By , September 06, 2011.

Spend any amount of time reading or talking about copyright and you’re bound to have come across a debate over infringement and theft. Like many internet debates, it is very much a dead horse that has been beaten — I personally have written not one but two posts on the topic — yet the subject never dies.

Case in point: a couple weeks ago, Ben Jones at TorrentFreak resurrected the debate in an article called Copyright Infringement and Theft – The Difference. In it, Jones says, “A common recurring theme in the comments here on TorrentFreak is that P2P file-sharing is ‘stealing’. While such sentiments are often expressed by the industry lobby groups, it’s completely at odds with the law. It could also be the very LAST thing those bodies want.”

In the article, Jones makes the argument that since copyright infringement is enforced in courts through infringement claims rather than theft claims, it is wrong to ever use theft-type language to describe the harm caused by infringement. While this is not the only argument used by the “infringement is not theft” crowd, it is one of the more common ones.

It is also semantic nonsense.

At the risk of belaboring this point, here are five reasons why this argument fails.

#1. It’s based on an imaginary rule

According to the argument advanced in the TorrentFreak article, it’s wrong to call copyright infringement theft because it isn’t prosecuted under theft statutes.

This argument implies a rule: you’re only allowed to use words in their formal, legal manner. Throw away your Merriam-Webster’s, because the Blacks Law Dictionary is the only proper source for learning the meaning of a word.

Even the strictest language prescriptivist would cringe at the thought of such a rule. Many words have different meanings in different contexts — a certain definition in one context doesn’t preclude other definitions in other contexts.

#2. It assumes there’s only one legal definition for theft

If we accept this arbitrary, made-up rule, we still run into problems. Which legal definition of “theft” do we use? Every jurisdiction has its own specific definition; in the US, that means there is a different definition in each state.

Some states don’t call it “theft” at all. In West Virginia, for example, the criminal deprivation of personal property is prosecuted as either grand or petit larceny, depending on the value of the property. 1W.Va.Code § 61-3-13. Cries of “Larceny isn’t theft!” would be the nonsensical result of this argument. Stealing is stealing no matter what a lawyer is required to call it for pleading purposes.

#3. The same argument doesn’t make sense with other words

Suppose, for the sake of argument, that we can get around the previous two objections: it’s a settled rule that we should only use words in their formal, legal sense, and we can agree on a legal definition for “theft.” We still run into absurd results under this argument.

“Theft” is commonly used to describe the criminal offense of depriving someone of personal property. But in most jurisdictions, someone can sue for a wrongful deprivation in civil court rather than pressing charges. Such a claim would be for conversion — the “unauthorized dominion over personal property in interference with a plaintiff’s legal title or superior right of possession” 2LoPresti v. Terwilliger, 126 F.3d 34, 41 (2nd Cir. 1997).. It’s entirely accurate, then, to say that “conversion isn’t theft”, but so what? The nature of the act itself doesn’t change depending on which court the claim is brought in.

#4. Stealing or theft?

The crux of the argument advanced in the TorrentFreak article is that infringement isn’t theft, but it kicks off with an example of a comment that “P2P file-sharing is ‘stealing'”. So which is it? Even if this particular argument was valid, does that mean it extends to the characterization of infringement as stealing? Stealing isn’t a legal term, after all — though it should be noted that, in the US, criminal copyright infringement is codified under the heading “Stolen Property“.

This little switch-a-roo just highlights the semantic shenanigans involved in the “infringement isn’t theft” argument.

#5. Some pretty smart people disagree

The argument that calling copyright infringement “theft” is “completely at odds with the law” takes on a patronizing air — i.e., “you’re only calling it theft because you don’t understand the law as well as we do.” This is no more than hubris, however; many people whose job it is to know the law know better.

In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. Grokster, Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens and O’Connor, said, “deliberate unlawful copying is no less an unlawful taking of property than garden-variety theft.” 3545 US 913, 961 (2005) (concurrence). The Supreme Court has been comfortable referring to copyright infringement as theft on other occasions. 4For example, Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, 471 US 539, 558 (1985) (citing Iowa State University Research Foundation v. American Broadcasting Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 61 (2nd Cir. 1980): “The fair use doctrine is not a license for corporate theft, empowering a court to ignore a copyright whenever it determines the underlying work contains material of possible public importance” ; Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 415 US 394, 417 (1974) (J. Blackmun, dissent in part): “A CATV that builds an antenna to pick up telecasts in Area B and then transmits it by cable to Area A is reproducing the copyrighted work, not pursuant to a license from the owner of the copyright, but by theft”; Dun v. Lumberman’s Credit Assn, 209 US 20,22 (1908): “[a] number of instances are disclosed in the evidence which have strong tendency to establish the charge that defendants have used some of complainants’ copyright material in making their book … such indicia is held to indicate a substantial theft of copyright property.” Lower courts and Congress have also used “theft” to describe copyright infringement on various occassions. 5See, for example, In re Verizon Internet Services, 240 F.Supp.2d 24, 35 (D. DC 2003): “There is little doubt that the largest opportunity for copyright theft is through peer-to-peer (“P2P”) software”; A&M Records v. Napster, 114 F.Supp.2d 896, 900 (ND Cali 2000): “The matter before the court concerns the boundary between sharing and theft, personal use and the unauthorized world-wide distribution of copyrighted music and sound recordings”; Protecting Intellectual Rights Against Theft and Expropriation Act, S.2863 (2004); Artists’ Rights and Theft Prevention Act, S.1932 (2003); Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act, PL 106-160 (1999); No Electronic Theft Act, PL 105-147 (1997).

Perhaps TorrentFreak and the rest of the “infringement isn’t theft” crowd knows more about the law than Supreme Court Justices, federal court judges, and Congress, but I’m willing to bet that that’s not the case.

Copyright infringement is theft

Language is incredibly malleable; we use words in a variety of ways. Many people over the centuries have described the deprivation of the exclusive rights in the fruits of their creative endeavors as “theft”, there’s no question about that.

But I think it is fair to ask why some bristle at any mention of theft in connection with infringement and piracy. I highly doubt their motives are solely to increase legal literacy by ensuring that words are used in their exact legal sense — mistakenly, in this case, as shown above. After all, one doesn’t have to look very far to see losing civil defendants being described as having been found “guilty”, or statutory damages for infringement being described as “fines” by these same critics — both terms that aren’t accurate in their strictly legal sense.

It’s my sense that this linguistic peeving is explained by the fact that “theft” has definite moral overtones to it, while “infringement” is still capable of euphemistically avoiding any moral concerns. Perhaps proponents of this argument hope that by straining semantics, they don’t have to confront the very real harm that infringement causes to creators and the public.

In other words, the “infringement isn’t theft” argument is often just cover for some other point.

References

References
1 W.Va.Code § 61-3-13.
2 LoPresti v. Terwilliger, 126 F.3d 34, 41 (2nd Cir. 1997).
3 545 US 913, 961 (2005) (concurrence).
4 For example, Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, 471 US 539, 558 (1985) (citing Iowa State University Research Foundation v. American Broadcasting Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 61 (2nd Cir. 1980): “The fair use doctrine is not a license for corporate theft, empowering a court to ignore a copyright whenever it determines the underlying work contains material of possible public importance” ; Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 415 US 394, 417 (1974) (J. Blackmun, dissent in part): “A CATV that builds an antenna to pick up telecasts in Area B and then transmits it by cable to Area A is reproducing the copyrighted work, not pursuant to a license from the owner of the copyright, but by theft”; Dun v. Lumberman’s Credit Assn, 209 US 20,22 (1908): “[a] number of instances are disclosed in the evidence which have strong tendency to establish the charge that defendants have used some of complainants’ copyright material in making their book … such indicia is held to indicate a substantial theft of copyright property.”
5 See, for example, In re Verizon Internet Services, 240 F.Supp.2d 24, 35 (D. DC 2003): “There is little doubt that the largest opportunity for copyright theft is through peer-to-peer (“P2P”) software”; A&M Records v. Napster, 114 F.Supp.2d 896, 900 (ND Cali 2000): “The matter before the court concerns the boundary between sharing and theft, personal use and the unauthorized world-wide distribution of copyrighted music and sound recordings”; Protecting Intellectual Rights Against Theft and Expropriation Act, S.2863 (2004); Artists’ Rights and Theft Prevention Act, S.1932 (2003); Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act, PL 106-160 (1999); No Electronic Theft Act, PL 105-147 (1997).
By , August 24, 2011.

Rick Falkvinge, founder of the Pirate Party and self-described “political evangelist“, loves to tell stories.

Last week on TorrentFreak, Falkvinge wrote a post called Nobody Asked for a Refrigerator Fee. In it, he tells the story of the refrigerator and how it displaced the need for home delivery of ice blocks. The broader point is that this industry “had been made totally obsolete by technical development.”

Falkvinge compares this story to today, where some monolithic “copyright industry” is being displaced by “new expressions of culture” and file-sharing. The difference is that when the “ice distribution industry became obsolete”, “no refrigerator owner was sued for making their own cold and ignoring the existing corporate cold distribution chains.”

It’s a neat story, one that plays well with the anti-copyright crowd, but unfortunately gets a number of things wrong.

For starters (and this is only a sidenote), anyone who has been to a convenience store lately and seen bags of ice for sale can tell you that the “ice distribution industry” did not become obsolete with the arrival of the refrigerator. It is, in fact, a $2.5 billion industry today.

Secondly, Falkvinge’s equating of distributors of a single product to the entire “copyright industry” is inexact. The “copyright industry”, as it were, includes not only distributors, but also creators, producers, publishers, and various other component companies. The International Intellectual Property Alliance divides copyright industries in four general groups, and describes them like this:

The core industries include newspapers and periodicals, book publishing and related industries, music publishing, radio and television broadcasting, cable television, records and tapes, motion pictures, theatrical productions, advertising and computer software and data processing. Most of these industries are engaged primarily in the generation, production and dissemination of new copyrighted material. Some, such as software (including business, education and entertainment applications) and data processing, include both the generation of copyrighted material and its application.

The second group comprises the partial copyright industries, a disparate collection of industries, only part of whose products are copyrighted materials. These industries range from fabric to business forms to architecture. The third group, distribution, includes the industries that distribute copyrighted materials to businesses and consumers. Examples include transportation services, libraries, and wholesale and retail trade involved in the distribution of copyrighted products. The fourth group involves the copyright-related industries, those that produce and distribute products that are used wholly or principally in conjunction with copyrighted materials, such as computers, radios, televisions, and consumer recording and listening devices. We refer to the four groups together — core, partial, distribution, and related — as the total copyright industries. 1Copyright Industries in the US Economy, the 2002 Report, Stephen E. Siwek (2002).

Most importantly, just as “no refrigerator owner was sued for making their own cold and ignoring the existing corporate cold distribution chains,” no one has been sued for making their own music, or films, or any other product of creative effort.

No one has been sued either for the business model they’ve adopted, or the technology they use. And there are plenty of new ones in place, with varying levels of success. Jamendo uses BitTorrent technology to distribute its members’ music; Bandcamp gives emerging musicians a variety of methods for selling to fans, from pay-what-you-want digital sales to physical merchandise fulfillment — authors, filmmakers, and other creative professionals have a wealth of options alongside “traditional” avenues for distributing and marketing their works, all legal. The “copyright industries” themselves continue to innovate as well, with new, legal ways for people to experience existing content appearing every day.

What isn’t legal, however, is distributing or selling other people’s work without appropriate permission. Those companies and individuals that have done that — Napster, Aimster, Grokster, Limewire, Isohunt, et al. — have indeed been sued. Not because they “ignored the existing corporate distribution chain” but because they ignored the exclusive rights creators have to the products of their labor. Whatever business model or technology they used to do that is irrelevant.

I’m continually amazed that those like Falkvinge have such a difficult time with such a simple concept. Then again, it’s a lot easier to justify piracy by falsely characterizing it as simply a new way of doing business.

References

By , July 20, 2011.

Yesterday I was able to take Spotify for a test-drive after getting a beta invite. My dad was nearby, so I asked him for a song to see how deep the catalog was. He recommended “Trouser Press” by the Bonzo Dog Band.

I don’t get my dad’s taste in music.

I also don’t get this post about Spotify by the Electronic Frontier Foundation. Titled Spotify’s US Launch Highlights the Good, the Bad, and the Promise of Subscription-Based Music Services, it seems mostly to use the launch of Spotify as an excuse to dust off archaic complaints against the entire recording industry.

Instead of being forced to buy full-length CDs at $15.99, fans can now make their own decision about how much they value music and how much of it they want.

What the EFF? Setting aside this patronizing view of consumers being compelled to purchase music against their will, what happened to iTunes? Thousands of record labels have provided single songs for sale on the site since it launched in 2003. Before iTunes, record labels had been experimenting with digital single sales since at least 1997, before the arrival of Napster even. 1See, for example, Sue Zeidler, New Music Goes on Sale Online, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, pg 5, Sept. 8, 1997. An entire generation has grown up that hasn’t ever been “forced to buy full-length CDs at $15.99”.

The EFF continues:

Of course, the record labels could have launched a service like this years ago.

This statement is baffling for a number of reasons.

First, Spotify isn’t the first streaming music subscription service. Others include Rhapsody, Rdio, and Mog. I didn’t pick those three randomly, they’re the three services that the EFF mentioned only sentences before. Rhapsody has had music from the catalogs of all the major labels available since 2002 — nine years ago.

Second, record labels aren’t necessarily the ones who should be developing services like this in the first place. They’re in the business of recording and marketing music, not technology. It makes as much sense as saying, prior to the internet, that record labels should have been the ones developing and operating physical stores where CDs and albums were sold.

Put another way, if technology companies could have made the type of service the EFF finds acceptable years ago, but for the record labels’ licensing terms, why is no one asking why technology companies haven’t developed and recorded their own catalog of music?

Most baffling is why the EFF wrote this in the first place. The EFF is a public interest group that bills itself as “the first line of defense” for “when our freedoms in the networked world come under attack.” It’s difficult to see how a thinly-veiled criticism of the collective business decisions of an entire industry fits this purpose — especially when those criticisms have been obsolete for at least a decade. Never mind that the EFF welcomes the arrival of Spotify — with licenses for the major labels’ music — in the US. When it comes to the EFF’s view of record labels, it seems to be “damned if you do, damned if you don’t.”

References

References
1 See, for example, Sue Zeidler, New Music Goes on Sale Online, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, pg 5, Sept. 8, 1997.
By , May 26, 2011.

Last week, Andy Sellars responded to a post I had made about the free speech critique of copyright mistake, where I provided his statement that “Copyright itself is a content-based form of regulation: it determines the legality or illegality of speech on the basis of how the speech is expressed,” as an example of why it’s important to draw a distinction between how the word “content” can be used in a general sense and how the word is used in a specific manner in First Amendment jurisprudence, as shaped by US courts.

It’s well-worth a read. Today, I’d like to continue the discussion.

Sellars correctly notes that “The crux of Hart’s argument is that people like me (and Powell, Lange, Volokh, and Lemley) are using ‘content’ incorrectly in the First Amendment context. This is not pedantic. As Hart notes, the word ‘content’ carries a lot of weight in the First Amendment realm. Finding a restriction to be content-based invites strict scrutiny, from which few restrictions survive.”

Sellars response: “I stand behind those words, but I certainly do not mean to suggest that copyright-regulates-content-and-is-therefore-unconstitutional. There are those that go that far; I’m not one of them. Hart’s critique, however, takes an impermissibly narrow view of content-based restriction under the First Amendment. Copyright is a content based restriction of speech as First Amendment law traditionally defines that term, but, I argue, should be viewed as one of the classic, time immemorial exceptions to the traditional prohibition of content-based restrictions.”

Sellars goes on to provide support for this argument in his post.

From a normative sense, there’s certainly no problem with Sellar’s contention that copyright should be considered a “content-based restriction of speech as First Amendment law traditionally defines that term.” Others have advanced that idea, and while I disagree with it, everyone is entitled to their own opinions.

But I disagree that this contention is correct in a descriptive sense.

Copyright is not a Content-Based Regulation of Speech

To reiterate, courts entertaining a First Amendment argument against a law are concerned with whether it acts to suppress ideas.

At the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence. Our political system and cultural life rest upon this ideal. Government action that stifles speech on account of its message, or that requires the utterance of a particular message favored by the Government, contravenes this essential right. Laws of this sort pose the inherent risk that the Government seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or information or manipulate the public debate through coercion rather than persuasion. These restrictions “rais[e] the specter that the Government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.”

For these reasons, the First Amendment, subject only to narrow and well-understood exceptions, does not countenance governmental control over the content of messages expressed by private individuals. Our precedents thus apply the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech because of its content. Laws that compel speakers to utter or distribute speech bearing a particular message are subject to the same rigorous scrutiny. In contrast, regulations that are unrelated to the content of speech are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny, because in most cases they pose a less substantial risk of excising certain ideas or viewpoints from the public dialogue. 1Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC, 512 US 622, 641-43 (1994).

Contrary to Sellars assertion, copyright law is not a content-based restriction of speech” under this definition. In fact, it is not even a content-neutral regulation in First Amendment parlance, a point made explicit by the Supreme Court in Eldred v. Ashcroft.

But again, this doesn’t mean copyright law is immune from the constitution’s proscription on infringing freedom of speech. As Eldred points out, copyright law has built-in free speech safeguards: the idea/expression distinction and fair use. The effect of these safeguards is the same as the tests used outside of copyright law, it’s just the legal terms of art that are different.

Perhaps nothing illustrates this idea better than Triangle Publications v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers. The lower court had — for the first time in US history — defeated a copyright claim based on a First Amendment defense. 2Triangle Publications v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, 445 F. Supp. 875 (D Fla 1978). On appeal, the 5th Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision — but on the grounds of fair use rather than a First Amendment defense. 3Triangle Publications v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, 626 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir 1980).

So when Sellars says:

Hart (and Prof. Greenberg, whom Hart cites) seem to be defining ‘content-based’ as efforts made to suppress ideas instead of means. Copyright is not ‘content-based,’ the argument goes, because ideas are not monopolized under copyright, and copyright makes no effort to preference certain ideas over others. Copyright addresses means. You can say what you want, you just can’t use protected expression to do so — we all know the quote from Eldred about using “other people’s speeches.” And they’re not alone in arguing this. The esteemed Chemerinski Treatise also suggests that “content-based” restrictions can be broken down into either (a) viewpoint-based or (b) subject-matter based, and those that are neither are content-neutral. Copyright is clearly neither.

This is an incomplete view of content-based restrictions.

He is ignoring the the clear import that law has given to the definition of “content-based.” It is not only me (and Prof. Greenberg) who has defined “content-based” in the way I described, it is the Supreme Court and lower courts — the same courts that came up with this language in First Amendment jurisprudence in the first place — that define it this way.

The Goals of Free Speech

Sellars next identifies some of the underlying goals of the First Amendment’s limit on abridging the freedom of speech.

The policies of the First Amendment similarly favor drawing “content-based” restrictions broadly, as the Court has. The concerns around government regulation of speech go beyond controlling content as a proxy for controlling viewpoint, a concern raised by Hart vis-à-vis Turner. The worry about undue interference in the marketplace of ideas is not our only concern in First Amendment law. There is a fundamental autonomy to speech that we identify and respect. We are all repulsed by the thought of someone telling us “you can’t say/print/post that,” whatever “that” is. We do not want to have to worry, or self-censor, or feel in any way restrained in our speech. (Imagine, for example, a law prohibiting the use of “filler words“ in public discourse. Clearly not viewpoint or subject matter based, and yet certainly likely to receive strict scrutiny.) The right to unencumbered expression is a natural right recognized by the First Amendment, limited by our law only in areas where we have another overriding concern. And thus any regulation of speech that depends on regulating the exact words used should invite strict scrutiny, be it embraced in a viewpoint judgment or not.

It’s correct that fundamental autonomy to speech is an important policy of the First Amendment — not the only policy, but perhaps the one that most people readily grasp.

But autonomy to act freely is not without its limits. One rather salient limit is on your freedom to act when it impinges on someone else’s own freedom. Or to put it another way, “Your right to swing your arms ends just where the other man’s nose begins.” 4Zechariah Chafee, Freedom of Speech in War Time.

“In my judgment, every principle of justice, equity, morality, fitness and sound policy concurs, in protecting the literary labours of men, to the same extent that property acquired by manual labour is protected.” 5Wheaton v. Peters, 33 US 591, 672 (1834) (J. Thompson dissent). However one characterizes the species of rights secured by copyright law, these are rights that Congress protects pursuant to an expressly enumerated power authorized by the Constitution. What’s more, copyright creators have their own speech interests that must be considered under the question of infringement. 6I’ve previously written on this subject, see Speech Interests of Creators and The Chilling Effect of Copyright Infringement for example.

Protecting the freedom of speech advances many goals beyond autonomy. The familiar refrain of Eldred that copyright is the “engine of free expression” illustrates most plainly how the First Amendment is only one tool of many for advancing these goals. Sellars, and other free speech critics of copyright, are concerned that the balance between copyright protection and the First Amendment limitation has tipped to the detriment of freedom of speech. But we should be equally as concerned that free speech can be negatively impacted if the balance tips the other way. As the Supreme Court noted:

It is fundamentally at odds with the scheme of copyright to accord lesser rights in those works that are of greatest importance to the public. Such a notion ignores the major premise of copyright and injures author and public alike. “[T]o propose that fair use be imposed whenever the ‘social value [of dissemination] . . . outweighs any detriment to the artist,’ would be to propose depriving copyright owners of their right in the property precisely when they encounter those users who could afford to pay for it.” And as one commentator has noted: “If every volume that was in the public interest could be pirated away by a competing publisher, . . . the public [soon] would have nothing worth reading.” 7Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 US 539, 559 (1985).

Despite the contrast in our approaches, however, Sellars and I reach the same conclusion. He writes:

But here’s the thing that may distinguish me from others that take this position: I’m okay with copyright existing as a content-based discrimination. I firmly believe that the First Amendment was not designed to trump the Article I power of Congress to provide limited-time exclusivity to writings.  I maintain that copyright (done well) is still an incredibly valuable tool for the creation and dissemination of culture. I agree with Hart when he argues that copyright is the engine of free expression. And I agree with Hart when he claims that copyright’s own “built in free speech safeguards” account for copyright’s First Amendment analysis. This is a perfectly accurate statement of the Court’s approach, at least in our post-Eldred pre-Golan world. (And I’m inclined to believe that this Court will only undercut the First Amendment role when it takes up Golan next term.)

Copyright’s Procedure

Where we depart is at Sellar’s concern that the First Amendment is not adequately represented in the latest approaches to protecting copyright:

But this does not mean that the First Amendment has no role to play in the copyright context. As an unprotected category of speech, it is still subject to the procedural protections that govern all speech regulation. Because another concern guides our First Amendment jurisprudence: the fear of overeager or premature action by the government in the name permissible speech regulation. As I detail fairly extensively in my article above, when adjudication of legality depends entirely on the exact words used and their meaning, courts wait to make sure that the speech meets one of the proscribable categories before they take it out of circulation. Our doctrine has created procedural protections to make sure that lawful, legal speech is not retrained or punished in the name of getting unlawful, proscribable speech (like infringing speech). The law does not require full adjudication, as Freedman v. Maryland shows, but it requires a neutral party to make that determination before speech is enjoined. This is the central problem I identify with Operation In Our Sites: no serious effort is made by any neutral party to determine the legality of speech before websites find their domains seized.

I disagree for several reasons — though the following reasons differ from my reasons for saying that the seizure of domain names is allowed under current First Amendment jurisprudence (namely, that no content is seized or removed from circulation, it remains in the custody of the site operator.)

First, it makes sense to deal with different kinds of speech with different approaches to what procedures are constitutionally adequate, a point glossed over by Sellars. While it seems attractive to have consistent rules for any case involving the First Amendment, that does little to advance its goals. The justifications for regulating obscenity differ greatly from those for regulating libel; the dangers that can arise out of overzealous regulation also differ greatly. Courts generally avoid treating First Amendment jurisprudence in different types of speech cases interchangeably. For example, the DC District Court noted in 2003 that “The Supreme Court has not extended Blount’s requirements of ‘built-in safeguards’ and judicial review beyond the obscenity context,  and lower federal courts have declined to apply Blount and its progeny in other contexts.” 8In re Verizon Internet Services, 257 F. Supp. 2d 244, 262.

Second, the unbroken history of the types of procedures, and procedural protections, available in copyright infringement cases lends support to the idea that existing copyright procedure is constitutionally adequate. Preliminary injunctions are common in infringement cases, and even ex parte injunctions, while rare, are not unheard of. 9For example, see the Order granting a TRO in Capitol Records v. Bluebeat (Nov 5, 2009). Large seizures of pirated and infringing goods are made every year by federal and state law enforcement. Federal administrative seizures of mass quantities of infringing goods are also common. I don’t see any systemic suppression of ideas or viewpoints throughout this history — or what benefits additional procedural protections could bring, and if they are worth the trade-off in detriments they would bring.

Finally, copyright law is simply ill-suited to being called a “government regulation” of speech. Although courts provide the forum for infringement suits, the dispute is a private rather than a public one. The free speech critique of copyright relies substantially on infringement lawsuits as a state action, since the First Amendment doesn’t limit the actions of private individuals.

David McGowan explains the problems he has with the “state action” argument:

It is false to say that copyright “targets” protected speech. The rights do not distinguish between protected and unprotected expression. Specific suits target speech, but in general these are not brought by government officials. They are brought by rights holders, as a trespass action would be brought by a landowner. For all the similarities in analysis, employing the language of general and specific regulations obscures a fact that a straightforward state-action analysis would stress: To the extent that there is “targeting,” or potentially worrisome motives, they involve private rights holders, who probably are after revenue or their own artistic vision, and not government officials trying to feather their nests, hide their misdeeds, or perpetuate their power. 10David McGowan, Some Realism about the Free Speech Critique of Copyright, 74 Fordham Law Review 101, 113-14 (2005).

McGowan’s comparison of copyright infringement to trespass is illuminating. We generally wouldn’t worry about the freedom of speech of someone who breaks into a home, no matter how much they are talking.

Noted First Amendment scholar Lillian BeVier considers this analogy between, on the one hand, the First Amendment and trespass and, on the other hand, the First Amendment and copyright and concludes that it is particularly apt. 11Copyright, Trespass and the First Amendment: An Institutional Perspective, 21 Soc. Phil. & Pol’y 104 (2004).

In the following passage, she takes a broader look at why copyright law resembles little the content-based regulations of First Amendment jurisprudence, providing a fitting conclusion:

Rubenfeld’s implication that copyright law is at odds with the First Amendment’s aversion to content regulation takes no account of a very important fact: even if the question of whether the defendant has infringed turns in every case on the “content” of both the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s work, the nature of the inquiry into content will not bring into play any of the reasons for the aversion to content regulation. The Court’s express distrust of content-based regulations is more than a convenient knee-jerk doctrinal guideline. It reflects a number of concerns that emerge from consideration of the First Amendment’s animating values. For example, it reflects a concern for equality —that particular categories of speech be treated equally so as to deflect the government from attempting to manipulate public discourse. Second, it reflects a concern to prevent government from regulating speech based on its communicative impact, thus forestalling restrictions of speech that surreptitiously rely on constitutionally disfavored justifications. It reflects a concern to foreclose the possibility that government will deliberately distort debate by preventing the communication of particular disfavored ideas, viewpoints, or items of information. Finally, it reflects a concern with improper legislative motivation.

But a judgment that a copyright defendant’s work reproduces the plaintiff’s, or is based upon it, or distributes or publicly performs it, though it will of course be based on the content of both the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s speech, simply raises none of these concerns. It does not jeopardize the equality of treatment of particular categories of speech so as to enable government to manipulate discussion. It does not turn on the speech’s communicative impact. And it does not raise the risk of an improper government motivation to prevent the dissemination of particular ideas, viewpoints, or items of information that the government disfavors. In fact, the predicate for copyright liability is not the communicativeness of an infringer’s speech at all. It is, rather, its similarity to the plaintiff’s — and even then it is only its similarity to the plaintiff’s expression, not to the ideas or facts therein.

References

References
1 Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC, 512 US 622, 641-43 (1994).
2 Triangle Publications v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, 445 F. Supp. 875 (D Fla 1978).
3 Triangle Publications v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, 626 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir 1980).
4 Zechariah Chafee, Freedom of Speech in War Time.
5 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 US 591, 672 (1834) (J. Thompson dissent).
6 I’ve previously written on this subject, see Speech Interests of Creators and The Chilling Effect of Copyright Infringement for example.
7 Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 US 539, 559 (1985).
8 In re Verizon Internet Services, 257 F. Supp. 2d 244, 262.
9 For example, see the Order granting a TRO in Capitol Records v. Bluebeat (Nov 5, 2009).
10 David McGowan, Some Realism about the Free Speech Critique of Copyright, 74 Fordham Law Review 101, 113-14 (2005).
11 Copyright, Trespass and the First Amendment: An Institutional Perspective, 21 Soc. Phil. & Pol’y 104 (2004).
By , May 17, 2011.

Did you hear that Florida just outlawed sex?

This was pointed out by Southern Fried Scientist, after reading of a Florida bill that prohibits “knowing sexual conduct or sexual contact with an animal.” Humans are, after all, animals, so by definition, Florida has just made normal sexual relations a crime.

Obviously, that’s not what happened. As Rick Hasen at Election Law Blog points out, “A court facing a question of interpreting the statute would almost certainly read the statute’s use of the term ‘animals’ as ‘non-human animals,’ both to avoid absurdity and to conform with (1) the intent of the drafters; (2) the purpose of the statute; and (3) a commonly used (if scientifically inaccurate) understanding of the term ‘animal’ to exclude humans.”

But it does provide a good example of language in the law. Law, in many respects, is semantics. It is based on words written down in constitutions, statutes, and court opinions, and shaped by how courts, lawyers, and the public interpret those words.

Underneath the veneer of the plain meaning of language in law is a mass of complex and sometimes inscrutable precepts. Hasen, above, advances three such precepts to explain why ‘animal’ doesn’t include humans in the Florida law. To a lawyer, understanding how language works in law is second nature, but to the layperson, much of it may seem like “the art of the puzzling and confounding.”

Law professor Frederick Schauer describes this better than I do:

There are times when law uses language of its own making, often in  Latin — replevin, assumpsit, quantum meruit, habeas corpus, res judicata — and sometimes even in English—bailment, demurrer, due process, joinder, interpleader, easement. Such terms have little if any meaning for the layperson, but they can still have plain meanings in law and for lawyers and judges. So as long as one believes in anything close to plain or literal meaning at all, such terms, when used inside the legal world, do not present special problems. Like the words of ordinary language, the meaning here is determined by the rules of use of the relevant linguistic community, but here that community is the community of legal actors rather than the men on the Clapham omnibus.

Things become somewhat more problematic, however, when terms have both ordinary and technical legal meanings. We know that ‘due  process’ in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments has a legal/constitutional meaning with no ordinary counterpart. The  women on the D train are no more likely ever to use the term than are the men on the Clapham omnibus. But the same does not hold true for ‘speech’ and ‘religion’ in the First Amendment or ‘arms’ in the Second or ‘searches’ in the Fourth. Here there are both ordinary and legal meanings, and the question is about the relation between them. So too outside of constitutional law, where words such as ‘trespass,’ ‘complaint,’ and even ‘contract’ have legal meanings that diverge from their nonlegal ones. 1A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park, 83 New York University Law Review 1109, 1123 (2008).

When is content not content?

What does this have to do with copyright?

Well, some critics of the law base their objection on the premise that copyright protection infringes on the freedom of speech. 2See Copyright and Censorship, note 17, for an inexhaustive list of such criticisms. A few — certainly not all — of these criticisms are based on the following line of thought: copyright law regulates content, content-based regulations presumptively violate the First Amendment, therefore much of copyright law is unconstitutional.

One recent example is from a paper by Andrew Sellars, who wrote, “Copyright itself is a content-based form of regulation: it determines the legality or illegality of speech on the basis of how the speech is expressed.” 3Seized Sites: The In Rem Forfeiture of Copyright-Infringing Domain Names (May 8, 2011). (I don’t mean to single out Mr. Sellars, I only highlight this quote to provide an example of the argument.)

The Supreme Court, of course, rejected the classification of copyright as even a content-neutral regulation — which, in First Amendment parlance, still merits a higher standard of review than general laws. 4Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 US 186, 218-19 (2003). But, looking at the language being used, how can this be? How can copyright law restrict content yet not restrict content?

The answer lies in understanding how language is being used. Law professor Marc Greenberg explains:

The strength, and weakness, of this argument lies in the definition of the term ‘content’ in the Free Speech context, in the context of judicial interpretations of the First Amendment, and in the copyright context.  I submit that content in the free speech context refers both to the ideas a speaker presents, and the language or other expressive means used to present that idea.  For courts applying the term ‘content’ in a strict scrutiny context seeking to determine if a statute violates the First Amendment by banning certain works, the term ‘content’ is focused on the ideas expressed, and not on the means of expression used. Finally, copyright, in particular infringement cases, focuses purely on the means of expression used, since the statute expressly precludes protection for ideas. The Critics seek to use the free speech definition as a basis for challenging copyright—arguing under this definition that since copyright clearly ‘deals’ with content, it is a content-based law which requires strict scrutiny and a bias in favor of finding that it violates First Amendment protections.  The problem with this approach is that content, when subject to any copyright law analysis, only pertains to expression, and therefore the claim that for constitutional purposes it means more than that is erroneous. Professor Baker supports the Critics’ view by suggesting that under a strict scrutiny analysis, warranted because copyright deals with content, the market incentive concerns underlying copyright do not rise to the level of a compelling government concern, and proposes that perhaps those concerns can be addressed by less restrictive means. He writes: “If content must be examined to determine if a law is violated then the law is content based.” Does  this  mean that reporting a theft of art from your home, in which the police must have a description of the art, means that art theft is a content-based law?  Similarly, in a case of the theft of a rare book, a description of the book, the art on the cover, and its subject matter is required—does this make the theft law subject to a content-based strict scrutiny?  Additional examples from art and music illustrate the problems with this approach.  A copy of a musical piece focuses on the sequence of notes, not the underlying melody or musical concept embodied in the piece.  A derivative copy of a piece of artwork repeats elements of the composition, not the content, consisting of the concept of the piece.

The question that should be asked is whether the restriction on content found in copyright law really abridges someone’s freedom of expression and whether there is a fair policy in saying that anyone is free, for example, to paint a portrait.  However, they are not free to take someone else’s property, their painting of a portrait, and use that for their own benefit.  Interestingly enough, what this argument does is turn one of copyright’s attributes, the ability to reuse the work via copies without diminishing it, against the creator.  There is no question that if I wanted to paint a portrait, and saw a similar portrait you did on your wall,  that I cannot, in my expression of free speech, come into your house, take your painting, cut out the face in it, and put it in my painting.  But because art in the digital world can more easily be reproduced through mechanical means, suddenly it is a violation of your freedom of expression to take a copy of the work, which is sold with the express understanding that it may not be used by you, and use it for your own purposes, be they commercial or noncommercial. 5Reason or Madness: A Defense of Copyright’s Growing Pains, 7 John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law 1, 15-16 (2007).

This point shouldn’t be dismissed as merely arguing semantics. It’s important to make the distinction between “content” in the ordinary sense of the word and “content” in the First Amendment sense of the word. And not because it lets copyright law escape constitutional protections.

How does copyright deal with content?

The First Amendment protects against government control over “content” in the ordinary sense.

At the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence. Our political system and cultural life rest upon this ideal. Government action that stifles speech on account of its message, or that requires the utterance of a particular message favored by the Government, contravenes this essential right. Laws of this sort pose the inherent risk that the Government seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or information or manipulate the public debate through coercion rather than persuasion. These restrictions “rais[e] the specter that the Government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.”

For these reasons, the First Amendment, subject only to narrow and well-understood exceptions, does not countenance governmental control over the content of messages expressed by private individuals. Our precedents thus apply the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech because of its content. Laws that compel speakers to utter or distribute speech bearing a particular message are subject to the same rigorous scrutiny. In contrast, regulations that are unrelated to the content of speech are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny, because in most cases they pose a less substantial risk of excising certain ideas or viewpoints from the public dialogue. (Citations removed). 6Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC, 512 US 622, 641-42 (1994).

The Supreme Court has developed doctrines to test whether general laws violate the First Amendment. These doctrines aren’t applied to copyright law — not because it is immune from First Amendment scrutiny, but because copyright law’s own “built-in free speech safeguards” already account for First Amendment analysis. And these safeguards mirror the tests developed by the Court surprisingly well.

When you recognize “content” as the ideas conveyed by a speaker, and recognize that a government cannot generally suppress these ideas, you see that copyright law already accounts for this through the idea/expression distinction — the law only protects the specific expression of an idea, not the idea itself.

Traditional First Amendment jurisprudence recognizes that laws that don’t specifically target the “content” of speech may nevertheless violate free speech principles. Such laws are typically analyzed under the test set out and explained by the Supreme Court in US v. O’Brien:

We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled “speech” whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea. However, even on the assumption that the alleged communicative element in O’Brien’s conduct is sufficient to bring into play the First Amendment, it does not necessarily follow that the destruction of a registration certificate is constitutionally protected activity. This Court has held that when “speech” and “nonspeech” elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms. To characterize the quality of the governmental interest which must appear, the Court has employed a variety of descriptive terms: compelling; substantial; subordinating; paramount; cogent; strong. Whatever imprecision inheres in these terms, we think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. We find that the 1965 Amendment to § 12 (b) (3) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act meets all of these requirements, and consequently that O’Brien can be constitutionally convicted for violating it. 7United States v. O’Brien, 391 US 367, 376-77 (1968).

Copyright’s analogue to the O’Brien test is found in the fair use doctrine. That is, when does copyright law allow the speech that is made with the normally prohibited conduct of copying another’s expression?

Like O’Brien, courts use a balancing test. The balancing test is the familiar four-part fair use analysis, which looks at: “(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for non-profit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.” 817 USC § 107.

Implicit in the fair use factors are the same prerogatives of the O’Brien test. Along with the preamble, enumerating several purposes of fair use, the factors guide courts in considering whether a specific use promotes the progress of the useful arts. The qualitative and quantitative factors, along with the effect on the potential market, ensure that the restriction on using copyrighted expression is no greater than necessary to promote that progress.

I’ve talked a lot about the intersection of free speech and copyright on this site. The notion that the two areas of law are in conflict should be put to rest — I’ve even advanced the notion that copyright helps expand free speech rights. A careful analysis of the language we use, and how legal doctrines incorporate that language, show that the two are wholly consistent with the values that underlie our concept of what a free and just society should embody.

References

References
1 A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park, 83 New York University Law Review 1109, 1123 (2008).
2 See Copyright and Censorship, note 17, for an inexhaustive list of such criticisms.
3 Seized Sites: The In Rem Forfeiture of Copyright-Infringing Domain Names (May 8, 2011).
4 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 US 186, 218-19 (2003).
5 Reason or Madness: A Defense of Copyright’s Growing Pains, 7 John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law 1, 15-16 (2007).
6 Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC, 512 US 622, 641-42 (1994).
7 United States v. O’Brien, 391 US 367, 376-77 (1968).
8 17 USC § 107.
By , May 05, 2011.

One of the recurring themes seen in some criticisms of copyright law is that it is weighted too strongly in favor of creators and copyright owners, with the public good taking a back seat.

A couple of recent online posts provide examples of this argument. The first is from politician and Swedish Pirate Party founder Rick Falkvinge, who writes at TorrentFreak about Why the Copyright Industry Isn’t a Legitimate Stakeholder in Copyright. Journalist Julian Sanchez provides the second in Things that are Irrelevant to Copyright Policy.

Both provide similar views of what copyright policy should be. Falkvinge states that the purpose of copyright “is to maximize the available culture. Nothing more and nothing less.” To Sanchez, the question when considering copyright policy “is whether a marginal restriction on the general ability to use information incentivizes enough additional information production over the long run to justify denying that marginal use to every other human being on the planet, whether for simple consumption or further creation.”

I don’t want to go into a deeper discussion of either article here (though I welcome readers to discuss them further in the comments). Rather, I want to address the broader point made, as it is emblematic of a point made by copyright critics.

It’s true that copyright’s ultimate beneficiary is the public. But the immediate beneficiary is creators. More importantly, the best way to ensure the public benefits the most from copyright law is by ensuring that creators have secure and stable rights to their creations. It makes little sense to argue otherwise — if the public benefits from the creation of new works, how is that interest served by reducing the incentive to invest in creating new works?

How Copyright Benefits the Public

In the US, the Constitution gives Congress the authority, “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors … the exclusive Right to their … Writings.”

Explanations of how the public receives its benefit through the law begin with the author of the Copyright Clause itself, James Madison. In the Federalist Papers, No. 43, Madison writes, “The public good fully coincides in both cases with the claims of individuals.”

Since then, the Supreme Court has expanded this explanation:

• “Copyright is a right exercised by the owner during the term at his pleasure and exclusively for his own profit and forms the basis for extensive and profitable business enterprises. The advantage to the public is gained merely from the carrying out of the general policy in making such grants and not from any direct interest which the Government has in the use of the property which is the subject of the grants.” (Emphasis added.) 1Fox Film v. Doyal, 286 US 123, 130 (1932).

• “The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’ Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered.” (Emphasis added). 2Mazer v. Stein, 347 US 201, 219 (1954).

• “The limited scope of the copyright holder’s statutory monopoly, like the limited copyright duration required by the Constitution, reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public interest: Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts. The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.” 3Twentieth Century Music v. Aiken, 422 US 151, 156 (1975).

In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court took on the idea sometimes made that there is some kind of bargain implied in the Copyright Clause. 4537 US 186, 214-17 (2003). It is not a quid pro quo, as the grant of patent rights entails. With copyright protection, “disclosure is the desired objective, not something exacted from the author in exchange for the copyright.” As explained by the Court, unlike patent law, “copyright gives the holder no monopoly on any knowledge. A reader of an author’s writing may make full use of any fact or idea she acquires from her reading.”

Access to Culture

At times, copyright’s critics argue that the purpose of the law is not only to increase the creation of new works, but also to increase the public’s access to those works. This argument only works if we expand the meaning of “access” to include not only the ability of someone to read, watch, or listen to copyrighted works — the number of outlets for getting legal content has exploded in recent years — but the ability to do so instantly, in as many formats as possible, for as close to free as possible.

The four dissenting Justices in Sony v. Universal City Studios warned against this idea of access. It’s “tempting,” they said, to reduce the scope of copyright protection to “permit unfettered use” by new technologies “in order to increase access,” but doing so “risks eroding the very basis of copyright law, by depriving authors of control over their works and consequently of their incentive to create.”

The Justices added these remarks from Abraham Kaminstein, Register of Copyrights during the run-up to the 1976 Copyright Act revision:

I realize, more clearly now than I did in 1961, that the revolution in communications has brought with it a serious challenge to the author’s copyright. This challenge comes not only from the ever-growing commercial interests who wish to use the author’s works for private gain. An equally serious attack has come from people with a sincere interest in the public welfare who fully recognize … ‘that the real heart of civilization… owes its existence to the author’; ironically, in seeking to make the author’s works widely available by freeing them from copyright restrictions, they fail to realize that they are whittling away the very thing that nurtures authorship in the first place. An accommodation among conflicting demands must be worked out, true enough, but not by denying the fundamental constitutional directive: to encourage cultural progress by securing the author’s exclusive rights to him for a limited time. 5464 US 417, 481, n.34 (1984).

Conclusion

The public, rather than copyright holders, is the true beneficiary of the law. It benefits by the creation of works that might otherwise not have been created, and by the exclusive rights encouraging dissemination. Julian Sanchez even notes this, saying, “We are all the massive beneficiaries of millennia of accumulated human scientific knowledge and cultural output, and not one of us did anything [to] deserve a jot of it.”

Barbara Ringer, the first female Register of Copyrights in the US, provides the best summary of the argument against claims that the public’s interest is underserved by copyright law. Her words, spoken over 30 years ago, are just as relevant today:

The 1909 Joint Congressional Committee, in its report No. 2223, made a statement which has been quoted many times and which I agreed with at one time, but which I have ceased to agree with.

I will paraphrase it. It was that copyright is not for the protection of the author, but for the public and that where the author’s interests and the public’s interests conflict, the author must yield.

This sounds great and for a long time, I felt that this was probably correct. But, the more I have looked upon the status of authors in this country and the fact that the public interest is badly served when authors are badly served, I have felt that too often the public interest has been identified with economic users rather than with authors.

In recent years, partly as a result of this whole revision exercise, I have been trying to gage individual issues in terms of their impact upon creativity and authorship, which I consider the ultimate public interest.

The Constitution speaks of the desirability of promoting the progress of science and useful arts, science in the broad sense of learning or knowledge, by offering protection for limited times to authors and inventors.

It seems to me that it is this protection, the exclusive rights that are supposed to be granted to authors, that is the ultimate public interest that the Constitution and its drafters were thinking about.

I do not think that this has ever been fully or even partly realized in any copyright law we have had in our entire history.

[…]

I think that the system that we have had has been based on the desire to induce dissemination, make works available to the public by offering protection to authors.

I think that this system is now subject to some difficulty because of the fact that the new technology has made it an absolute detriment to disseminate. In other words, an author in certain situations who lets the bird out of the cage, finds that there is no way to regain it, that once he has made a tape and it has been played over the radio or television, he finds suddenly it is being pirated or made in duplicates all over the country.

It is very, very difficult in that situation for him to realize any economic gain or reward for his creation and there may be situations in which he would prefer to keep his bird in its cage, so to speak.

I am speaking in terms of music, but I think the example is better in some areas where there is a more realistic possibility of exercising complete control.

The task of your committee, as I see it, is to try in some way to evaluate the impact of the new dissemination media on the basic task of giving authors a reasonable return and inducing them to let the work go out to the public. 6Copyright Law Revision Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives Ninety-Fourth Congress, First Session on H.R. 2223, pp. 116-17 (May 7, 1975).

References

References
1 Fox Film v. Doyal, 286 US 123, 130 (1932).
2 Mazer v. Stein, 347 US 201, 219 (1954).
3 Twentieth Century Music v. Aiken, 422 US 151, 156 (1975).
4 537 US 186, 214-17 (2003).
5 464 US 417, 481, n.34 (1984).
6 Copyright Law Revision Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives Ninety-Fourth Congress, First Session on H.R. 2223, pp. 116-17 (May 7, 1975).
By , March 14, 2011.

A familiar trope of copyright critics is that those involved in creating content — whether record labels, movie studios, or book publishers — are stuck in the past. The challenges facing these industries stem from their refusal to embrace innovation.

The tech industry is especially fond of this trope and seem to have settled on the “buggy whip” as their analogy of choice. A notable example is last August’s statement by Gary Shapiro, president of the Consumer Electronics Association, who said, “Rather than adapt to the digital marketplace, NAB [National Association of Broadcasters] and RIAA act like buggy-whip industries that refuse to innovate and seek to impose penalties on those that do.”

On its face, this claim doesn’t hold up.

As pointed out on Copyright Alliance last week, “the motion picture studios and other members of the creative community are licensing new technology models daily and have embraced an evolving technological landscape to create legal and innovative products and markets.” We have a wealth of different ways to experience content nowadays. The MPAA and RIAA both have pages listing just dozens of legal and convenient examples.

It’s true that people are changing the way they access and consume content, but the transition is gradual and ongoing. Traditional forms of consumptions — terrestrial radio, cable TV, CDs, for example — still make up the majority of how media is experienced. 1Glenn Peoples, Paper Sheds New Light on Music Listening Habits, Billboard, Nov. 3, 2009; Americans Watching More TV Than Ever; Web and Mobile Video up Too, Nielsen Wire, May 20, 2009.  It doesn’t make sense to rush in gutting existing business models for unproven models, models that don’t yet sustain the production of the type of content people love.

In addition, many of the oft-touted suggestions for how the media industries should be adapting have yet to produce substantial returns. According to NPD analyst Russ Crupnick, the past 10 years has seen greater “ubiquity, disaggregation, fragmentation, liberal licensed, disabled DRM, and disinflation” but less growth in music buyers.

Content Industries are not Buggy-whip Makers

On a deeper level, this claim make even less sense.

The buggy-whip analogy comes from an article written by a Harvard Business School professor in the 1960s. 2Randall Stross, Failing Like a Buggy Whip Maker? Better Check Your Simile, New York Times, Jan. 9, 2010. It describes a business that refuses to adapt in the face of technological innovation. When automobiles replaced horse-drawn carriages, buggy-whip manufacturers either had to change their business models or risk obsolescence.

How are content industries like buggy-whip manufacturers? It’s not like they are making something no one wants. People haven’t switched entirely to new forms of entertainment; people haven’t to a large extent embraced alternatives to the content created by traditional industries.

Note that complaints about outdated business models are often not that the RIAA’s and MPAA’s make it difficult for others to create their own music or movies. The complaints largely come from those who want to get the benefits of other people’s content. Service providers and hardware manufacturers certainly recognize the value of this content, they just want more of that value for themselves.

To put it another way, if media industries are making buggy-whips, and buggy-whips are obsolete, why are people pirating buggy-whips?

Piracy is not the Automotive Industry

But even if media industries can be described as buggy-whip industries, it doesn’t follow that copyright infringement is the automobile.

Piracy is not an innovation.

I sometimes wonder if those who compare content creation to the buggy-whip industry and piracy to the automotive industry realize that piracy was around long before the internet. Prior to mp3s and torrents, the record industry faced unauthorized CD and vinyl pressing operations. When the major product of the music industry was sheet music, pirate printers hawked “wretchedly-got-up versions” of popular songs on the streets. And through the centuries, authors and publishers had to contend with reprinters and copyists. The only difference between then and now is that copying is cheaper and more diffuse — a quantitative, rather than qualitative, difference.

But no matter how cheap and easy copying gets, it’s still only copying; no new works are created through piracy.

No doubt, the way people experience media will continue to evolve. Media industries will need to continue to adapt to remain successful. But the comparison between copyright industries and metaphorical buggy-whip manufacturers is inaccurate.

References

References
1 Glenn Peoples, Paper Sheds New Light on Music Listening Habits, Billboard, Nov. 3, 2009; Americans Watching More TV Than Ever; Web and Mobile Video up Too, Nielsen Wire, May 20, 2009.
2 Randall Stross, Failing Like a Buggy Whip Maker? Better Check Your Simile, New York Times, Jan. 9, 2010.
By , March 03, 2011.

How much evidence about the negative effects of online piracy can be ignored?

This week, the Canadian Intellectual Property Council released a report on The True Price of Peer to Peer File-Sharing. The report re-examined Don’t blame the P2P file-sharers: the impact of free music downloads on the purchase of music CDs in Canada, a 2007 report that cast doubts on the link between online piracy and music sales.

Using the same data from the 2007 report, analyst Dr. George Barker found the original conclusions to be incorrect.  Dr. Barker instead discovered:

1. three out of every four respondents said that if P2P were not available they would have purchased some or all of the music; and

2. almost two-thirds of the “hardcore” P2P downloaders (those who indicated in the survey that they acquired music by P2P only) said they would have purchased one-third of the tracks they downloaded if the songs were not available on P2P networks — this amounts to an average expense of $168 per person, adding up to hundreds of millions of dollars in extra revenue for the music industry per year from this group alone.

Based on this data, Dr. Barker concluded “that P2P downloads have strong negative effects on legitimate music purchases” and, contrary to the original analysis of the data, P2P downloading acts as a substitute for legitimate music purchases. Dr. Barker’s analysis infers that stronger copyright laws “would substantially increase music purchases and music industry sales revenues and, by implication, increase artist income and industry employment and contribute to both economic growth and higher government tax revenues in Canada.”

While it’s significant that a closer analysis of the original data reveals entirely different conclusions, this isn’t the first time the conclusions of the original report have been challenged. Noted economist Stan Liebowitz examined the original report’s conclusions when it first came out and found them “not only implausible” but actually “impossible to be true.”

Other studies independently confirm that reducing online piracy leads to increased sales. 1David Blackburn, On-line Piracy and Recorded Music Sales, Working Paper, Harvard University (2004), finding 30% reduction in files available online leads to 10% increase of industry sales in 2003; Kristina Groennings, An Analysis of the Recording Industry’s Litigation Strategy Against Direct Infringers, 7 Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law 389 (2005), finding RIAA’s litigation strategy led to initial decrease in P2P filesharing and increase in album sales in 2003 and 2004 after several years of decline. Taking a broader perspective, one economic study of stock prices found that “current and past efforts by the media industry to check illegal file-sharing over P2P networks through stricter copyright laws and lawsuits against violators have a significant positive impact on expected long-term profitability and economic viability of major media firms. 2Sanjay Goel, Paul Miesing, Uday Chandra, The Impact of Illegal Peer-to-Peer File Sharing on the Media Industry, 52 California Management Review 6 (2010).

The conclusions of the CIPC report — “people buy things they like unless they can get them for free — seem obvious enough not to need studying in the first place. But despite study after study and piles of evidence that show the harmful effects of online piracy, there are those who continue to insist that piracy is not a problem. The arguments are not that this approach or that approach to diminishing piracy is unwise for whatever reason, but that the harm doesn’t even exist in the first place.

Prove It

The academic consensus is that online piracy has had a significant negative effect on music sales. I listed a number of major studies on the issue in a previous post here. Olberholzer-Gee and Strumpf provide a similar table of major academic studies on the effect of online piracy in their paper File-sharing and Copyright (Table 5). Studies since then reveal similar findings; for example, Choi and Kim found that piracy has a negative effect on online music sales in Korea in a 2010 study. 3Dongook Choi & Yeonbae Kim, Effects of Piracy and Digital Rights Management on the Online Music Market in Korea, TEMEP Discussion Paper No. 2010:72 (December 2010). While a handful of studies have argued that online piracy has no effect, or even a positive effect, on music sales — most notably an earlier study by Olberholzer-Gee and Strumpf — these studies are in the minority.

The effect of online piracy on music sales around the world is easy to see. Countries which have improved legal responses to online piracy in the past few years, like South Korea and Sweden, have seen music sales rise. In contrast, countries like Spain and Brazil, where copyright laws are lax or ineffective against digital infringement, have seen music sales fall at a rate above the global average. 4See IFPI Digital Music Report 2011 and IFPI Recording Industry in Numbers 2010.

And ineffective copyright enforcement around the world is not just a concern of major media industries. Jiarui Liu looks at the problem of piracy in emerging markets by examining the music industry in China. While it may seem that copyright enforcement in such countries is only a foreign problem, it turns out that rampant infringement has a profound effect on local artists:

In many cases, piracy of foreign works could be more devastating to domestic companies than to foreign companies. Because the competition from low-priced pirated works both online and offline undercuts stable income from royalties, Chinese musicians have witnessed the entire music industry becoming increasingly dependent on alternative revenue streams such as advertising, merchandizing, and live performance. The pressures of paid appearances and extended tours have started to squeeze the time that artists need to spend on music production. The alternative revenue streams also force many music companies to abandon traditional album contracts and operate in a way more like talent agencies that control all aspects of an artist’s career. Music companies are inclined to sign talents at a very young age with a long-term agency deal in order to exploit the full value of artists in the advertising market. In addition, the need to attract sponsorship opportunities puts more emphasis on non-musical qualities, such as a fresh appearance and healthy public image, which to some extent marginalizes “pure” musicians who have less value in those alternative markets.

Most importantly, as copyright piracy obstructs the communication of consumer preferences to musicians, an increasing number of musical works are created to accommodate the tastes of entrepreneurs (e.g., sponsors and advertisers) rather than those of average consumers, and this has caused a fundamental shift in the creative process of the Chinese music industry. Although entrepreneurs should arguably be willing to take whatever is popular among music fans as a draw to their own products, the expectations of entrepreneurs and consumers do not always meet in a dynamic market setting. For this reason, the interests of less commercial artists and new artists are more likely to be compromised. 5The Tough Reality of Copyright Piracy: A Case Study of the Music Industry in China, 27 Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal 621 (2010).

Commitment to effective intellectual property laws has ripple effects in a nation’s economy beyond the media industries. On Tuesday, attorney Lawrence J. Siskind, writing in The Recorder, asked Has Israel’s Approach to IP Law It Strong? In the article, he attributes some of Israel’s national growth over the past several decades to strengthening its approach to intellectual property. He quotes one report that says, “Israel, by 1990 was still mostly barren of technology and finance. … Israel generated few significant companies or technologies, no significant financial institutions, and little important science.” The country was known for wide-scale piracy at the time. But this changed by the turn of the new century (in part due to trade pressures from the US). “As Israel’s image morphed from IP pirate to IP protector, the country became a magnet for global investment.”

Courts, which are in the business of judging evidentiary claims, recognize the harms of online piracy. For example, the court in A&M Records v. Napster was convinced that “Napster use is likely to reduce CD purchases by college students.” Napster’s expert did not “provide credible evidence that music file-sharing on Napster stimulates more CD sales than it displaces.” Napster also tried to argue that the “sampling” of music its service provided (try-before-you-buy) stimulates retail music sales. The court was still not persuaded, calling the evidence used to support this argument “unreliable” and accepting “that the activity defendant calls sampling actually decreases retail sales of their music.” 6114 F.Supp.2d 896, 910-914 (ND Cali 2000).

Yet, some still find ways to rationalize away the conclusions revealed above.

Yes, But…

These ways include focusing a lot of attention on less-than reliable studies or distorting the literature that is out there.

As mentioned above, one of the favorite studies of the piracy-is-not-a-problem contingent is Olberholzer-Gee & Strumpf’s 2007 paper, The Effect of File Sharing on Record Sales: An Empirical Analysis. But the study looked only at a small period of time (17 weeks at the end of 2002) and uses some curious methodologies (“Our most important instrument  is the number of German secondary school kids who are on vacation in a given week”). Stan Liebowitz has been especially critical of the study, and has published several responses worth a read here, here, here, and here. But the biggest surprise comes from Olberholzer-Gee and Strumpf themselves, who backed off from their earlier claims in a 2010 paper.

Another report widely cited as evidence against the harm of piracy is the US Government Accountability Office’s April 2010 Observations on Efforts to Quantify the Economic Effects of Counterfeit and Pirated Goods. After the release of this report, many declared the debate over the effects of piracy over — most notably a number of interest groups in a full page ad that said “Content Industry Piracy Claims are Bogus.” 7Other examples include an article in Ars Technica titled “US government finally admits most piracy estimates are bogus.” But is that really what the report said?

No. Far from looking at all or even most piracy claims, the report only examined a small percentage of independent reports — and even then, it merely highlighted some of the limitations inherent in those reports. It’s most damning conclusions were aimed at only three government agency figures that have been used — an FBI estimate used in 2002, a CBP estimate also used in a 2002 memo, and an estimate used by the Motor and Equipment Manufacturers Association in 2005 attributed to the FTC. The GAO’s conclusion? It couldn’t substantiate these estimates. The broader takeaway of the GAO report reflects the consensus: piracy has significant negative effects, but it’s difficult to nail down a specific number or dollar figure on the harm caused.

A particularly telling example of distortion can be seen in an article on Torrentfreak, Pirates are the Music Industry’s Most Valuable Customers. The site draws that conclusion from an IFPI commissioned survey carried out by Jupiter Research. Torrentfreak highlights the survey’s results that, compared to music buyers, music pirates are “31% more likely to buy single tracks online, 33% more likely to buy music albums online, 100% more likely to pay for music subscription services, and 60% more likely to pay for music on mobile phone.” That sounds like a big deal until you look at the actual report. There, you’ll see that Torrentfreak played a little numbers game — the percentage of either group of participants to engage in any of these activities is small, so that even a few percentage points difference results in an impressive-sounding “more likely” figure. For example, only 2% of “music buyers” paid for a music subscription service compare to 4% of “music pirates.” Not as impressive when you put it that way.

While that kind of statistical shenanigary might be overlooked, what’s truly misleading is that if you look at the total figures provided by the report, the total music spending by “music pirates” is less than the total of “music buyers” (and every other segment surveyed).

Well What About…

Maybe there are causes besides piracy of decreasing music sales, the final argument goes.

Not so, according to Stan Liebowitz, who has examined data over the past 30 years to arrive at his conclusion. While some factors may have played some role, that role is at best secondary and at the very least only negligible. Nothing else — the general economy, shifts in consumer spending to other forms of entertainment, etc. — has caused as big an impact as the advent of online piracy. The data doesn’t support the idea, and neither do economic theories. 8Liebowitz’s own site summarizes his research in file-sharing and links to his papers on the subject.

Is it possible that piracy has positive benefits? The GAO report considered this question, as have several other studies. Maybe network effects increase the value of copyrighted works. Maybe the “sampling” of digital files that file-sharing allows lead to more purchases.

Again, the consensus among researchers is that any possible positive benefits of piracy are far outweighed by the negative effects. 9Note that these questions of “benefits” are mostly limited to economic benefits. Not addressed in this discussion are the equally, if not more, important personal considerations of creators: their free speech interests and the chilling effect of piracy, to name just two. Going back to Liebowitz, “sampling” is more likely to decrease sales rather than increase them. This seems like common sense if you think about it: if you can “sample” an entire work, over and over again, whenever and wherever you want, why would you ever buy it? Never mind that if piracy’s positive benefits were greater than the negative effects, we wouldn’t be having this debate, since creators and media industries would be doing better rather than worse after a decade of file-sharing.

Most creators don’t need to be convinced that piracy is a problem — the real question is how best to deal with it, whether that involves legal, technological, or business model solutions (or, most likely, some combination of the three). But despite all the evidence about the harms of online piracy, there will still be those who keep believing it is not harming creators and the media industries that invest in them. New research and studies will continue to be ignored or distorted. Alternative theories about piracy will be made that may sound nice, but without evidence to substantiate them, they are mere speculation.

References

References
1 David Blackburn, On-line Piracy and Recorded Music Sales, Working Paper, Harvard University (2004), finding 30% reduction in files available online leads to 10% increase of industry sales in 2003; Kristina Groennings, An Analysis of the Recording Industry’s Litigation Strategy Against Direct Infringers, 7 Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law 389 (2005), finding RIAA’s litigation strategy led to initial decrease in P2P filesharing and increase in album sales in 2003 and 2004 after several years of decline.
2 Sanjay Goel, Paul Miesing, Uday Chandra, The Impact of Illegal Peer-to-Peer File Sharing on the Media Industry, 52 California Management Review 6 (2010).
3 Dongook Choi & Yeonbae Kim, Effects of Piracy and Digital Rights Management on the Online Music Market in Korea, TEMEP Discussion Paper No. 2010:72 (December 2010).
4 See IFPI Digital Music Report 2011 and IFPI Recording Industry in Numbers 2010.
5 The Tough Reality of Copyright Piracy: A Case Study of the Music Industry in China, 27 Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal 621 (2010).
6 114 F.Supp.2d 896, 910-914 (ND Cali 2000).
7 Other examples include an article in Ars Technica titled “US government finally admits most piracy estimates are bogus.”
8 Liebowitz’s own site summarizes his research in file-sharing and links to his papers on the subject.
9 Note that these questions of “benefits” are mostly limited to economic benefits. Not addressed in this discussion are the equally, if not more, important personal considerations of creators: their free speech interests and the chilling effect of piracy, to name just two.
By , January 25, 2011.

On January 19, 2011, members of New York City’s theater community and human rights supporters gathered to mark the one month anniversary of Belarus’ contested presidential election. The election was widely condemned as fraudulent, accompanied by the arrests of many peaceful protesters in Belarus with thousands more beaten.

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Members of the Belarus Free Theatre joined the gathering, having recently wrapped up a show in the City. In Europe’s last dictatorship, the Belarus Free Theatre is illegal. Shows are held in secret, with theater members and audiences subject to arrest. The members are barred from attending state universities or working in state employment. When the Belarus Free Theatre left for New York, they did so in the middle of the night, hidden in car trunks in order to avoid detection by the government. Once in the US, they heard news of their homes being ransacked, and their children being declared orphans — the government considering them “dead to the state.” The members fear arrest once they return to Belarus. 1For more on Belarus and the Belarus Free Theatre, see Zone of Silence; Why Belarus Free Theatre deserves a standing ovation; and Police ‘threatened to rape’ Belarus Free Theatre director after election protest.

Their crime? Performing theater.

That’s censorship.

Enforcing copyright law — whether through DMCA takedown notices, domain  name seizures, etc — is not in the same league. Yet, copyright critics almost reflexively apply the label of “censorship” to any attempt at better protecting the rights of creators.

I’ve written about free speech and copyright several times in the past: noting the sometimes shaky relationship between artistic expression, the first amendment, and copyright; discussing the chilling effect of copyright infringement and the oft-forgotten speech interests of creators; and examining first amendment arguments against COICA and domain name seizures.

Today, I want to put a bookend on these previous discussions of free speech and copyright by looking at some of the broader issues in the debate.

On Censorship

The “copyright as censorship” comparison permeates much of the discussion surrounding free speech and copyright. It’s often noted that early copyright law grew out of press licensing statutes that were passed to both protect proprietary rights of book publishers and allow governments to control seditious publications. The dual purpose of copyright law at the time is probably more coincidental than anything; France, for example, had no copyright law at that time, yet still maintained censorship over the press. 2Visit Voltaire: Voltaire Bio. Nevertheless, copyright law today is completely divorced from any sort of government control over content. If copyright is censorship, it hardly resembles the type of censorship the Belarus Free Theatre faces.

Supreme Court Justice John Marshall Harlan II described what he calls the “typical censorship situation” and its associated dangers in a 1964 dissent:

In the typical censorship situation material is brought as a matter of course before some administrative authority, who then decides on its propriety. This means that the State establishes an administrative structure whereby all writings are reviewed before publication. By contrast, if the State uses its penal system to punish expression outside permissible bounds, the State does not comprehensively review any form of expression; it merely considers after the event utterances it has reason to suppose may be prohibited. The breadth of its review of expression is therefore much narrower and the danger that protected expression will be repressed is less.

…

There are built-in elements in any system of licensing or censorship, the tendency of which is to encourage restrictions of expression. The State is not compelled to make an initial decision to pursue a course of action, since the original burden is on the citizen to bring a piece of writing before it. The censor is a part of the executive structure, and there is at least some danger that he will develop an institutionalized bias in favor of censorship because of his particular responsibility. In a criminal proceeding, however, the burden is on the State to act, the decision-maker belongs to an independent branch of the government, and neither a judge nor a juror has any personal interest in active censorship.

…

One danger of a censorship system is that the public may never be aware of what an administrative agent refuses to permit to be published or distributed. A penal sanction assures both that some overt thing has been done by the accused and that the penalty is imposed for an activity that is not concealed from the public. In this case, the information charged that obscene books were possessed or kept for sale and distribution; presumably such possession, if knowing, could, as a constitutional matter, support a criminal prosecution. The procedure adopted by the State envisions that a full judicial hearing will be held on the obscenity issue. Finally, the federal system makes it highly unlikely that the citizenry of one State will be unaware of the kind of material that is being restricted by its own government when there is great divergence among the policies of the various States and a high degree of communication across state lines. 3Harlan dissent, Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 US 205, 222-24 (1964).

Thankfully, this “typical censorship situation” is largely an anachronism in the US today. It is worth noting some of Harlan’s points about what makes administrative censorship so dangerous to free expression, especially an institutionalized bias in favor of active censorship. Also notable is the distinction between executive censor and criminal proceeding — with less danger of restrictions on expression under the latter. This danger is attenuated further when we’re in a civil proceeding between two private parties, as most copyright infringement cases are.

However, what Harlan doesn’t talk about in this particular passage is the sine qua non of censorship: restricting expression because of disagreement over its content. Government censorship is typically targeted at suppressing politically dissident speech, or obscene and other “inappropriate” speech. This is where copyright as censorship arguments falter. It’s illogical to say that enforcement of piracy is based on a disagreement about the content — a copyright owner agrees completely with the content. 4Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102 (DC Cir 1981), discusses the hypothetical situation of the government using copyright as a pretext for actual censorship. The court said, “Underlying the appellants’ First Amendment assault on the copyright obtained for ‘Equal Justice Under Law’ is their professed concern that the Government may one day attempt to use the copyright law as an instrument of censorship … We are aware that there is at least a theoretical possibility that some copyright laws may be used by some nations as instruments of censorship … We are unaware, however, of any effort on the part of the United States Government to throttle free expression through use of the copyright laws, and we are not inclined to hypothesize such an effort nor to hand down a decision invalidating an act of Congress on that hypothetical basis … We are confident that should the day come when the Government denies someone access to a work produced at its direction on the basis of a copyright, and if the doctrine of fair use and the distinction between an idea and its expression fail to vindicate adequately that person’s interests — although we have no reason to believe that they would — the courts of the United States would on the basis of facts, not hypotheses, consider afresh the First Amendment interests implicated thereby.” Cases of creative or transformative infringement do sometimes present issues where a copyright owner sues to stop a subsequent use she disagrees with, but as we’ll see, the doctrine of fair use provides a safeguard against censorship.

Prior Restraints

Closely related to censorship is the idea of “prior restraints.” In the First Amendment realm, prior restraints — suppression of speech before a final judicial determination that it is unprotected speech — are considered worse than punishment after speech has been made. 5Blackstone defined freedom of the press as freedom solely from prior restraints, “not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published.” Courts consequently take a deeply skeptical look at any type of law or regulation that resembles a prior restraint. This includes preliminary injunctions in civil lawsuits because they are granted only on the basis that speech is likely to be unprotected.

Yet courts routinely award preliminary injunctions in copyright infringement cases. The Supreme Court has even gone so far as to say that “The Congress has authorized a strain of prior restraints against private parties in certain instances … Article I, § 8, of the Constitution authorizes Congress to secure the “exclusive right” of authors to their writings, and no one denies that a newspaper can properly be enjoined from publishing the copyrighted works of another.” 6New York Times v. US, 403 US 713, White concurrence n.1 (1971).

What is it that makes courts treat copyright cases differently than other speech cases? The following excerpt provides a hint:

Moreover, freedom of thought and expression “includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.” We do not suggest this right not to speak would sanction abuse of the copyright owner’s monopoly as an instrument to suppress facts. But in the words of New York’s Chief Judge Fuld:

“The essential thrust of the First Amendment is to prohibit improper restraints on the voluntary public expression of ideas; it shields the man who wants to speak or publish when others wish him to be quiet. There is necessarily, and within suitably defined areas, a concomitant freedom not to speak publicly, one which serves the same ultimate end as freedom of speech in its affirmative aspect.”

Courts and commentators have recognized that copyright, and the right of first publication in particular, serve this countervailing First Amendment value. 7Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 US 539, 559-60 (1985).

First Amendment Opportunism

Before delving into the issue of the First Amendment and copyright, I want to take a quick look at the issue of “First Amendment opportunism.” 8A term coined by Frederick Schauer in First Amendment Opportunism. Free speech is one of the foundations of a democratic society. Censorship, the kind the Belarus Free Theatre faces, is ugly. As we’ll see, the question of whether copyright law adequately accounts for free speech is increasingly being asked, as well it should. But coloring the debate by alleging censorship — comparing the removal of a dancing baby video from a corporate video site to violent suppression of political dissidents — is a damaging use of hyperbole. It both minimizes the horrors of true censorship and paints opponents as evil rather than wrong.

At the same time, such language is merely an outgrowth of First Amendment opportunism in the copyright realm. What do I mean by this?

In some ways, the First Amendment is the “won’t somebody think of the children” of the legal world.

First Amendment scholar Frederick Schauer explains, “[T]he First Amendment, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press provide considerable rhetorical power and argumentative authority. The individual or group gaining the support of the First Amendment often believes, and often correctly, that it has secured the upper hand in public debate. The First Amendment not only attracts attention, but also appears to strike fear in the hearts of many who do not want to be seen as being against it.” Schauer calls this “First Amendment magnetism” and says it “leads strategic actors to gravitate to it as easily as politicians gravitate to the flag, motherhood, and apple pie.”

The magnetic force of the First Amendment generates two distinct phenomena. First, actors in the public arena (defined here to exclude the courts) are likely to rely on the First Amendment in pressing their causes, in the often-justified expectation that doing so will disproportionately, compared to relying on other dimensions of the law, attract allies, generate favorable attention by the press, and arouse the sympathies of other public actors. Second, lawyers representing clients with claims and causes not necessarily lying within the First Amendment’s core or traditional concerns will add First Amendment arguments and claims to their core claims, or will modify their core claims to connect them with First Amendment arguments, all in the hope that doing so will increase the probability of their success. 9Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 Harvard Law Review 1765 (2004).

David McGowan has attributed much of the growing trend in constitutionalizing copyright to this First Amendment magnetism. He notes:

Many copyright scholars object to the way Congress deals with their subject. With good reason, they feel Congress wields a copyright ratchet: terms get longer, and the scope of rights gets wider, but never the reverse. The rare exception occurs when publishers ask Congress to shore up fair use rights to make it easier for authors to get information they need to produce works. On this account, Congress is simply a tool rich media conglomerates use to soak consumers, who are rationally ignorant of the shameless fleecing their “representatives” give them.

It’s no fun beating one’s head against a wall. So if the representative branches sell out, at least by academic standards, their power to do harm must be limited. Two things are needed: a non-representative forum, to limit the power of producer wealth, and a law that trumps Congress’s Article I power to grant exclusive rights to authors. The First Amendment seems like just the thing. Like copyright, it deals with expression, which makes almost any argument facially plausible. More importantly, in a conflict with Congress’s Article I power, the First Amendment trumps. 10David McGowan, Why the First Amendment Cannot Dictate Copyright Policy, 65 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 281 (2004).

This isn’t to say that First Amendment magnetism is the same as naked opportunism, though it’s worth noting that this opportunistic use of free speech shows its head in practice. In 1879, one writer observed that “the ever active demagogue has been able to frame a cry of “free books for free men.” It is wonderful what an amount of things “free” men are entitled to have free. Free books, free and unlimited currency, free support from the State, etc., are supposed to have some connection with free speech, freedom of religion, and free trade, and therefore to be proper and valid cries. 11Book Notices, 391 Yale Literary Journal 287 (April 1879). Courts have called out alleged infringers for “hiding behind the first amendment.” 12Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald’s, 562 F.2d 1157, 1170-71 (9th Cir 1977), referring to Duchess Music Corp. v. Stern, 458 F.2d 1305, 1310-11 (9 Cir. 1972); United States v. Bodin, 375 F.Supp. 1265, 1267-68 (W.D.Okl.1974);McGraw Hill, Inc. v. Worth Publishers, Inc., 335 F.Supp. 415, 422 (S.D.N.Y.1971) and Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, 345 F.Supp. 108 (N.D.Cal.1972). Even free speech critics have made note of a naked First Amendment opportunism. L. Ray Patterson notes that courts have consistently rejected First Amendment defenses in infringement actions but states that “in general, these cases were sound in rejecting the free speech defense as being the last refuge of an infringing scoundrel.” 13Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 Vanderbilt Law Review 1, 36 n.110 (1987).

What we’re talking about here is an opportunism in the nonpejorative sense. Recognizing the existence of this First Amendment magnetism is important when discussing copyright law. The issue is not one of copyright versus free speech, no matter how often it is framed as greedy creators against defenders of the First Amendment.

With that in mind, let’s take a look at the brief history of copyright and the First Amendment.

Copyright and the First Amendment: A Brief History

The US Constitution, which grants Congress the power to “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries,” was completed September 17, 1787. It officially went into effect March 4, 1789. The first federal copyright law, the Copyright Act of 1790, was signed by President Washington on May 31, 1790. The First Amendment was adopted December 15, 1791.

For nearly 200 years, the relationship between the first amendment and copyright law received little if any attention from courts or scholars. This is not entirely surprising if you consider the fact that first amendment free speech jurisprudence as a whole has only emerged within the past hundred years. 14See Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 California Law Review 2353 (2000); but cf. David M. Rabban, Free Speech in its Forgotten Years, Cambridge Univ. Press 1999.

This changed in 1969 when Melville Nimmer asked Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press? 15Melville Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. Rev. 1180 (1969). Two more articles, by Paul Goldstein and Lionel Sobel followed shortly afterward — with Sobel’s article presciently asking about a “gathering storm” between copyright and the first amendment. 16Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 Columbia Law Review 283 (1970); Lionel Sobel, Copyright and the First Amendment: A Gathering Storm?, 19 Copyright Law Symposium (ASCAP) 43 (1971). Over the next several decades, the clouds slowly gathered with occasional articles on the subject. 17Robert Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the Protection of Expression, 67 California Law Review 283 (1979); L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 Vanderbilt Law Review 1 (1987); Diane Zimmerman, Information as Speech, Information as Goods: Some Thoughts on Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights, 33 William & Mary Law Review 665 (1992); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283 (1996). With the enactment of the Copyright Term Extension Act and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act in the late 90s, the storm clouds finally broke; the relationship between copyright and free speech grabbed a lot of attention from scholars. 18See, for example: Mark A. Lemley and Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Copyright Cases, 48 Duke L.J. 147 (1998); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Asserting Copyright’s Democratic Principles in the Global Arena, 51 Vanderbilt Law Review 217 (1998); Eugene Volokh & Brett McDonnell, Freedom of Speech and Independent Judgment Review in Copyright Cases, 107 Yale Law Journal 2431 (1998); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 New York Univ. Law Review 354 (1999); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Market Hierarchy and Copyright in Our System of Free Expression, 53 Vanderbilt Law Review 1879 (2000); Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What Copyright Has in Common with Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance Reform, and Telecommunications Regulation, 42 B.C. L. Rev. 1 (2000); Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability for Subscriber Copyright Infringement, Enterprise Liability, and the First Amendment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1833 (2000); Alan E. Garfield, The First Amendment As a Check on Copyright Rights, 23 Hastings Communication and Entertainment Law Journal 587 (2001); Lawrence Lessig, Copyright’s First Amendment, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 1057 (2001); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 Stanford Law Review 1 (2001); C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 891 (2002); Erwin Chemerinsky, Balancing Copyright Protections and Freedom of Speech: Why the Copyright Extension Act Is Unconstitutional, 36 Loyola Law Review 83 (2002); Jed Rubenfeld, Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 Yale Law Journal 1 (2002); Yochai Benkler, Through the Looking Glass: Alice and the Constitutional Foundations of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173 (2003); Michael D. Birnhack, The Copyright Law and Free Speech Affair: Making-Up and Breaking-Up, Idea: Journal of Law & Technology 43 (2003); William W. Van Alstyne, Reconciling What the First Amendment Forbids with What the Copyright Clause Permits: A Summary Explanation and Review, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 225 (2003); Eugene Volokh, Essay, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts After Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 697 (2003); Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law to Lock Down Culture and Control Creativity (2004); Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104 Columbia Law Review 272 (2004); Rebecca Tushnet, Essay, Copy this Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535 (2004); Timothy Wu, Copyright’s Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278 (2004); Daniel A. Farber, Conflicting Visions and Contested Baselines: Intellectual Property and Free Speech in the “Digital Millennium”, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1318 (2005); Wendy Seltzer, Free Speech Unmoored in Copyright Safe Harbors, Harvard Journal of Law and Technology (2010). Taken as a whole, the academic literature has shown an increased effort at “constitutionalizing” copyright, offering a “free speech critique” of copyright. 19A phrase used by David McGowan in Some Realism About the Free Speech Critique of Copyright, 74 Fordham Law Review 101 (2005).

But despite all this academic attention toward a conflict between copyright and free speech, courts have consistently rejected separate First Amendment defenses in copyright infringement cases. On its face, this point understandably creates confusion; it’s easy to think that copyright is thus corrosive to free speech values. That’s not the case though.

As it turns out, copyright itself incorporates many of the same speech values that the First Amendment does.

Copyright’s Free Speech Values

The Supreme Court has on several occasions described copyright as the “engine of free expression.” By providing incentives to invest in creating and disseminating works, copyright drives new expression and ideas into the public sphere, benefiting everyone. Copyright infringement, especially wholesale piracy, short-circuits these incentives, creating a chilling effect on the creation of new works. Creators also have a continuing speech interest in their works, which copyright helps protect.

Copyright and the First Amendment thus serve many of the same values, just in different ways. They coexist rather than contradict. Lon Sobel explains this coexistence by demonstrating that the two operate in different spheres of influence:

The purpose of the first amendment is to guarantee freedom of expression. As Thomas I. Emerson had indicated, freedom of expression is necessary 1) to assure individual self-fulfillment, 2) to attain the truth, 3) to secure participation by the members of society in social and political decision making, and 4) to maintain a balance between stability and change in society.

Clearly none of these reasons for free expression is violated by the Copyright Act.

Individual self-fulfillment requires that man be free to express the beliefs and opinions he has formed in the process of developing his mind. As Emerson explained, expression is in fact an integral part in the development of ideas. “Hence suppression of … expression is an affront to the dignity of man.”

However, the expression of the beliefs and opinions of another, using the exact words the other used, is not any part of the development of one’s own ideas. True, “‘A dwarf standing on the shoulders of a giant can see farther than the giant himself.'” But any consideration of the ideas of another which is thoughtful enough to provoke new ideas in the mind of the reader, should also be thoughtful enough to enable the reader to restate his own new ideas. Thus, the Copyright Act prohibition of word-for-word copying of another can hardly be thought of as “an affront to the dignity” of the one who would have otherwise copied. The Copyright Act is merely an impediment to the one who would reap where he has not sown.

The attainment of truth depends upon free expression because no person or group can possess all knowledge. Truth is distilled from the volatile mixture of opposing opinions. But the expression of an opinion already expressed by another — in the same words used by that other — adds nothing to the search for truth. It is merely the repetition of an opinion that was already available from its original source. Nor is it an answer to allege that the infringer may be supplying customers the copyright holder was unable to supply. It is freshman economics that supply — to the extent it is variable — will increase to meet the demand.

Since the ascertainment of truth depends upon the consideration of every relevant fact and opinion, it is important that all members of society participate in social and political decision-making. Freedom of expression is necessary in order for people to participate truthfully and fully. Moreover, since, as the Declaration of Independence states, governments derive “their just powers from the consent of the governed,” the governed must have the freedom to express their consent — or lack of it. However, what is important in this regard is the participation of one’s self in the decision-making processes. The man who has expressed and copyrighted his own views has already contributed those views. The government is not further assisted by one who merely parrots that which has already been said. Therefore, copyright laws do not impede any useful participation in the decision-making processes.

[…]

In the sum and substance, the first amendment was designed to encourage and protect the communication of diverse ideas. Copyright laws, protecting as they do only particular expressions, do not conflict with any of the first amendment’s purposes. 20Copyright and the First Amendment: A Gathering Storm?, 19 Copyright Law Symposium (ASCAP) 43, 71-74 (1971).

Copyright’s Internal Handling of Free Speech

If copyright law and the First Amendment coexist, does that mean they never contradict? Of course not. But courts’ handling of First Amendment issues in copyright cases differs from its handling of First Amendment issues in other types of cases.

To understand why, we need to first look a little closer at how courts deal with free speech arguments in general. One District Court provides a little background:

Courts often have spoken of certain categories of expression as “not within the area of constitutionally protected speech” … But such judicial statements in fact are not literally true. All modes of expression are covered by the First Amendment in the sense that the constitutionality of their “regulation must be determined by reference to First Amendment doctrine and analysis.” Regulation of different categories of expression, however, is subject to varying levels of judicial scrutiny. Thus, to say that a particular form of expression is “protected” by the First Amendment means that the constitutionality of any regulation of it must be measured by reference to the First Amendment. 21Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 111 F.Supp.2d 294, 326 (SDNY 2000).

In one sense, all laws or regulations impact free speech to some extent. “[E]very civil and criminal remedy imposes some conceivable burden on First Amendment protected activities,” said the Supreme Court in Arcara v. Cloud Books. 22478 US 697, 706 (1986). “One liable for a civil damages award has less money to spend on paid political announcements or to contribute to political causes, yet no one would suggest that such liability gives rise to a valid First Amendment claim. Similarly, a thief who is sent to prison might complain that his First Amendment right to speak in public places has been infringed because of the confinement, but we have explicitly rejected a prisoner’s claim to a prison environment least restrictive of his desire to speak to outsiders.”

Frederick Schauer points out an important distinction between the “coverage” and the “protection” of the First Amendment. He notes:

Like any legal rule, the First Amendment is not infinitely applicable. Though many cases involve the First Amendment, many more do not. Thus, the acts, events, behaviors, and restrictions not encompassed by the First Amendment at all, that remain wholly untouched by the First Amendment, are the ones we will describe as not being covered by the First Amendment. It is not that the speech (or anything else) is not protected by the First Amendment. Rather, it is that the entire event does not present a First Amendment issue at all, and the government’s action is consequently measured against no First Amendment standard whatsoever. The First Amendment simply does not show up.

When the First Amendment does show up, the full arsenal of First Amendment rules, principles, maxims, standards, canons, distinctions, presumptions, tools, factors, and three-part tests becomes available to determine whether the particular speech will actually wind up being protected. 23The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 Harvard Law Review 1765 (2004).

What sets copyright apart from other “speech” cases — obscenity, libel, “fighting words,” etc. — is that both the coverage and the protection of the First Amendment are handled internally rather than through the panoply of “rules, principles, maxims, standards,” and so on. The two major “built-in free speech safeguards” in copyright law are the idea-expression dichotomy and fair use.

Copyright protection doesn’t cover ideas, only the expression of those ideas. This distinction between ideas and expression has been called a “definitional balance” between free speech and copyright interests — a line between what is covered by the first amendment and what is not. Copyright provides an incentive to create and disseminate expression. By extension, the ideas expressed are also disseminated, benefiting the public. But protection ends where expression ends, and anyone is free to use the ideas in any given work. In a sense, the first amendment protects this “marketplace of ideas” but doesn’t extend to a “right to copy.” 24See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 US 186, 221 (2003): “The First Amendment securely protects the freedom to make — or decline to make — one’s own speech; it bears less heavily when speakers assert the right to make other people’s speeches.” Or, as one court bluntly put it:

We do not find any denial of freedom of expression to the “tape pirate”. What he seeks is not the freedom to express himself artistically or otherwise, but the right to make exact and identical copies of sound recordings produced by others. We fail to see as any protected first amendment right a privilege to usurp the benefits of the creative and artistic talent, technical skills, and investment necessary to produce a single long-playing record of a musical performance. 25US v. Bodin, 375 F.Supp 1265).

The fair use doctrine recognizes that some uses of copyrighted expression without the permission of the copyright owner are beneficial. Prior to the infusion of First Amendment rhetoric into the copyright realm, fair use was seen as an important component in furthering copyright’s constitutional purpose:

There are situations, nevertheless, in which strict enforcement of this monopoly would inhibit the very “Progress of Science and useful Arts” that copyright is intended to promote. An obvious example is the researcher or scholar whose own work depends on the ability to refer to and to quote the work of prior scholars. Obviously, no author could create a new work if he were first required to repeat the research of every author who had gone before him.The scholar, like the ordinary user, of course could be left to bargain with each copyright owner for permission to quote from or refer to prior works. But there is a crucial difference between the scholar and the ordinary user. When the ordinary user decides that the owner’s price is too high, and forgoes use of the work, only the individual is the loser. When the scholar forgoes the use of a prior work, not only does his own work suffer, but the public is deprived of his contribution to knowledge. The scholar’s work, in other words, produces external benefits from which everyone profits. In such a case, the fair use doctrine acts as a form of subsidy — albeit at the first author’s expense — to permit the second author to make limited use of the first author’s work for the public good. 26Sony Corp v. Universal City Studios, 464 US 417, 477-78 (1984); see also Williams & Wilkins v. US, 487 F.2d 1345, 1352-53 (Ct of Claims 1973).

At the same time, fair use has come to be seen as the primary mechanism for resolving any conflicts between free speech and copyright. 27For example: Nihon Keizai Shimbum v. Comline Business Data, 166 F.3d 65 (2nd Cir. 1999); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184, 1188 (5th Cir. 1979); Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 758-59 (9th Cir. 1978). The rationale is much the same. The only difference is a shift in framing the purpose of fair use as upholding first amendment values rather than progress of the useful arts and sciences values.

Think of it this way. the idea-expression distinction sets the boundaries of what is covered by the First Amendment. The question is not whether using another’s expression is “protected” or “unprotected” but rather whether it falls within the First Amendment’s scope at all. Even then, we have long recognized that some uses of expression should be allowed, and that’s where fair use kicks in. Fair use balances the free speech interests of the public and subsequent creator against those of the original creator.

Both these doctrines adequately address first amendment concerns within copyright law. The free speech critique of copyright essentially argues that courts should address these concerns a second time in a separate analysis. But to date, courts have found no need to ask the same question twice.

References

References
1 For more on Belarus and the Belarus Free Theatre, see Zone of Silence; Why Belarus Free Theatre deserves a standing ovation; and Police ‘threatened to rape’ Belarus Free Theatre director after election protest.
2 Visit Voltaire: Voltaire Bio.
3 Harlan dissent, Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 US 205, 222-24 (1964).
4 Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102 (DC Cir 1981), discusses the hypothetical situation of the government using copyright as a pretext for actual censorship. The court said, “Underlying the appellants’ First Amendment assault on the copyright obtained for ‘Equal Justice Under Law’ is their professed concern that the Government may one day attempt to use the copyright law as an instrument of censorship … We are aware that there is at least a theoretical possibility that some copyright laws may be used by some nations as instruments of censorship … We are unaware, however, of any effort on the part of the United States Government to throttle free expression through use of the copyright laws, and we are not inclined to hypothesize such an effort nor to hand down a decision invalidating an act of Congress on that hypothetical basis … We are confident that should the day come when the Government denies someone access to a work produced at its direction on the basis of a copyright, and if the doctrine of fair use and the distinction between an idea and its expression fail to vindicate adequately that person’s interests — although we have no reason to believe that they would — the courts of the United States would on the basis of facts, not hypotheses, consider afresh the First Amendment interests implicated thereby.”
5 Blackstone defined freedom of the press as freedom solely from prior restraints, “not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published.”
6 New York Times v. US, 403 US 713, White concurrence n.1 (1971).
7 Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 US 539, 559-60 (1985).
8 A term coined by Frederick Schauer in First Amendment Opportunism.
9 Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 Harvard Law Review 1765 (2004).
10 David McGowan, Why the First Amendment Cannot Dictate Copyright Policy, 65 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 281 (2004).
11 Book Notices, 391 Yale Literary Journal 287 (April 1879).
12 Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald’s, 562 F.2d 1157, 1170-71 (9th Cir 1977), referring to Duchess Music Corp. v. Stern, 458 F.2d 1305, 1310-11 (9 Cir. 1972); United States v. Bodin, 375 F.Supp. 1265, 1267-68 (W.D.Okl.1974);McGraw Hill, Inc. v. Worth Publishers, Inc., 335 F.Supp. 415, 422 (S.D.N.Y.1971) and Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, 345 F.Supp. 108 (N.D.Cal.1972).
13 Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 Vanderbilt Law Review 1, 36 n.110 (1987).
14 See Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 California Law Review 2353 (2000); but cf. David M. Rabban, Free Speech in its Forgotten Years, Cambridge Univ. Press 1999.
15 Melville Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. Rev. 1180 (1969).
16 Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 Columbia Law Review 283 (1970); Lionel Sobel, Copyright and the First Amendment: A Gathering Storm?, 19 Copyright Law Symposium (ASCAP) 43 (1971).
17 Robert Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the Protection of Expression, 67 California Law Review 283 (1979); L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 Vanderbilt Law Review 1 (1987); Diane Zimmerman, Information as Speech, Information as Goods: Some Thoughts on Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights, 33 William & Mary Law Review 665 (1992); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283 (1996).
18 See, for example: Mark A. Lemley and Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Copyright Cases, 48 Duke L.J. 147 (1998); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Asserting Copyright’s Democratic Principles in the Global Arena, 51 Vanderbilt Law Review 217 (1998); Eugene Volokh & Brett McDonnell, Freedom of Speech and Independent Judgment Review in Copyright Cases, 107 Yale Law Journal 2431 (1998); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 New York Univ. Law Review 354 (1999); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Market Hierarchy and Copyright in Our System of Free Expression, 53 Vanderbilt Law Review 1879 (2000); Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What Copyright Has in Common with Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance Reform, and Telecommunications Regulation, 42 B.C. L. Rev. 1 (2000); Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability for Subscriber Copyright Infringement, Enterprise Liability, and the First Amendment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1833 (2000); Alan E. Garfield, The First Amendment As a Check on Copyright Rights, 23 Hastings Communication and Entertainment Law Journal 587 (2001); Lawrence Lessig, Copyright’s First Amendment, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 1057 (2001); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 Stanford Law Review 1 (2001); C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 891 (2002); Erwin Chemerinsky, Balancing Copyright Protections and Freedom of Speech: Why the Copyright Extension Act Is Unconstitutional, 36 Loyola Law Review 83 (2002); Jed Rubenfeld, Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 Yale Law Journal 1 (2002); Yochai Benkler, Through the Looking Glass: Alice and the Constitutional Foundations of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173 (2003); Michael D. Birnhack, The Copyright Law and Free Speech Affair: Making-Up and Breaking-Up, Idea: Journal of Law & Technology 43 (2003); William W. Van Alstyne, Reconciling What the First Amendment Forbids with What the Copyright Clause Permits: A Summary Explanation and Review, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 225 (2003); Eugene Volokh, Essay, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts After Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 697 (2003); Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law to Lock Down Culture and Control Creativity (2004); Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104 Columbia Law Review 272 (2004); Rebecca Tushnet, Essay, Copy this Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535 (2004); Timothy Wu, Copyright’s Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278 (2004); Daniel A. Farber, Conflicting Visions and Contested Baselines: Intellectual Property and Free Speech in the “Digital Millennium”, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1318 (2005); Wendy Seltzer, Free Speech Unmoored in Copyright Safe Harbors, Harvard Journal of Law and Technology (2010).
19 A phrase used by David McGowan in Some Realism About the Free Speech Critique of Copyright, 74 Fordham Law Review 101 (2005).
20 Copyright and the First Amendment: A Gathering Storm?, 19 Copyright Law Symposium (ASCAP) 43, 71-74 (1971).
21 Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 111 F.Supp.2d 294, 326 (SDNY 2000).
22 478 US 697, 706 (1986).
23 The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 Harvard Law Review 1765 (2004).
24 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 US 186, 221 (2003): “The First Amendment securely protects the freedom to make — or decline to make — one’s own speech; it bears less heavily when speakers assert the right to make other people’s speeches.”
25 US v. Bodin, 375 F.Supp 1265).
26 Sony Corp v. Universal City Studios, 464 US 417, 477-78 (1984); see also Williams & Wilkins v. US, 487 F.2d 1345, 1352-53 (Ct of Claims 1973).
27 For example: Nihon Keizai Shimbum v. Comline Business Data, 166 F.3d 65 (2nd Cir. 1999); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184, 1188 (5th Cir. 1979); Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 758-59 (9th Cir. 1978).
By , January 05, 2011.

“No one would create without monetary incentives.”

Surprisingly, many opponents of copyright firmly believe that the above statement accurately reflects the views of creators and the creative industries—that they think but for copyright, creativity would not exist.

It provides an easy target to knock down: “Clearly, people have created for thousands of years before copyright existed.” The conclusion seems to be that if copyright is not necessary, then it isn’t justified.

Law professor Eric E. Johnson is currently writing a series of posts on “the great fallacy of intellectual property“. He describes this fallacy this way: “The long understood theory for why IP rights are necessary has been that people won’t invent useful technologies or create worthwhile art and literature without having the right to profit from their labors.”

We can call this the “fallacy of intellectual property” fallacy.

It’s a fallacy because it doesn’t accurately state the theory behind copyright. The economic justification for copyright is that it is an incentive to create—not a necessary condition. True, there exists a base level of drive to create knowledge and culture. But, as knowledge and culture are fundamentally important to a democratic society, an incentive to create above and beyond this base level provides significant benefits to that society.

In addition, the “fallacy of intellectual property” fallacy fails to account for an arguably more important function of copyright. Copyright provides an incentive to invest in creation.

“In a private market economy, individuals will not invest in invention or creation unless the expected return from doing so exceeds the cost of doing so — that is, unless they can reasonably expect to make a profit from the endeavor.”1Mark Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 Texas Law Review 989 (1996). Creative works require financial investment. Some, like movies, require more than others, but all works require some level of investment. The inherent risks of investing in creative works makes copyright protection more important. Creative works also require investment in time—not only the time spent creating, but the time a creator spends honing her skills.

How Piracy Harms Investment

First, let’s talk about how online piracy has harmed investment in creative works. I’m focusing mostly on creative intermediaries—book publishers, record labels, film studios, etc. Individuals certainly invest in their own works, but the bulk of investment comes from intermediaries.

Insufficient enforcement of online piracy has led to a reduction in investment of creating new works. The following chart shows how employment in the music industry and new releases both fell at the same time online piracy has grown.

Recorded music shipments and employment of musicians and artists 1999-2009

Additional evidence shows how weak copyright protection reduces investment in new works — harming new and local artists particularly. According to the IFPI’s Digital Music Report 2010:

  • “In Spain, which has one of the highest rates of illegal file-sharing in Europe, sales by local artists in the top 50 have fallen by an estimated 65% between 2004 and 2009;
  • France, where a quarter of the internet population downloads illegally, has seen local artist album releases fall by 60% between 2003 and 2009;
  • In Brazil, full priced major label local album releases from the five largest music companies in 2008 were down 80% from their 2005 level.”

Leveraging Investment

Intermediaries provide much-needed resources and expertise for producing high-quality works. But they perform another function that is just as important: aggregating the risk of producing creative works.

Economists sometimes refer to creative works as “experience goods“. The value of a book, movie, or song is difficult to judge beforehand, unlike other consumer goods. Consumers cannot determine if a particular work will be satisfactory until after they experience it.

Experience goods are thus risky to produce. How risky?

History suggests the risk is quite high. Remarks from several participants in the 1876 Royal Commission on Copyright in the UK cast light on the situation over 130 years ago. One William Smith said that “only one book in four” recoups its expenses, with one Anthony Trollope following up that he had heard from two separate publishers that “not one book in nine has paid its expenses.”2Minutes of the Evidence Taken Before the Royal Commission on Copyright.

These percentages hold true today. In the music industry, only about one in ten record albums sell enough copies to break even on expenses.3“Most RIAA members report that less than 10% of their releases are profitable”, David Baskerville, Music Business Handbook and Career Guide, pg. 339 (Sage, 2006); “A 1980 Cambridge study showed … approximately 84 percent of record albums failed to sell the allotted amount in order to break even”, Patrice L. Johnson, Are Black Entertainers More Likely to Receive Unfair Contract Agreements Than Their White Counterparts? Independent study, 1998. Film is similar—perhaps even worse. One economist has calculated that less than 3% of independent films produced break even.

Yet, creative industries can thrive under these conditions with appropriate copyright protections. And those intermediaries that do build sustainable businesses continue to invest in the next generation of creative works.

According to the IFPI, record labels reinvest around 30% of revenues into developing and marketing artists—$5 billion a year globally:

Recording contracts typically commit artists and labels to work together to produce a series of albums. Artists benefit from heavy upfront investment that would be difficult to secure elsewhere and record labels have the opportunity to recoup their outlay over a period of time.

Achieving commercial hits is the basis of the “circle of investment”, by which music companies plough back the revenues generated by successful campaigns to develop new talent and help fund the next generation of artists.

Continually investing in new talent is a hugely risky business, as only a minority of the artists developed by music companies will be commercially successful in a highly competitive market. Estimates on the commercial success ratio of artists vary between one in five and one in ten.

By aggregating risks, intermediaries—record labels, book publishers, film studios—can leverage their profits on hits toward the creation of a wider variety of new works. The 10 or 20 per cent of projects that break even help fund the creation of the 80 to 90 per cent of projects which don’t. This benefits niche works, works without mainstream appeal, and new creators who have not yet gained an audience.

Cultivating Genius

The expenses of creation include not just money but time too. Writing a book—especially fiction—doesn’t involve much of a financial burden. But it does take a good deal of time—time that is in short supply for many.

More importantly, time is needed for developing creative skills. While people may have some level of natural talent, few if any are born fully-realized artists. Pop economist Malcolm Gladwell famously said it takes 10,000 hours to master a skill.4Check out Ericsson, Roring & Nandagopal, Giftedness and Evidence for Reproducibly Superior Performance: An Account Based on the Expert Performance Framework, 18 High Ability Studies 3 (2007), for some of the research behind Gladwell’s claim.

In Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith writes:

And thus the certainty of being able to exchange all that surplus part of the produce of his own labour, which is over and above his own consumption, for such parts of the produce of other men’s labour as he may have occasion for, encourages every man to apply himself to a particular occupation, and to cultivate and bring to perfection whatever talent or genius he may possess for that particular species of business.

Copyright provides that certainty that encourages the investment of time to cultivating creative talents.

The alternative—relying only on innate motivation to drive development of creative talents—is not as attractive to a society that values creativity and culture. British historian Thomas Babington Macaulay recognized this as long back as 1841.

You cannot depend for literary instruction and amusement on the leisure of men occupied in the pursuits of active life. Such men may occasionally produce compositions of great merit. But you must not look to such men for works which require deep meditation and long research. Works of that kind you can expect only from persons who make literature the business of their lives. Of these persons few will be found among the rich and the noble. The rich and the noble are not impelled to intellectual exertion by necessity. They may be impelled to intellectual exertion by the desire of distinguishing themselves, or by the desire of benefiting the community. But it is generally within these walls that they seek to signalise themselves and to serve their fellow-creatures. Both their ambition and their public spirit, in a country like this, naturally take a political turn. It is then on men whose profession is literature, and whose private means are not ample, that you must rely for a supply of valuable books.

And this idea continues to be recognized today:

It has been said that people would create entertainment without being paid to do so, and I have no doubt some would. But everyone has to buy groceries and pay the rent. So the universe of those who would create for free would be limited to amateurs and the independently wealthy. Unless we’d be satisfied with their meager output, we need some way to provide financial incentives that permit people to create entertainment professionally, for a living.5Lionel Sobel, Why the Digital Piracy War has to be Fought, November, 2002, DGA Magazine.

Again, notice no one is saying that without copyright, no one would invest in developing their talents in creative fields. What’s being said is that because of the “public goods” nature of expressive works, the amount of people able to make that investment is limited without copyright.

The copyright incentive increases the ability of creators to invest time in perfecting their skills, allowing a wider range of voices to be heard and a higher quality of works created.

Journeyman Hierarchy

Now consider all the ancillary skills that go into producing creative works: the skills of book editors, recording engineers, film crews. Copyright industries in the US employ millions of people beyond what we would consider “primary” creators. Yet their skills, and their mastery of those skills, are just as vital to creating high-quality works.

The idea that innate motivations to create are sufficient to ensure an optimal level of high-quality creative works fails to take into account these ancillary roles. They require even more of an incentive to invest in their development.

A system that protects the rights of creators also supports the ability of those outside the limelight to perfect and master their skills.

In an interview with Chris Castle at Music Technology Policy, Songwriters Guild of America president Rick Carnes calls this a “journeyman hierarchy”, and talks about how it results in higher quality works. He uses the example of Spike Lee, who began with a student film. Based on that success, he was able to get funding for his next film and begin a career as a filmmaker. Along the way, actors such as Denzel Washington got their start and behind-the-scenes workers developed their skills. This continual cycle is what creates the “next generation of art.”

Carnes notes that great films and great music delve into ideas that inspire and challenge. Professionals create these types of works better than anyone else because it’s their job; they do it day in and day out, giving up a great deal of their lives to do so. But if copyright is not properly enforced, than people cannot get a return on their investment; if people cannot get a return on their investment, they’re less likely to invest in the next generation of art.

Bad Literature Drives Out Good

Creators have a variety of incentives to create besides those provided by copyright. The “fallacy of intellectual property” assumes that, in the absence of copyright, these other incentives would ensure a sufficient supply of high caliber works of knowledge and culture. This assumption, however, is doubtful.

“Without copyright protection,” write William Landes and Richard Posner, “there would be increased incentives to create faddish, ephemeral, and otherwise transitory works because the gains from being first in the market for such works would be likely to exceed the losses from absence of copyright protection.”6An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 Journal of Legal Studies 325, 332 (1989). Think more “Reality TV”, less Mad Men. More remakes and sequels, less original works.

History shows this principle in action. In Piracy: The Intellectual Property Wars from Gutenberg to Gates, Adrian Johns describes the experience in France during the French Revolution:

Briefly, after 1789 the revolutionaries wanted to see enlightenment spread from Paris by its own natural force. They therefore abolished literary property … What ensued was an experiment in whether print without literary property would help or hinder enlightenment … This was a revolutionary utopianism of the commons … But as utopias do, it turned rotten. The craft of printing did expand rapidly—the number of printers quadrupled—but what it produced changed radically too. The folio and the quarto were dead. Reprints became legitimate, then dominant … [Printers] employed whatever secondhand tools they could lay their hands on, worked at breakneck speed with whatever journeymen they could get, and ensured a rapid turnover by issuing newspapers and tracts with an immediate sale. What books were still published were largely compilations of old, prerevolutionary material. In other words, a literary counterpart to Gresham’s Law took hold, and the triumph of the presses grises led to disaster.7Pg. 53, University of Chicago Press, 2009.

Investment of time and money in creators and their works leads to a wider variety and higher quality of expression that enriches all our lives. Copyright, when it is properly enforced, provides an incentive to make that investment.

References

References
1 Mark Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 Texas Law Review 989 (1996).
2 Minutes of the Evidence Taken Before the Royal Commission on Copyright.
3 “Most RIAA members report that less than 10% of their releases are profitable”, David Baskerville, Music Business Handbook and Career Guide, pg. 339 (Sage, 2006); “A 1980 Cambridge study showed … approximately 84 percent of record albums failed to sell the allotted amount in order to break even”, Patrice L. Johnson, Are Black Entertainers More Likely to Receive Unfair Contract Agreements Than Their White Counterparts? Independent study, 1998.
4 Check out Ericsson, Roring & Nandagopal, Giftedness and Evidence for Reproducibly Superior Performance: An Account Based on the Expert Performance Framework, 18 High Ability Studies 3 (2007), for some of the research behind Gladwell’s claim.
5 Lionel Sobel, Why the Digital Piracy War has to be Fought, November, 2002, DGA Magazine.
6 An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 Journal of Legal Studies 325, 332 (1989).
7 Pg. 53, University of Chicago Press, 2009.