured privileges in Florence first, and also in Spain, in the Two Sicilies and in France. But privileges of this sort granted to non-residents were very infrequent, and no really efficacious protection for the books printed in another state was practically attainable in this way. Such protection indeed was wholly contrary to the spirit of the times, which held that an alien had no rights. In France, for example, a ship wrecked on the coasts was seized by the feudal lord and retained as his, subject only to the salvage claim. In England a wreck belonged to the King unless a living being (man, dog or cat) escaped alive from it ; and this claim of the crown to all the property of the unfortunate foreign owner of the lost ship was raised as late as 1771, when Lord Mansfield decided against it. When aliens were thus rudely robbed of their tangible possessions, without public protest, there was little likely to be felt any sense of wrong at the appropriation of a possession so intangible as copyright.

What was needed was, first of all, an amelioration of the feeling toward aliens as such ; and second, such a federation of the petty states as would make a single copyright effective throughout a nation, and as would also make possible an international agreement for the reciprocal protection of literary property. Only within the past hundred years or so has this consolidation into compact and homogeneous nationalities taken place.

***

The United States of America is now the only one of the great powers of the world which absolutely refuses the protection of its laws to the books of a friendly alien. From having been one of the foremost states of the world in the evolution of copyright, the United States has now become one of the most backward.

A year after this article was published, the US passed the International Copyright Act, which for the first time conditionally extended copyright protection to foreign authors.

References

References
1 Oren Bracha, Commentary on the U.S. Copyright Act 1790 (2008).
2 Gales & Seaton’s History, pp. 1117-18 (January 25, 1790).
3 Senator Buchanan’s remarks also included an early version of the “piracy is great exposure” claim, saying, “But to live in fame was as great a stimulus to authors as pecuniary gain; and the question ought to be considered, whether they would not lose as much of fame by the measure asked for, as they would gain in money.”
4 Gales & Seaton’s Register of Debates in Congress, 24th Congress, 2nd Session, 670-71 (Feb. 2, 1837).
5 William Patry, Copyright Law and Practice (1994).
By , July 04, 2014.

Biscuit the Democat, by Eric Hart. Posted with permission.

It may with propriety be remarked, that in all countries where literature is protected, and it never can flourish where it is not, the works of an author are his legal property; and to treat letters in any other light than this, is to banish them from the country, or strangle them in the birth.

Thomas Paine, 1792.

By , May 08, 2014.

Tom W. Bell, a professor at Chapman University’s Fowler School of Law and an adjunct fellow of the Cato Institute, has a new book out from the Mercatus Center, Intellectual Privilege: Copyright, Common Law, and the Common Good. As its title suggests, Bell argues in favor of viewing copyright as a privilege rather than as property or as a right. At the same time, Bell argues that copyright has diverged from what the Constitutional Framers intended and should be reconfigured to address this divergence.

How accurate is this framing? One particularly compelling piece of evidence comes prior to the drafting and ratification of the Constitution, which created a federal legislature with the power, among others, to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” The Continental Congress appointed a committee “to consider the most proper means of cherishing genius and useful arts through the United States by securing to authors or publishers of new books their property in such works” on March 10th, 1783. This committee consisted of North Carolina representative Hugh Williamson, South Carolina representative Ralph Izard, and Viriginia representative James Madison, who would be the primary architect of the Constitution’s Copyright Clause.

Motion of Hugh Williamson

On May 2, the men presented the following to the Congress:

The committee, consisting of Mr. Williamson, Mr. Izard and Mr. Madison, to whom were referred sundry papers and memorials from different persons on the subject of literary property, being persuaded that nothing is more properly a man’s own than the fruit of his study, and that the protection and security of literary property would greatly tend to encourage genius, to promote useful discoveries and to the general extension of arts and commerce, beg leave to submit the following report:

Resolved, That it be recommended to the several states, to secure to the authors or publishers of any new books not hitherto printed, being citizens of the United States, and to their heir or assigns executors, administrators and assigns, the copyright of such books for a certain time, not less than fourteen years from the first publication; and to secure to the said authors, if they shall survive the term first mentioned, and to their heirs or assigns executors, administrators and assigns, the copyright of such books for another term of time not less than fourteen years, such copy or exclusive right of printing, publishing and vending the same, to be secured to the original authors, or publishers, or their assigns their executors, administrators and assigns, by such laws and under restrictions as to the several states may seem proper.

If you take a look at the original report, you’ll notice something interesting. The committee had originally referred, in the last sentence, to the exclusive privilege of printing, but crossed out privilege and substituted right.

Report

It’s a fascinating historical tidbit, and one that suggests the case that the Framers considered copyright to be some sort of government privilege is not as strong as Bell claims.

By , January 09, 2014.

When the U.S. passed its first copyright law in 1790, it was only the second nation in the world to have a modern copyright act. The U.S. Copyright Act only protected works of American authors. But within only a few decades, more nations began protecting copyright, and the recognition that international protection was necessary began to grow. U.S. authors and publishers, concerned about the inability to protect their works abroad and the difficulty of competing with cheap British imports, began rumblings for international protection as early as the 1830s. 1See, e.g., “International Copyright“, the New Yorker (Oct. 12, 1839).

On April 9, 1868, U.S. publisher George P. Putnam chaired a meeting of the “International Copyright Association”, a group of authors and publishers recently created to advocate on behalf of international copyright protection. Among those who spoke was Francis Lieber, a German-American jurist. Lieber begins by noting that opponents of international copyright have long used the same arguments. Some of this may sound familiar even today.

It is maintained that there is no such thing as literary property. What is called so is simply the effect of laws, judiciously or injudiciously enacted; it is an arbitrary creature of the law; and secondly, expediency leads us to prevent an International Copyright. Let us have books as cheap as possible.

The chief value of the latter reason depends on the first; for if there is such a thing as a right of real property in literary productions, as natural and direct as there is in a bushel of wheat for the farmer, if he is the producer, the argument founded on expediency, even if this could be made good, would have no more value than a recommendation of obtaining flour cheaper by stealing, than by honestly purchasing it. Right and wrong are not defined or confined by the blue or red colors of political demarcations on the map, any more than that they apply to religion, or mathematics, or music. Nay, allow a teacher of the law of nations to say that it is one of the characteristics of our progressive civilization, that as it advances, it takes more and more from the meaning of the colors of the map, reducing them more and more to a political meaning alone.

Is there such a thing as literary property? The main roots of all property whatsoever are appropriation and production, diffused and accumulated by exchange. Why? Is it, because, as the saying used to be, property is the creature of Government? By no means. Property invariably precedes government, as many other institutions do. It is because every human being is as conscious as of his own identity, that if he appropriates what belongs to no one—for instance, the trunk of a tree—and if he produces a new thing—for instance a canoe out of that tree—this appropriation, or this product, is verily his own; that he can do with it what he likes, and that every one who in turn attempts to appropriate it without the process of exchange, is an intruder, a robber, and the attempt will not only be resisted but resented. The whole right of property, however developed and ramified in a code of laws it may be, rests on this primordial consciousness of mine and thine—on appropriation and production; and I now appeal to the intuitive conviction of every living man to say whether a literary work, say Baker’s description of his toilsome journeys in Africa, or a Faust of Goethe, a musical composition, say a requiem by Mozart, is not a production in the fullest sense of the word, even more so than a barrel of herrings which have been appropriated in the North Sea, pickled and barrelled by the fisherman; and whether any one has a right to meddle with this property by production, any more than you or I have to meddle with the barrel of herrings.

But, say our opponents, that which you call the literary work consists of ideas which were common property, gathered, strung together. They belong to the common civilization, and cannot constitute property. Indeed! why not go further? The alphabet used in every book is common property; the words of which it consists have been published long ago in dictionaries.

We do not claim property in ideas, any more than Beethoven claimed property in the tones he indicated, or the laws of harmony and disharmony which the Creator has indelibly implanted in the human soul; but he justly claimed by natural right the ownership of his symphonies, and, therefore, the exclusive right of multiplying them by signs and on material. He deeply resented their piratical reprint.

An author, or a composer, or an artist is what he is, in a very great measure indeed, in consequence of the civilization of his times or of the ideas which, erroneously and inelegantly, are declared common property; but is the farmer what he is, less by the common civilization in which his existence has fallen? Does the farmer, perchance, create his grain, or does he only produce, that is, dispose his combining and shaping agency so that with the help of the natural agents his labor results in, the grain? His share in agricultural production is small, indeed, compared to the share which the author, or composer, or sculptor has in the production of his work. But the question is really more positively and directly answered by asking: Do you, or do you not, feel and know that Paradise Lost was Milton’s own, and that in the world of exchange to which, by divine decree, all of us must go for subsistence, he had an exclusive right to dispose of his work?

If literary property is merely a thing so called; if there is no natural right of literary property, why does our law and the municipal law of every civilized country acknowledge and protect it in each respective country? There is no exception to it. And if literary property is real property, why not acknowledge and protect it internationally, as all righteous property is?

To the objection that literary property is of a very recent date, which is said to prove that, like the patent law, it is altogether a legal invention, and originates from no natural right, I would simply reply that literary property was claimed as soon as it obtained importance in the market, that is, immediately after the invention of the art of printing. There is a passage in the works of Dr. Martin Luther, in which he asks the “Sirs Printers” why they rob one another, and make money of what belongs to another, leaving only loss and dissatisfaction to him who incurred all the expenses in order to get out a book; and it will be remembered how short a time there elapsed between the humanizing invention of the art of printing and the great translation of the Bible by one man—Martin Luther. As to International Copyright, it belongs to our century indeed; but the whole law of nations has made its greatest strides only in recent times. Down to this century, the highest statesmanship was believed to consist in the greatest amount of injury that could be done to a neighbor. The barbarous confusion of foreigner and enemy still somewhat adhered to our race. Now it is gladly acknowledged in the commonwealth of nations to which we belong that the great law of good neighborhood, all-important among individuals, is not less so among nations, and the existing positive law of nations shows us that treaties are in force between Germany, France, England, Italy, internationally protecting literary and aesthetical copyright. Why should we lag behind? We, whose boast it is to honor and protect human rights with eager jealousy, should we, of all leading nations, disregard the right of property, because the owner is a foreigner?

Speech of Francis Lieber, Meeting of Authors and Publishers at the Rooms of the New York Historical Society, April 9, 1868.

References

References
1 See, e.g., “International Copyright“, the New Yorker (Oct. 12, 1839).
By , September 17, 2013.

“[W]ithout question, the exercise of the [copyright] power has operated as an encouragement to native genius, and to the solid advancement of literature and the arts.” 1Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, Book 3, Chapter 19 (1833).

September 17 marks “Constitution Day” in the United States, a day that commemorates the approval of the final draft of the Constitution by the U.S. Constitutional Convention delegates in 1787. 236 U.S.C. § 106. Copyright is the subject of one of Congress’s few enumerated powers; Clause 8 of Section 8 of Article 1 says that  “The Congress shall have power … To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”

The story of how the United States became only the second nation in history to recognize a modern day version of copyright is one of authors and ideals. There was no publishing industry to speak of in Colonial America. What few printers did exist in the thirteen original states by the time of the Revolution focused mostly on government printing or newspapers. Horace Scudder, a 19th century biographer of Noah Webster (more on him later) wrote of the time, “Literature in its finer forms had but slender encouragement. The absence of easy communication, the poverty of the people, the dispersion of the population, gave little chance for bookstores and circulating libraries and private accumulation.” 3Horace Scudder, Noah Webster: American Man of Letters (Boston: 1890).

As in many parts of Europe and Great Britain, exclusive publishing privileges had at times been granted to individuals in the colonies, but these were rare. 4The first was granted to John Usher in 1672 to print and publish the laws of the Massachusetts colony. The first attempt by an author, rather than a publisher, to seek exclusive rights to his work came in 1772 from musician William Billings, though he was ultimately unsuccessful. It was not until after the Revolutionary War that we would see the push for copyright begin in earnest.

Copyright before the Constitution

Thomas Paine, who is best known in U.S. history for his 1776 pamphlet Common Sense, immensely influential in calling for independence from Great Britain, also “counted copyright agitation among his many other revolutionary interests.” 5John William Tebbel, 1 A History of Book Publishing in the United States 138 (1972). In a 1782 pamphlet, Paine used the introduction to call attention to the pirating of works by French writer Abbe Raynal, saying “It may with propriety be remarked, that in all countries where literature is protected, and it never can flourish where it is not, the works of an author are his legal property; and to treat letters in any other light than this, is to banish them from the country, or strangle them in the birth.” 6Paine, On the Affairs of North America: In Which the Mistakes in the Abbe’s Account of the Revolution of Amreica [sic] are Corrected and Cleared Up (1782). Paine added, in a passage that demonstrated that his thoughts on copyright were consistent with the Republican ideals he espoused in his political writings,

The state of literature in America must one day become a subject of legislative consideration. Hitherto it hath been a disinterested volunteer in the service of the revolution, and no man thought of profits: but when peace shall give time and opportunity for study, the country will deprive itself of the honour and service of letters and the improvement of science, unless sufficient laws are made to prevent depredations on literary property.

These sentiments were shared by Noah Webster, who wrote in a letter to Connecticut representative John Canfield, “America must be as independent in literature as in Politics, as famous for arts as for arms.” 7Oren Bracha, Commentary on the Connecticut Copyright Statute 1783, in Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-1900), (2008). citing Noah Webster, Letters of Noah Webster ed. H.R. Warfel (New York: Literary Publishers, 1953), 1-4.

Webster, who would go on to create the dictionary bearing his name, played perhaps the most pivotal role in getting states to recognize copyright. Having recently completed his second book on grammar and spelling for schoolchildren, Webster began efforts to lobby the states for copyright laws, beginning in New Jersey in 1782. Then, on to Connecticut in October of that year (at which time he wrote the letter quoted above), returning in January of 1783 where he learned of the plans to pass a general copyright act.

On January 6, 1783, author and explorer John Ledyard had petitioned the Connecticut General Assembly for copyright protection for his latest work, A Journal of Captain Cook’s Last Voyage to the Pacific Ocean. On January 29, 1783, the General Assembly instead passed a general copyright statute, the first in the colonies.

Titled “An Act for the Encouragement of Literature and Genius”, the statute’s preamble indicated its foundations in natural rights and its goals to encourage publication, which was seen as providing a benefit to the public and the nation.

Whereas it is perfectly agreeable to the Principles of natural Equity and Justice, that every Author should be secured in receiving the Profits that may arise from the Sale of his Works, and such Security may encourage Men of Learning and Genius to publish their Writings, which may do Honour to their Country, and Service to Mankind.

The statute also provided a public interest requirement that authors and publishers provide sufficient copies of books at reasonable prices.

Along with Ledyard and Webster, others were striving for a copyright act, including historian Jeremy Belknap and author and politician Joel Barlow. Barlow wrote to Elias Boudinot, president of the Continental Congress in 1783, calling on him to protect the rights of authors. Barlow’s letter would end up playing an influential role in the foundations of U.S. copyright law. It both pressed the issue forward and established its starting points. Barlow’s exhortation for protecting the natural rights of authors would be reflected in the Continental Congress’s and State’s language to follow, and his suggestion to follow the Statute of Anne was also heeded.

In it, Barlow also echoed the appeals to pride in the new nation that Paine and Webster used. Said Barlow,

America has convinced the world of her importance in a political & military line by the wisdom, energy & ardor for liberty which distinguish the present era. A literary reputation is necessary in order to complete her national character; and she ought to encourage that variety & independence of genius, in which she is not excelled by any nation in Europe. As we have few Gentlemen of fortune sufficient to enable them to spend a whole life in study, or enduce others to do it by their patronage, it is more necessary, in this country than in any other, that the rights of authors should be secured by law.

According to Continental Congress records, the Connecticut Act was forwarded to the Continental Congress two days after it was proposed, on January 8th, followed another two days later by Barlow’s letter. 824 Journals of the Continental Congress 211 (1783).

Continental Congress representative Hugh Williamson of North Carolina moved that a committee be formed “to consider the most proper means of cherishing genius and useful arts through the United States by securing to authors or publishers of new books their property in such works.” That motion carried on March 10th, with the Congress appointing a committee consisting of Williamson, Ralph Izard of South Carolina, and James Madison.

On May 2, the committee issued its report. Records indicate the committee “to whom were referred sundry papers and memorials from different persons on the subject of literary property, [are] persuaded that nothing is more properly a man’s own than the fruit of his study, and that the protection and security of literary property would greatly tend to encourage genius.” 924 Journals of the Continental Congress 326. The Continental Congress issued a recommendation encouraging States to pass copyright legislation. By that time, Massachusetts and Maryland had already joined Connecticut in passing a general copyright law. It is likely that Noah Webster shared some responsibility for the the Massachusetts law, as he had been in that state, along with New York, that winter to lobby the representatives.

The Massachusetts copyright act began with a preamble explaining the foundations and motivations for the law:

Whereas the improvement of knowledge, the progress of civilization, the publick weal of the Commonwealth, and the advancement of human happiness, greatly depend on the efforts of learned and ingenious persons in the various arts and sciences: As the principal encouragement such persons can have to make great and beneficial exertions of this nature, must exist in the legal security of the fruits of their study and industry to themselves, and as such security is one of the natural rights of all men, there being no property more peculiarly man’s own than that which is produced by the labour of his mind.

After the Continental Congress’s recommendation, Webster redoubled his efforts, visiting the “middle and southern states” in May 1785. That November, Webster visited General Washington, who gave him letters addressed to members of the Virginia legislature to assist Webster in his efforts. Webster also lobbied James Madison personally to pass a copyright act, including through a letter to the Virginiana legislator in 1784. Madison would eventually write the act himself. The bill, “An act for securing to the authors of literary works an exclusive property therein for a limited time,” was presented to the Virginia House of Delegates by Madison on November 16, 1785.

Webster’s successful run fell short, however, when he reached Delaware. He petitioned the legislature, saying

Among all modes of acquiring property, or exclusive ownership, the act or  operation of creating or making seems to have the first claim. If anything can justly give a man an exclusive right to the occupancy and enjoyment of a thing it must be that he made it. The right of a farmer and mechanic to the exclusive enjoyment and right of disposal of what they make or produce is never questioned. What, then, can make a difference between the produce of muscular strength and the produce of the intellect?

But while a committee was formed to draft a copyright bill, the bill was deferred at the end of the legislative session, never to resume. All in all though, not too bad. Following the Continental Congress’s recommendation, twelve of the thirteen original states — all but Delaware — had enacted copyright legislation within three years. And over half, like Massachusetts, referred explicitly to the natural rights foundation of the law. 10The others included Connecticut, Georgia, New Hampshire, North Carolina, New York, and Rhode Island.

Toward a Federal Copyright Power

Within a year of the last state copyright act going into effect (That honor goes to New York, which passed a copyright act on April 29th, 1786) there were calls to amend the Articles of Confederation that governed the Continental Congress. Once this Convention assembled however, in May 1787, delegates agreed that the goal was not amendment but drafting of an entirely new Constitution. From that point, the delegates moved quickly:

The Convention kicked off May 14, 1787. On June 23, a Committee on Detail was established to draft a document that incorporated the various plans and proposals from the Convention. The Committee presented the first draft of the Constitution to the Convention on August 6. On September 8, a Committee on Style was created to incorporate changes brought up by delegates after discussing the first draft and revise the text of the Constitution. This Committee presented the final draft to the Convention on September 12, who ratified and signed it on September 17. And that’s how you make an America. 11Copyright and the Constitution (September 12, 2010).

James Madison played a pivotal role in drafting the Constitution. In the April before the Convention, he sat down to write a memorandum to the chairman of the Convention detailing a dozen Vices of the Political System of the United States. Among these vices was a “want of concert in matters where common interest requires it.” Madison wrote that this defect was most noticeable concerning commercial affairs, but it was also felt in “the want of uniformity in the laws concerning naturalization & literary property.”

Considering the enormity of the issues facing the delegates, it should not be surprising that copyright was not a high priority. It was not included in the first draft of the Constitution, on August 6, and would not be proposed until the waning days of the Convention. 12Some suggest that South Carolina delegate Charles Pinckney included authority to secure copyrights in the Plan he submitted on May 28th, which would move the genesis of the clause a few months earlier. However, at least one scholar has concluded that the evidence does not support this. See Dotan Oliar, The (Constitutional) Convention on IP: A New Reading, 57 UCLA Law Review 421 (2009).

On August 18, James Madison and Charles Pinckney proposed a number of enumerated powers to vest in the legislative branch of the federal government. Among these, Madison proposed that Congress have the power “to secure to literary authors their copyrights for a limited time” while Pinckney proposed the similar power “to secure to authors exclusive rights for a certain time.” All were referred to the Convention’s Committee on Detail without discussion. 132 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 321–22, 324–35. The final version of the Copyright Clause (which also incorporated a authority to secure patents) was presented to the Convention on September 5, where it was agreed to without any objections. 14Id. at 509. There is no evidence that the change in wording between the proposed powers and the final version was intended to be substantive rather than merely stylistic.

The Copyright Clause in the Court of Public Opinion

After September 17, the newly drafted Constitution went to the Continental Congress for approval on September 28, and then referred to the states to be ratified. Reflecting the low amount of attention the power received during the Convention, there were few mentions of the power during ratification debates.

James Madison did refer to the Clause in the Federalist Papers, written along with John Jay and Alexander Hamilton to drum up support for ratifying the Constitution, but only once, and only very briefly. In Federalist Papers 43, Madison wrote

The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right of common law. The right to useful inventions seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors. The public good fully coincides in both cases with the claims of individuals. The States cannot separately make effectual provision for either of the cases, and most of them have anticipated the decision of this point, by laws passed at the instance of Congress.

George Mason, a delegate to the Continental Convention from Virginia became one of the Constitution’s most strenuous critics, and penned a series of Objections explaining his reasons for not signing the final draft. Among these, he warned that “Under their own construction of the general clause at the end of the enumerated powers, the Congress may grant monopolies in trade and commerce, constitute new crimes, inflict unusual and severe punishments, and extend their power as far as they shall think proper.” 15Objections of the Hon. George Mason, one of the Delegates from Virginia in the Late Continental Convention, to the Proposed Federal Constitution; Assigned as His Reasons for not Signing the Same (Oct. 1787). Mason was referring to the Necessary and Proper Clause. But this and his other objections drew a response from North Carolina’s James Iredell, a strong supporter of the Constitution and future Supreme Court Justice. Iredell explained that the Necessary and Proper Clause was not an independent grant of authority; it could only be exercised in conjunction with authority that the Constitution expressly granted Congress. Iredell then went on to confirm that none of Mason’s specific dangers could come to fruition through Congress’s delegated powers. When he looked at the possibility that “Congress may grant monopolies in trade and commerce,” Iredell remarked in a footnote

One of the powers given to Congress is, “To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.” I am convinced Mr. Mason did not mean to refer to this clause, he is a gentleman of too much taste and knowledge himself to wish to have our government established upon such principles of barbarism as to be able to afford no encouragement to genius. 16Reprinted by Griffith John McRee in Life and correspondence of James Iredell, vol. 2, pg. 186 (1863).

At another point in his answer to Mason’s objections, Iredell noted that Congress could not infringe the freedom of speech and press through the Copyright Clause:

The liberty of the press is always a grand topic for declamation, but the future Congress will have no other authority over this than to secure to authors for a limited time an exclusive privilege of publishing their works. This authority has been long exercised in England, where the press is as free as among ourselves or in any country in the world; and surely such an encouragement to genius is no restraint on the liberty of the press, since men are allowed to publish what they please of their own, and so far as this may be deemed a restraint upon others it is certainly a reasonable one, and can be attended with no danger of copies not being sufficiently multiplied, because the interest of the proprietor will always induce him to publish a quantity fully equal to the demand-besides, that such encouragement may give birth to many excellent writings which would otherwise have never appeared. 17Answers to Mr. Mason’s Objections to the New Constitution Recommended by the Late Convention at Philadelphia, in Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States, pg. 361. Alexander Hamilton implicitly made a similar argument regarding the liberty of the press and the copyright clause in the Federalist Papers number 84, when he wrote, “Why, for instance, should it be said that the liberty of the press shall not be restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions may be imposed?”

We see the Clause come up during the Pennsylvania ratification debates as well, where it was mentioned by influential politician Thomas McKean, who was addressing possible objections to the Constitution. He noted none regarding the clause, pointing out instead the need for national uniformity in protecting authors.

[T]he power of securing to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their writings and discoveries, could only with effect be exercised by Congress. For, sir, the laws of the respective States could only operate within their respective boundaries, and therefore, a work which has cost the author his whole life to complete, when published in one State, however it might there be secured, could easily be carried into another State, in which a republication would be accompanied with neither penalty nor punishment—a circumstance manifestly injurious to the author in particular, and to the cause of science in general. 18Thomas McKean Speaking at the Pennsylvania Convention on the Ratification of the Federal Constitution.

The Constitution would eventually be ratified by the States, and it went into effect on March 4, 1789. The first Congress exercised its authority under the Copyright Clause not too long after, with George Washington signing into law the first U.S. copyright act on May 31, 1790.

References

References
1 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, Book 3, Chapter 19 (1833).
2 36 U.S.C. § 106.
3 Horace Scudder, Noah Webster: American Man of Letters (Boston: 1890).
4 The first was granted to John Usher in 1672 to print and publish the laws of the Massachusetts colony. The first attempt by an author, rather than a publisher, to seek exclusive rights to his work came in 1772 from musician William Billings, though he was ultimately unsuccessful.
5 John William Tebbel, 1 A History of Book Publishing in the United States 138 (1972).
6 Paine, On the Affairs of North America: In Which the Mistakes in the Abbe’s Account of the Revolution of Amreica [sic] are Corrected and Cleared Up (1782).
7 Oren Bracha, Commentary on the Connecticut Copyright Statute 1783, in Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-1900), (2008). citing Noah Webster, Letters of Noah Webster ed. H.R. Warfel (New York: Literary Publishers, 1953), 1-4.
8 24 Journals of the Continental Congress 211 (1783).
9 24 Journals of the Continental Congress 326.
10 The others included Connecticut, Georgia, New Hampshire, North Carolina, New York, and Rhode Island.
11 Copyright and the Constitution (September 12, 2010).
12 Some suggest that South Carolina delegate Charles Pinckney included authority to secure copyrights in the Plan he submitted on May 28th, which would move the genesis of the clause a few months earlier. However, at least one scholar has concluded that the evidence does not support this. See Dotan Oliar, The (Constitutional) Convention on IP: A New Reading, 57 UCLA Law Review 421 (2009).
13 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 321–22, 324–35.
14 Id. at 509.
15 Objections of the Hon. George Mason, one of the Delegates from Virginia in the Late Continental Convention, to the Proposed Federal Constitution; Assigned as His Reasons for not Signing the Same (Oct. 1787).
16 Reprinted by Griffith John McRee in Life and correspondence of James Iredell, vol. 2, pg. 186 (1863).
17 Answers to Mr. Mason’s Objections to the New Constitution Recommended by the Late Convention at Philadelphia, in Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States, pg. 361. Alexander Hamilton implicitly made a similar argument regarding the liberty of the press and the copyright clause in the Federalist Papers number 84, when he wrote, “Why, for instance, should it be said that the liberty of the press shall not be restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions may be imposed?”
18 Thomas McKean Speaking at the Pennsylvania Convention on the Ratification of the Federal Constitution.
By , June 18, 2013.

Yesterday, the Electronic Frontier Foundation provided a “reality check” of recent comments by MPAA CEO Chris Dodd regarding the current review of copyright law in the U.S. In a blog post titled Looking Deeper into MPAA’s Copyright Agenda, the organization writes the following:

Don’t Be So Sure You’ve Got The Founders On Your Side

Dodd claims that copyright as we know it is what “the founders of this republic intended.” Hardly. The first copyright act in the U.S, passed in 1790 by some of the same people who helped write the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, was very limited. It covered only books, maps, and charts – not music, theater, pamphlets, newspapers, sculpture, or any other 18th-century creative medium.  The Founders’ copyrights lasted 14 years, with an option to renew for another 14.  Today, of course, copyright covers nearly all written, visual, sculptural, architectural, and performing art, not to mention computer software and games, and it lasts for the author’s life plus 70 years.  We suspect that if anyone had described today’s copyright system to, say, Thomas Jefferson, he would have been shocked.  By all means, let’s look at how the Founders thought copyright should work, as one guidepost for fixing today’s law.

But as is true with much the organization says, the EFF’s “reality check” falls far short of reality — specifically concerning the subject matter covered by the 1790 Copyright Act.

It’s true the statute only refers to “books,” but the term was far broader. It included even a single page. 1Robert Maugham, A Treatise on the Laws of Literary Property, pg. 74 (London 1828). Certainly pamphlets and newspapers were covered by the Act, though publishers of such rarely secured copyright protection, likely because the onerous registration requirements of the Act far outweighed the ephemeral quality of such publications. 2Meredith L. McGill, “Copyright“, in An Extensive Republic: Print, Culture, and Society in the New Nation, 1790-1840, pg. 199 (2010); note, too, that six of the thirteen original States explicitly included “pamphlets” within their colonial copyright statutes.

English courts have held musical compositions to fall within the Statute of Anne (which, serving as the inspiration for the US Copyright Act, also referred to “books”) since 1777. 3Bach v. Longman, 2 Cowp. 623 (1777). In the same manner, the 1790 U.S. Act likely included music in printed form — indeed, US composers began to register musical works not too long after the statute went into effect. 4Kevin Parks, Music & Copyright in America: Toward the Celestial Jukebox, pg. 4 (ABA Publishing 2012) (early works registered include The Rural Harmony, Being an Original Composition, in Three and Four Parts in 1793 and The Kentucky Volunteer, a New Song in 1794.

Theatrical performances weren’t protected under the 1790 Act, but, as with musical compositions, written plays were protected as books. Again, the earliest copyright registration for theatrical works began within a decade of the Act. 5See, for example, John Burk, Bunker-Hill, “Copy-Right Secured According to Law [1797]. (Theatre took a while to rebuild during this period in large part because the Continental Congress had banned it during the Revolutionary War.) 6Allison Sarah Finkelstein, “Unhappy Differences”: The American Revolution and the Disruption of the Course of Theatre in Virginia (April 23, 2008) (unpublished B.A. thesis, College of William & Mary).

The EFF is technically correct that the 1790 Act didn’t include many visual works that are protected today, but if we are looking more generally at what the Founders thought of copyright, than even this point does not hold true. The Supreme Court would hold in 1884 that photographs were susceptible to copyright protection under the 1802 Copyright Act, and specifically pointed out that this act was enacted by “men who were contemporary with its formation, many of whom were members of the convention which framed it.” 7Burrow-Giles Lithographic v. Sarony, 111 US 53 (1884). And the Court was correct; the bill was drafted by Sen. Stephen Bradley, a colonel in the Revolutionary War and a politician active in Vermont starting before the ratification of the United States, and signed into law by President Thomas Jefferson — the same Thomas Jefferson who apparently would’ve been shocked that today’s copyright covered visual works (the bill also, concidentally, doubled the statutory damages available to copyright owners). 8William Patry, “Statutory Revision“, Copyright Law and Practice, n.108 (2000). In addition, though motion pictures were not explicitly included as copyrightable subject matter in the Copyright Act until 1912, 9Act of August 24, 1912, Pub. L. No. 62-303, 62d Cong., 2d Sess., 37 Stat. 488. early film producers such as Thomas Edison began registering films as still photographs in the early 1890’s, a practice upheld in court. 10Edison v. Lubin, 122 F. 240 (1903).

It is true that sculptural works were not brought within the scope of copyright law until 1870 (though limited protection under design patent provisions were available beginning in 1842). 11See Mazer v. Stein, 347 US 201 (1954). But copyright for sculptures is not exactly a hot button issue these days.

It’s also true that, unlike under the 1790 Act, nearly all written expression is covered under copyright law today. However, such expression was, so long as it remained unpublished, protected under common law copyright. And, unlike today, common law copyright was perpetual and not subject to traditional defenses such as fair use or first sale. 12See Did the 1976 Copyright Act Lessen the Orphan Works Problem?

What’s curious is that the EFF would focus so much on the provisions rather than the principles of early U.S. copyright law (never mind how incorrectly they stated the former) yet leave out so many provisions in current copyright law that the early acts lacked. For example, the 1790 Copyright Act included no statutory recognition of fair use, the first sale doctrine, or the idea/expression dichotomy; no prohibition on protecting government works by copyright; 13One would recall that one of the early seminal cases in U.S. copyright law, Wheaton v. Peters, 33 US 591 (1834), involved the copying of Supreme Court opinions. no exceptions for libraries, educational institutions, or non-profit groups; no centralized registration system or deposit requirement.

The grave inaccuracies contained in just a few short sentences should leave little surprise that the EFF is on shaky ground concluding that their views on copyright would be compatible with the Founders. Most Founders shared a philosophy that emphasized the primacy of private property — not just as a mechanism for prosperity but also as an essential component of a free society. 14“Property must be secured or liberty cannot exist.” John Adams, Discourses on Davila, No. 13 (1790); “Let these truths be indelibly impressed on our minds: (1) that we cannot be happy without being free; (2) that we cannot be free without being secure in our property; (3) that we cannot be secure in our property if without our consent others may as by right take it away.” John Dickinson, Letters from a farmer in Pennsylvania to the inhabitants of the British Colonies, Letter xii (1767). Copyright (or literary property) was explicitly seen as a form of property by these same Founders. 15See, for example, Randolph J. May & Seth L. Cooper, The Constitutional Foundations of Intellectual Property, 8 Perspectives from FSF Scholars (2013); Paul Clement, Viet Dinh & Jeffrey Harris, The Constitutional and Historical Foundations of Copyright Protection, Center For Individual Freedom (2012); Myths from the Birth of US Copyright; Justin Hughes, Copyright and Incomplete Historiographies: Of Piracy, Propertization, and Thomas Jefferson, 79 Southern California Law Review 993 (2006). Early US copyright law is not some ideal we should gaze at with nostalgia. It had long been considered inadequate to achieve its goals of advancing the public interest and has only in recent decades evolved to provide meaningful rights to the creators that drive progress and innovation.

So it is more likely that the Founders would find current copyright law an improvement over the 1790 Act. As Thomas Paine, the Father of the American Revolution, wrote:

The state of literature in America must one day become a subject of legislative consideration. Hitherto it hath been a disinterested volunteer in the service of the revolution, and no man thought of profits: but when peace shall give time and opportunity for study, the country will deprive itself of the honour and service of letters and the improvement of science, unless sufficient laws are made to prevent depredations on literary property. 16A Letter Addressed to the Abbe Raynal (1782).

The EFF is welcome, as it concludes in its post, to write about and promote “real copyright reform.” But it should try to do so without revisionist claims that it has history on its side.

References

References
1 Robert Maugham, A Treatise on the Laws of Literary Property, pg. 74 (London 1828).
2 Meredith L. McGill, “Copyright“, in An Extensive Republic: Print, Culture, and Society in the New Nation, 1790-1840, pg. 199 (2010); note, too, that six of the thirteen original States explicitly included “pamphlets” within their colonial copyright statutes.
3 Bach v. Longman, 2 Cowp. 623 (1777).
4 Kevin Parks, Music & Copyright in America: Toward the Celestial Jukebox, pg. 4 (ABA Publishing 2012) (early works registered include The Rural Harmony, Being an Original Composition, in Three and Four Parts in 1793 and The Kentucky Volunteer, a New Song in 1794.
5 See, for example, John Burk, Bunker-Hill, “Copy-Right Secured According to Law [1797].
6 Allison Sarah Finkelstein, “Unhappy Differences”: The American Revolution and the Disruption of the Course of Theatre in Virginia (April 23, 2008) (unpublished B.A. thesis, College of William & Mary).
7 Burrow-Giles Lithographic v. Sarony, 111 US 53 (1884).
8 William Patry, “Statutory Revision“, Copyright Law and Practice, n.108 (2000).
9 Act of August 24, 1912, Pub. L. No. 62-303, 62d Cong., 2d Sess., 37 Stat. 488.
10 Edison v. Lubin, 122 F. 240 (1903).
11 See Mazer v. Stein, 347 US 201 (1954).
12 See Did the 1976 Copyright Act Lessen the Orphan Works Problem?
13 One would recall that one of the early seminal cases in U.S. copyright law, Wheaton v. Peters, 33 US 591 (1834), involved the copying of Supreme Court opinions.
14 “Property must be secured or liberty cannot exist.” John Adams, Discourses on Davila, No. 13 (1790); “Let these truths be indelibly impressed on our minds: (1) that we cannot be happy without being free; (2) that we cannot be free without being secure in our property; (3) that we cannot be secure in our property if without our consent others may as by right take it away.” John Dickinson, Letters from a farmer in Pennsylvania to the inhabitants of the British Colonies, Letter xii (1767).
15 See, for example, Randolph J. May & Seth L. Cooper, The Constitutional Foundations of Intellectual Property, 8 Perspectives from FSF Scholars (2013); Paul Clement, Viet Dinh & Jeffrey Harris, The Constitutional and Historical Foundations of Copyright Protection, Center For Individual Freedom (2012); Myths from the Birth of US Copyright; Justin Hughes, Copyright and Incomplete Historiographies: Of Piracy, Propertization, and Thomas Jefferson, 79 Southern California Law Review 993 (2006).
16 A Letter Addressed to the Abbe Raynal (1782).